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The Constitutionality of Business
Regulation in the Burger Court:
Revival and Restraint
By ScoTT M. REzNICK*
The Burger Court is now revitalizing constitutional limits on the
government's power to regulate private market business activities. It
has given new meaning to the constitutional attributes of private property. It has revitalized atrophied constitutional provisions and discovered new applications for limitations not previously used to restrain
economic regulation. Furthermore, it has established intermediate
levels of scrutiny to balance the competing constitutional claims of private economic interests and the public welfare.
To restrain the regulatory authority of the legislative and executive
branches, the Burger Court has used its own constitutionally-derived
political authority. After its long inertia, this reemergence of judicial
activism is of contemporary political significance. While government
regulation of business has proliferated, contemporary political opinion
has questioned the ability of such regulation to promote the general
welfare.' The Supreme Court has the constitutional discretion to
check, balance, and prevent this increase in regulation. Constitutional
*

Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Camden. A.B., 1968, Brandeis

University; J.D., 1973, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to
thank Adjunct Professor Steven Goodman, and Steven Singer, Frank Corrado, John Marley, and Robert Hoffman, students at Rutgers, for their assistance in researching and editing
this Article.
1. "Regulatory reform... strikes a sympathetic chord in all Americans who have
watched with dismay the accelerating transition from representative democracy to government by distant public administration. Modern government at all levels has extended its
reach and strengthened its grasp. Countless social and economic decisions once in the province of the market or of individual choice are now decisively influenced by government
agencies and employees. Even calculated by primitive methodologies, the costs are immense
[A]n otherwise inexplicable alliance has arisen between the free enterprise right and
the 'small is beautiful' left. Populists championing economic autonomy or civil liberties can
be equally comfortable with the implicit promises of the otherwise time-worn battle cry of
'regulatory reform.' Impressionistic evidence suggests that the great American center shares
this growing disenchantment with governmental intrusiveness." Frobnmayer, Regulatory
Refomr" A Slogan in Search of Substance, 66 A.B.A.J. 871 (July, 1980). See CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BusINEss, THE COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION

(1977).
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history, however, contains many examples of the abuse of judicial discretion to declare unconstitutional legislative and executive determinations of regulatory policy. 2 Thus, the expansion of judicial authority
itself raises issues of political concern. As the Burger Court revitalizes
its discretion and extends the reach of its authority, the risk increases
that the Court will ignore the mistakes of its predecessors, succumb to
the allure of power, and overreach its institutional limitations.
This Article seeks to illuminate the Burger Court's methods of assessing the constitutionality of business regulation. 3 The Burger Court
has developed a manageable and relatively consistent analytical methodology, rooted in prevailing political economic values, to establish its
view of the constitutional relationship between private property and the
public welfare. 4 This Article proceeds in four sections. The first sec2. See cases cited in note 228 infra.
3. The business regulation cases examined in the Article share three essential characteristics. They involve (1) the constitutional assessment of (2) the scope of regulatory
power, and (3) they define economic rights that originate in and arise from private market
activities. That is, they involve "traditional" or "old" property. The "entitlement" and
"government employment" cases, in which economic expectations are predicated upon government largesse under the spending power, are not examined. See notes 274-75 & accompanying text infra.
One line of cases that share the appropriate characteristics is not included. The Burger
Court has used the equal protection clause to scrutinize laws that allegedly discriminate
against black Americans seeking equal opportunity in the private marketplace. See, e.g.,
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 101 S. Ct. 2211 (1981); City of Memphis v.
Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1589 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Race is a characteristic of unique importance and historical significance in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Its analytical impact
places these cases in an independent doctrinal category from which generalization about the
constitutional scope of economic regulation may not be drawn. While of obvious legal,
economic, and political significance, they have, with reluctance, been excluded from this
Article. See generaly Karst & Horowitz, Bakke Opinions andEqual Protection Doctrine, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 7 (1979); Stone, Equal Protection in SpecialAdmissions, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 719 (1979); Tribe, Perspectiveson Bakke: Equal Protection,ProceduralFairness,
or StructuralJustice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites o/Passage: Race, the
Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979); Wright, Color-Blind
Theories and Color-ConsciousRemedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1980).
4. This normative issue has been widely discussed in the literature. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968); Choper, The Supreme Court and the PoliticalBranches,Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810 (1974); McClesky, JudicialReview
in a Democracy. A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354 (1966); Symposium-Judicial
Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Van Alstyne, 4 CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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tion sets forth an interdisciplinary, legal-political-economic methodology for describing and evaluating the Burger Court's business
regulation opinions. Each of the following sections explores constitutional property rights of a particular nature. The second section examines the Court's protection of market prerequisites: the right to exclude
and the reliance interest. The Article next analyzes the private rights
that are preconditions to competitive efficiency: the right to market information and the right to enter the market, including the right to remain in the market and the right to enter interstate markets. The final
section reviews the cases in which regulation has attempted to ameliorate market failures. These decisions have conferred constitutional dimension on the right to externalize and the right to consume common
pool resources.
An Interdisciplinary Methodology
The United States has a mixed economy: elements of government
control are intermingled with elements of private activity in the organization of production and consumption.5 This mixed market system is
predicated upon several assumptions about public and private legal
and economic behavior. Two principal assumptions are that people
want more than is available6 and that individual control over available
7
resources will permit these wants to be satisfied as fully as possible.
Individuals cooperate or compete for scarce resources for their personal
8
satisfaction; ultimately, this benefits the aggregate welfare of society.
Given available resources, the mixed market system should enhance
society's welfare by reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of
economic activity. When the system allocates those costs and benefits
efficiently, society's welfare is enhanced. The mixed market system
also distributes costs and benefits. When aggregate welfare is distributed, however, individuals may find their share of benefits too small
and their burden of costs too great. Other forms of individual economic behavior, perhaps less beneficial to the aggregate welfare, would
more significantly enhance personal welfare. Scarcity and the mixed
5.

P. SAMUELsON, EcoNoMics 48 (10th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as SAMUELSoN].

6.

A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 12-13

(1969) [hereinafter cited as ALCHIAN & ALLEN].
7. Resources might also be managed by the community or by the state. The literature
examining the costs and benefits of the various ownership systems is vast and beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Furubotn and Pejovich, 7he State and PropertyRights.
Assignnents, in THE EcONOMIcs OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 167 (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds.
1974).
8. ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 12.
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market's means of allocating and distributing available resources can
thus create a tension between individual economic behavior and the

optimal aggregate economic welfare.
In the mixed market system, both the law and the private marketplace have essential roles to fulfill.9 Private economic interests are recognized and defined by the law and given value by the marketplace.' 0
Only in combination do legal and market systems allocate scarce resources in ways that optimize welfare. A failure in the legal-economic
interaction may cause the costs of an activity to exceed its benefits and
9. "In the real world ... the regulations pertaining to property are crucially important in determining the welfare potentialities of the system; as the elementary general equilibrium model suggests, property rights assignments exert systemwide influence on the
allocation of resources, the composition of output, the distribution of income, etc."
Furubotn & Pejovich, Introduction: The New PropertyRights Literature,in THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as

Furubotn & Pejovich Introduction]. See generally ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6; EcoNOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS (H. Manne ed. 1975); THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (E.
Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds. 1974); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as POSNER]; G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975); Cheung, Private PropertyRights and Sharecropping,76 J. POL. ECON. 1107

(1968); Cheung, Transactions Costs, Risk A version, and the Choice of ContractualArrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I
(1960); Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11
(1964); Demsetz, Some Aspects of PropertyRights, 9 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1966); Demsetz, TowardA Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967); Demsetz, Wealth Distribution andthe Ownership ofRights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972); Landes & Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Peltzman, Toward a More GeneralTheory
of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Posner, Observation: The Economic Approach to
Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757 (1975); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON.
AND MANAGEMENT SCI. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Process of Economic Regulation, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (1972); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. AND

MANAGEMENT SCI. 3 (1971); Symposium-Changein the Common Law. LegalandEconomic
Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980); Veljanovski, The Economic Approach to Law- A
CriticalIntroduction, 7 BRIT. J.L. & Soc. 158 (1980); Weinrib, Utilitarianism,Economics, and
Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307 (1980); Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics:
The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
10. Individuals trade with one another to enhance their own and society's economic
welfare. Through its auction system, the marketplace gives value to the private economic
interests available for trade. Economic value is ordinarily expressed in terms of money.
Thus, a principal function of the market is to establish and maintain a pricing mechanism.
Through its prices, the market provides information about consumer preferences. As the
demand for a particular good increases, its price rises. Resources will then be redirected to
its production, new producers will enter the market and output will expand. Eventually, the
quantity of the good demanded will equal the quantity supplied and competitive efficiency
will have been achieved. Consumer preferences will have been satisfied, the benefits of
trade realized by consumers and producers alike and society's general economic welfare
enhanced. See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 5, at chs. 4, 20.
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thereby unnecessarily decrease the aggregate welfare. It may also
cause an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits.
According to contemporary political economic theory, the principal function served by the law in the mixed market system is to specify
the attributes of ownership in economic interest, that is, to define rights
in property. In theoretical terms, property may be defined as the sanctioned behavioral relations among people that arise from the existence
and scarcity of resources and that pertain to control over the costs and
benefits of their use, consumption, and exchange in an attempt to maximize welfare." The law grants society's sanction only to particular behavioral relationships. When government regulates economic
behavior, it simultaneously specifies the attributes of private property.
The law defines and regulates private property in three principal
ways:' 2 it establishes and enforces the market prerequisite right of exclusion, it maintains the market conditions necessary for competitive
efficiency, and it mitigates "market failures." The law sanctions an
owner's right to exclude others from enjoying the benefits of his or her
labor. The right to exclude gives an owner the ability to use and consume his or her resources or to enter into enforceable exchanges of
them for resources held by another. Without the capacity to use, consume or exchange, an owner will have little expectation of deriving personal satisfaction from his or her resources and little incentive to
produce or trade them in order to increase that satisfaction.' 3 The law
also regulates the conditions necessary for competitive efficiency. It
regulates the flow of market information concerning the quality and
11. "Property rights are understood as the sanctionedbehavioralrelations among men
that arise from the existence of goods and pertain to their use. These relations specify the
norms of behavior with respect to goods that each and every person must observe in his
daily interactions with other persons, or bear the cost of non-observance." Furubotn &
Pejovich Introduction,supra note 9, at 3.
12. Government, through its taxing and spending laws, fulfills an additional fundamental economic function: it provides public goods and services. The right to exclude is
essential to the functioning of the auction system that is the private marketplace. Certain
kinds of goods and services, however, are not susceptible to exclusion; it is impossible to
prevent other people from enjoying the benefits of their ownership. For example, an individual's consumption of the nation's nuclear capability, that is, nuclear protection, does not
reduce the amount of protection that another is able to enjoy. The benefits of consumption
are "nonrival." One cannot prevent another from consuming nuclear deterrent. There is no
reason, therefore, for an individual to pay for the protection. Government must coercively
require payment by levying taxes. See generaly R. MuSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE ch. 3 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MUSoRAVE &
MUSGRAvE]. The scope of this Article is limited to government control over the marketplace through regulatory processes. It does not examine issues of taxation and expenditure.
13. See notes 44-48 infra.
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price of goods and services available for trade. 14 Through its licensing
powers, the government exercises significant control over access to the
market by producers and consumers.1 5 In addition, the law alleviates
the costs of "market failures." The operation of competitive markets
may not optimize the aggregate welfare available from existing resources. The costs and benefits derived from economic activities are
not always borne exclusively by the actors.' 6 Externalities may exist.
Private costs and benefits may differ from social costs and benefits. Individuals other than the actual producers and consumers may incur
some of the costs or enjoy some of the benefits arising from the activity.
The law attempts to internalize these cost and benefit externalities by
7
rearranging legal rights and responsibilities through regulation.'
The benefits of regulation ordinarily exceed its costs. When costs
exceed benefits, however, the regulation in question is inefficient.
When costs and benefits are distributed disproportionately, the regulation may be inequitable. The United States Constitution contains our
society's most fundamental political proscriptions for determining
when a regulation is inefficient and, particularly, when the resultant
distribution of costs and benefits is inequitable. Constitutional mandates identify the private regulatory costs and benefits that may be of
constitutional dimension and provide the means by which they may be
weighed and balanced against the public benefits of regulation. Constitutional ideals determine the extent of government's political intervention in private economic activities and provide the checks and balances
needed to restrain the exercise of regulatory power.
Constitutional proscriptions are rendered relevant to prevailing social, economic, and political conditions by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court gives constitutional ideals contemporary meaning by
establishing a normative balance of constitutionally relevant regulatory
costs and benefits. The Court, however, is not the only institution of
American government that balances regulatory costs and benefits.
Political authority over questions of regulatory policy is divided among
the three branches of government. The political economic relationship
between the private market and the public welfare is defined by the
14. See note 125 infra.
15. See note 126 infra.
16. See notes 405-06 infra.
17. "'Internalizing' such external effects refers to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons. A
primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities." Demsetz, Towarda Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 348 (1967).
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legislature that enacts a regulation and the executive that enforces it.
The Supreme Court, therefore, is an institution with a limited political
role and circumscribed discretion. Its responsibility is to ensure that
the economic policies of the legislative and executive branches do not
contravene constitutional ideals. When the Court exercises its authority to check and balance the legislative and executive branches, it must,
therefore, respect the separation of powers. As the appointed court of
final appeal in a democratic society, it must be especially circumspect
in its exercise of discretion. Moreover, as a court of limited jurisdiction,1 8 it must not extrapolate broad judicial policy from the limited
facts of the case or controversy before it.
The Court resolves the tension between its responsibility to balance the legislative and executive branches and its limited institutional
role by determining the substantive breadth and analytical depth of its
constitutional review. When defining the constitutional attributes of
property and specifying the standards of review and levels of scrutiny
available for their protection against regulatory encroachment, the
Court both exercises its political and economic discretion and shows
respect for the policy judgments of the legislative and executive
branches. Manageable and consistent methods of analysis permit the
Court to exercise its discretion with restraint. Moreover, judicial predictability itself enhances society's economic welfare. 19
The Constitutionality of Economic Regulation
Historically, the Court has responded to the prevailing political
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
19. "It is also true that the sharpness of specification of property rights and their development over time affect welfare. The logic of competition (i.e., the heeding of alternative
uses) indicates that a more complete and definite specification of individual property rights
diminishes uncertainty and tends to promote efficient allocation and use of resources. Dynamic questions are more complex. At this stage, the way in which the specification process
unfolds is not entirely clear, nevertheless, it seems plausible to say that either a reduction of
the costs of transaction, or an increase in the value of a given commodity will result in fuller
specification of property rights in that commodity and, hence, in an improvement in the
accuracy of private accounting calculations." Furubotn & Pejovich Introduction, supra note
9, at 6. "A capitalist system is aided by cheap transferability and exclusivity of rights to
physical use of human and nonhuman goods. When these rights do not prevail, or are
'expensive' to define or exchange, the market exchange system fails. Other forms of competition for determining uses of goods dominate." ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 161.
The goal of this Article, restated in terms of political economic theory, is to describe the
dynamic process by which the United States Supreme Court affects economic welfare by
specifying constitutional property rights with varying degrees of sharpness or ambiguity.
Analytical consistency tends to sharpen that specification, reduce uncertainty and inefficiency and, therefore, enhance the general economic welfare.
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opinion on the propriety and effectiveness of regulation in its resolution
of the tension between its constitutional responsibilities and its institutional role. Shifts in the prevailing political consensus have resulted in
reevaluations of the breadth and depth of the Court's authority. The
opinions of the Burger Court represent only the latest such
reevaluation.
From 1868 to 1905,20 the Court's discretion over regulatory authority was in its formative doctrinal years. 2 ' Initially hesitant,22 the

Court began to develop the capacity for constitutional review inherent
in the newly promulgated due process clause. The permissible purpose-rationality of relationship test was developed, 23 and liberty to contract was defined as a constitutional right. 24 Nevertheless, in weighing
and balancing regulatory costs and benefits, the Court ordinarily de-

ferred to legislative judgment: "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."2 5 In
response to burgeoning industrialization and urbanization, the scope of
26
regulatory authority was expanded.
From 1905 to 1933, the doctrine of substantive due process was in
its heyday. The Court exercised extensive political authority over eco20. The just compensation, contract, and commerce clauses provided the Court with
jurisdiction over matters of regulatory power prior to 1868. The Court's principal just compensation clause case, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), was,
however, decided shortly after the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. The Court's
contract clause cases included Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). The commerce clause was relied upon in The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504
(1847); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. See generally R. Morr, DUE PROCESS OF LAw 337-42 (1926); Cushman, The Social
and Economic Interpretation of the FourteenthAmendment, 20 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741-53
(1922); Strong, The Economic Philosophyof Lochner: Emergence, EmbrasureandEmasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 419, 422-26 (1973).
22. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
23. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). See note 226 infra.
24. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See note 231 infra.
25. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); see also Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380
(1895); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888): "The power which the legislative
has to promote the general welfare is very great, and the discretion which that department of
the government has, in the employment of means to that end, is very large."
26. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906): "We hold
that the police power of a State embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public
health, the public morals or the public safety." See also Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318
(1907); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,
31 (1885).
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nomic policy: "[F]reedom of contract is. ..the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge
it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances." 27
This judicial attitude reflected the prevailing laissez faire economic philosophy. Property rights were given preferred constitutional status.
The Court was not restrained by institutional deference to the legislative and executive branches. Nonetheless, it did not frequently exercise
its discretion to the fullest extent.2 8 The political, institutional, and analytical consequences of those few occasions on which unrestrained discretion was exercised, however, have been of historic significance. 29
These examples of the Court's potential for abusing its discretion illustrate the necessity of judicial restraint.
The New Deal era, 1933 to 1940, was a time of transition for both
the nation and the Court. The Depression radically altered the prevailing political consensus, and increased government involvement in a
chaotic private marketplace gained widespread acceptance. The
Court's laissez faire attitudes evolved into a more evenhanded approach: "Equally fundamental with a private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest." 30 Although economic interests
were no longer preferred, they were still afforded constitutional protection. The political authority of the New Deal Court was active but
3
restrained. '
Following the New Deal transition, the Court adopted an attitude
of extreme deference to legislative and executive determinations of regulatory policy: "[Wihen the legislature has spoken, the public interest
has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. .

.

. The concept of

the public welfare is broad and inclusive. '3 2 From 1940 to 1969, the
Court subordinated its constitutional authority to the economic policy
judgments of the legislative and executive branches. It narrowly construed the Court's institutional role and capabilities. Substantive analysis suffocated under the weight of virtually irrebuttable presumptions
in favor of the constitutionality of regulation.33 The power of the legis27. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
28. See note 227 infra.
29. See note 228 infra.
30. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,523 (1934); see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding
legislation prohibiting interstate shipment of "filled" milk); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state's minimum wage law for women).
32. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); see also Village of Belie Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See notes 455-58 & accompanying text infra..
33. See note 234 infra.
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lative branch to intervene in private market affairs was virtually unchecked by constitutional limitations. Regulation proliferated.
The history of the Court's attempts to resolve the tension between
its political authority and its institutional role reveals shifts from one
analytical extreme to another. Both extremes were abuses of the
Court's constitutionally derived and mandated political authority. The
abdication of checks and balances authority from 1940 to 1969 was as
much an abuse of judicial discretion as were the excesses of review dur34
ing the heyday of substantive due process.
The Burger Court: Revival and Restraint
The Burger Court has attempted to exercise its constitutional discretion over regulatory policy with evenhanded restraint. Its analysis
ordinarily has been manageable and consistent; its decisions and rationales generally have been predictable. The constitutional protections
currently granted to private economic interests, and the concomitant
limitations on the government's authority to regulate them, have resulted from methods of analysis that reflect an awareness of the Court's
checks and balances responsibilities and the limits upon its institutional
role. Triggered by the nature and importance of the property right alleging infringement, the analytical interaction between the Court's definition of constitutional property, its standards of review, and its levels
of scrutiny reveals that the Burger Court is aware of both the lessons of
history and the reality of today's social, economic, and political
conditions.
The analytical methodology of the Burger Court's constitutional
assessment of business regulation ordinarily has followed the permissible purpose-rationality of relationship model originally developed to
apply the mandates of substantive due process. While the Court has on
occasion scrutinized the legitimacy of the legislature's purpose, it has
ordinarily limited itself to an examination of the likelihood that the
means of implementing the purpose will produce the desired public
benefits without also producing excessive or disproportionately distributed regulatory costs to constitutionally protected private economic interests. As an analytical adjunct to rationality of relationship-means
34. "[Tlhe error of decisions like Lochner v. New York lay not in judicial intervention
to protect 'liberty' but in a misguided understanding of what liberty actually required in the
industrial age. The authority and the duty of judges, as well as legislators and executive
officials, to seek a better understanding and to enforce it in accord with their constitutional
oaths, were undiminished by the constitutional revolution of 1937." L. TIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 564 (1978) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
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scrutiny, the Court also has questioned the availability of alternative,
less costly means of producing the desired regulatory benefits.
The nature and importance of the economic interest in issue have
been the principal analytic values controlling the Court's use of its discretion. The nature of the economic interest first determines the availability of constitutional review. The Court has conferred constitutional
dimension on only some of the attributes of private property; protection of other economic expectations, not deemed "constitutional property,"' 35 has been left to legislative and executive discretion. The nature
of the economic right then dictates the applicable standards of review.
Only certain public and private regulatory costs and benefits arising
from the conflict between constitutional property rights and the public
welfare have been the subject ofjudicial review. The importance of the
property right has determined the Court's degree of deference to legislative and executive judgments of regulatory policy. When the alleged
infringement is upon important rights, the Court has relied upon presumptions against the constitutionality of the regulation. Presumptions
favoring validity have been used when less significant rights are in issue. Four such levels of scrutiny have been used. Together, nature and
importance have given constitutional content to the Burger Court's
analysis of economic regulation. It thus has avoided the abuse of its
inescapable discretion over regulatory policy.
The nature of the economic interest in issue has determined the
breadth of the Court's political discretion. It has established the constitutional provision, or vehicle, under which the Court has conferred
constitutional dimension upon the economic interest in issue and identified the regulatory costs and benefits relevant to constitutional scrutiny. Eight such provisions have been relied upon: the just
compensation clause, 36 the contract clause,37 the first amendment, 38 the
commerce clause, 39 the privileges and immunities clause, 40 the equal
protection clause, 4 ' procedural due process, 42 and substantive due process.43 Only those private economic interests that have been deter35. See note 69 infra.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See notes 52-100 & accompanying text infra.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See notes 101-123 & accompanying text infra.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See notes 129-218 & accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 309-85 & accompanying text infra.
39. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cL 1. See notes 391-404 & accompanying text infra.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See notes 219-23, 235-40, 454-58 & accompanying
text infra.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See notes 224, 271-308 & accompanying text infra.
43. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. See notes 20-34, 226-34, 407-29, 472-73 & accompanying
text infra.
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mined to fall under the protection of one of these provisions are
"constitutional property" and will generate judicial scrutiny. Only regulatory costs to these private economic interests are constitutional costs.
With the exception of substantive due process, each provision also focuses the Court's evidentiary investigation of the conflict. The applicable standards of review permit the Court to balance only certain of the
costs and benefits caused by the regulation in issue.
The nature of constitutional rights in property are categorized here
in terms of the three principal economic functions served by the law:
the rights of exclusion, the competitive pre-conditions, and the market
failure rights. There is a high correlation between these categories of
rights and the constitutional vehicle chosen to give private market economic interests constitutional dimension and, at times, constitutional
protection against the regulatory costs they have incurred. The market
prerequisites include the right of exclusion, or the right to use, consume
or exchange property, and the reliance interest. These have been protected by the just compensation and contract clauses respectively.
Commercial speech has been protected by the first amendment. The
right to enter the market as a competitor has been subject to both substantive due process and equal protection analysis. The obverse right
to remain in the marketplace has generated procedural due process
scrutiny. The commerce clause and privilege and immunities clause
have been relied upon to resolve the entry problems peculiar to our
federal system of government; each has conferred protection upon the
right of interstate entry. Substantive due process and equal protection
have provided shelter for the market failure right to consume common
pool resources. The market failure "right to externalize" has been a
right in search of a vehicle. The three cases in this area have involved
equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process
scrutiny.
The Burger Court's reluctance to assess the legitimacy of legislative purpose and its reliance on multiple constitutional vehicles to illuminate the substantive focus of its rationality of relationship scrutiny
must be contrasted with the virtually exclusive use of substantive due
process prior to the New Deal. Prior Courts independently determined
the permissible goals of regulation and demanded that the purpose underlying a regulation comport with their notions of the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. This issue is now left almost exclusively to the discretion of the legislature. Moreover, substantive due
process was then, and remains today, a broad provision that fails to
focus the Court's cost-benefit analysis. The use of multiple provisions,
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however, each with its own substantive focus, has enabled the Burger
Court largely to avoid these abuses of judicial discretion.
The importance of the property right undergoing constitutional review has determined the degree of judicial deference to legislative and
executive policy judgments and, therefore, the depth of the Court's
political discretion. By governing the distribution of the presumption
of constitutionality among the litigants, the importance of the right in
issue has established the applicable level of judicial scrutiny. Four
such levels have been used. Level I involves a virtually irrebuttable
presumption against constitutionality in which an extremely heavy burden is placed on the state to demonstrate the constitutionality of its
legislation. Rights at Level I are very important in the constitutional
hierarchy. At Level II, the Court relies upon rebuttable presumptions
against constitutionality. The burden of persuasion is still held by the
state, but may be overcome by evidence that public benefits substantially exceed private costs. Level II rights are constitutionally important. At Level III, a rebuttable presumption favoring constitutionality
is used. The burden of persuasion is shifted to the private party, who
may overcome it with evidence that private costs substantially exceed
public benefits. Level III rights are significant. Level IV involves reliance upon a virtually irrebuttable presumption favoring constitutionality. A very heavy burden is placed on the individual to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of the legislation. Rights at Level IV are constitutionally insignificant.
The constitutional analysis of economic regulation at Levels I and
IV does not involve the exercise of substantive discretion by the Court.
The Court's initial decision to rely upon virtually irrebuttable presumptions does involve judicial discretion, but the narrow scope of review prohibits a substantive weighing and balancing of the evidence of
constitutional costs and benefits. Rather, the initial determination of
the level of scrutiny dictates the outcome of the case and eliminates the
further exercise of political discretion.
At Level I, the Court's political discretion is at its zenith; its deference to legislative and executive judgments is minimal. Only by showing that the public purpose underlying the regulation is "compelling,"
and that the means chosen to effectuate it are "necessary," will the state
overcome the virtually irrebuttable presumption against constitutionality. At Level IV, the Court's political discretion is at its nadir; its deference is extreme. Only by showing that the legislature's purpose is
"illegitimate," and its means "not even rationally related" to the
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achievement of its purpose, will the individual prove unconstitutionality.
Only at Levels II and III does the Court exercise substantive discretion by weighing and balancing the evidence of constitutional costs
and benefits. At Level II, the state must demonstrate that its purpose is
"important" and its means "substantially related" to its ends. The state
may also be called upon to prove that less intrusive means of accomplishing its purpose do not exist. At Level III, the individual holds the
burden of persuasion, which may be met by showing an "unimportant"
purpose and an "insubstantial relationship" between means and ends.
The individual facing Level III scrutiny may also be called upon to
prove that equally effective and less intrusive means do exist.
The importance of a property right generally has depended upon
how essential it is to the maintenance of the prerequisites and preconditions of a competitively efficient private marketplace. In addition, a
link between the economic right and a suspect classification or fundamental interest has increased the applicable level of scrutiny. Maintenance of the right to exclude has been afforded Level III scrutiny, while
the reliance interest has been afforded Level II scrutiny. A linkage between economic rights in the free flow of commercial information and
fundamental first amendment interests has most often generated Level
II analysis. A linkage of economic rights with the fundamental interest
of interstate entry under the commerce clause has generated both Level
I and II analysis. The suspect classification of alienage has triggered
Level I equal protection scrutiny of regulatory prohibitions of the right
to enter the market place as a competitor. The semi-suspect classification of gender, when allied with economic interests in entry, has produced Level II equal protection analysis. Of the rights essential to
competitive efficiency, only the right to enter the marketplace, standing
alone, has been treated as constitutionally insignificant, thus generating
Level IV scrutiny. The market failure right to externalize also has ordinarily generated only Level IV scrutiny.
In contrast to the Burger Court's reliance on four levels of scrutiny, pre-New Deal Courts abused their political discretion by inverting
the presumption of constitutionality and placing heavy burdens of persuasion on the state. Post-New Deal Courts, however, inflated the presumption of constitutionality to "well-nigh conclusive" status and
treated property rights as constitutionally insignificant. The Burger
Court's development of intermediate levels of scrutiny permits it both
to exercise and manage its political discretion.
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Market Prerequisites: The Rights of Exclusion and the
Reliance Interest
To render the abstract more readily understandable, this Article
employs a fable about cave dwellers. Their continuing story may help
to clarify the interaction between the law and the marketplace and to
make the economic functions of the law more concrete.
One spring, a cave dweller planted corn. He had never done so
before and was looking forward to having food to eat with his family
during the following winter. His neighbors, too, were hopeful that his
experiment with agriculture would succeed. Game became scarce for
all when cold weather settled upon their valley. As harvest time approached, a band of nomads came into the valley and took the corn.
The outraged farmer picked up his club to chase the nomads. He realized, however, that they were too many. He could always return to
hunting. But that meant empty bellies in the winter. Surely it made
little sense to plant and tend corn when nomads could take it with impunity. Then, all the cave dwellers in the valley volunteered to pursue
the nomads and recover the lost corn, which they did. The following
spring, they all planted corn and together protected it from the nomads.
One of the cave dwellers in the valley was old and infirm. She
could neither hunt nor farm. She could, however, make arrows that
flew straight and true. No other craftspeople in the valley made arrows
for sale, and the old woman's arrows were much in demand. Hunters
traded game and corn for these prized arrows. She ate very well and
they benefitted from hunting with superior arrows. All were better off
for having traded. Only once did the arrowmaker have difficulty. One
hunter had neither food nor arrows. He promised to bring the arrowmaker his payment for the arrows as soon as he had hunted. Reluctantly, the arrowmaker agreed. The hunter never returned.
When the cave dwellers joined together to recover the farmer's
corn, they established his right to exclude. The right to exclude is a
necessary attribute of property. 44 When society sanctions exclusion, individuals, like the farmer, can reasonably expect to enjoy the benefit of
their labors.45 They may use, consume, or trade their property for the
44. "Private-property rights in goods constitute the exclusive rights of the owners to use
their goods, and onl, theirgoods, in any way they see fit, including the right to transfer these
rights to other people .... Exclusivity of control constitutes a basic component of the private-property economic system. We emphasize that property rights are not rights of property; they are rights of people to use of property." ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 158;
see also Furubotn & Pejovich Introduction,supra note 9, at 4.
45. "[TIhe legal protection of property rights has the important economic function of
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46
property of another in a mutually beneficial exchange.
The auction system of the marketplace breaks down when individuals cannot be excluded and therefore cannot be required to pay in
trade for the benefits they consume. 47 When the auction system functions effectively, however, optimum economic welfare may be approached through trade.4 8 Both the hunters and the arrowmaker
gained from the exchange of food and arrows. When the arrowmaker
permitted the hunter to purchase the arrows and pay later, she extended the capacity of trade as a means of enhancing welfare. To realize that capacity, however, the community of cave dwellers must
enforce the trade.49 Otherwise, only simultaneous exchanges will take
place.
Each of the market prerequisite rights has been protected by the
Constitution. The rights of use, consumption, and exchange have constitutional dimension under the just compensation clause.50 The enforcement of exchanges, the reliance interest, has been protected under
the contract clause.5 1 The market prerequisite rights have illuminated
the Court's definition of constitutional property, determined the regulatory costs and benefits open to substantive scrutiny, and informed its
judgment of the constitutional importance of the right under review.

The Right to Use, Consume or Exchange
The just compensation clause states: "Nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' 52 This clause provides the Constitution's most fundamental protection of private prop[W]ithout property rights there is no
creating incentives to use resources efficiently ....
incentive to incur these costs because there is no reasonably assured reward for incurring
them. The proper incentives are created by the parceling out among members of society of
[I]f there is always an indimutually exclusive rights to the use of particular resources ....
vidual who can exclude all others from access to any given area-then individuals will endeavor ... to maximize the value of the land." POSNER, supra note 9, at 28.
46. "In sum, two basic elements of private property are exclusivity of right of use and
voluntary transferabilityor exchangeability of that right." ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6,
at 158.
47. "The market can function only in a situation where the 'exclusion principle' applies, i.e., where A's consumption is made contingent on his paying the price, while B, who
does not pay, is excluded. Exchange cannot occur without property rights and property
rights require exclusion." MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 12, at 50.
48. See generally ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, ch. 3.
49. "Holding people to their promises is. . . [an] economic function of contract law."
POSNER, supra note 9, at 66-67.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See notes 52-100 & accompanying text infra.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1. See notes 101-23 & accompanying text infra.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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erty rights against government intrusion. It protects the rights of
exclusion. 53 When used as the eminent domain clause,5 4 it requires the

government to pay fair market value for private property appropriated
for governmental use. When used as the taking clause, it requires the
government to distribute regulatory costs equitably. This section of
this Article is concerned solely with taking issue jurisprudence.

The government must alter regulations to respond to changing social and economic conditions. Changes in regulation necessarily alter

the property rights of use, consumption, and exchange. The owner's
expectations and the property's value are often diminished. These al-

terations are generally noncompensable: "To require compensation in
53. The Burger Court has also acted under the fourth amendment search and seizure
clause to protect the right to privacy of certain business interests against warrantless administrative searches of commercial and industrial property pursuant to a regulatory inspection
program. "This Court has already held that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, and that this rule applies to commercial premises as well as homes." Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (invalidating § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976), which empowered agents of Secretary of Labor to conduct warrantless inspections of the work area of any employment facility
within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and violations of OSHA's regulations). See
also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
overrulingpro tanto Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The Constitutional property
right involved is not as deserving of protection, however, as the right to privacy in one's
home. "[G]reater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property" is
constitutionally permissible. Donovan v. Dewey, 49 U.S.L.W. 4748, 4749 (June 17, 1981).
The Court has, moreover, carved out a significant exception to the general rule expressed in Barlow'rInc. In Donovan, the Court upheld the warrantless inspection of a quarry under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. III
1979). "[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably
determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4749. This "implied consent"
rationale is strengthened when the industry involved has been subject to a "'long tradition
of close government supervision,"' id. at 4751 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978)); when the regulatory legislation in question "provides a specific mechanism
for accommodating any special privacy concerns," id., at 4750; and when "a warrant requirement clearly might impede the 'specific enforcement needs' of the regulation," id.
(quoting Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978)). See also United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
While the Court has not made its level of scrutiny explicit in these cases, it appears to be
relying on Level II analysis.
54. The Burger Court's eminent domain valuation cases include: United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980);
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); United States v. Bodcaw Co.,
440 U.S. 202 (1979); Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); United States v. Fuller, 109 U.S.
488 (1973); Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470
(1973).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase."55 When the costs and benefits of regulation are
disproportionately distributed, however, the regulation may be an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation: "[T]he
Fifth Amendment guarantee . . . [i]s designed to bar Government
from forcing people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 56 The general
taking clause issue, therefore, is to determine when a change in regulation, or the promulgation of new regulations, so unevenly distributes
regulatory costs and benefits that an owner's right to use, consume or
exchange his or her property and, therefore, its value, have been unconstitutionally diminished, that is, taken.
The "taking" issue has had a rich constitutional history, 57 but was
relied upon only sparingly by post-New Deal Courts. 58 Recently, however, taking issue jurisprudence has been revitalized. Having rendered
only one prior opinion, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
59
the Burger Court decided four taking issue cases in the 1979City,
1980 term: Andrus v. Allard,60 KaiserAetna v. United States,6 1 Agins v.
55. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922). In Mahon, Justice Holmes stated: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Id.
56. "[T]he Fifth Amendment 'prevents the public from loading upon one individual
more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to
the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of
the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.'" Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1883)).
57. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871). The just compensation clause was made applicable to the states in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897). See generally F. BOSSELMAN,
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective. Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63;
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Schreiber, The Roadto Munn.- Eminent Domainand The
Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AM. HisT. 329 (1971);
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980);
Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power. The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation
Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
58. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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City of Tiburon,62 and PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins;63 and two
in its 1980-1981 term: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama64 and Hodel v. Indiana (Hodel11).65
tion Association, Inc. (HodelI),
In these opinions, the Court explicitly defined the property rights protected by the taking clause in terms of the rights of exclusion and iden-

tified three significant components of its substantive review: 66 actual
physical invasion, diminution in value, and reciprocity of advantage.

Moreover, the Court consistently relied on Level III rebuttable pre-

sumptions favoring constitutionality to defer to legislative judgments. 67
The Court, in opinions by Justice Rehnquist, has explicitly defined
taking clause property in terms of the right to exclude. In KaiserAetna,
for example, the Court stated: "In this case we hold that the 'right to

exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government
cannot take without compensation." 68 It also distinguished between
mere economic expectations and those private economic interests sanc61. 444 U.S. 164 (1979); see also Vaughn v. Vermillion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979), aper
curiam decision in accord with Kaiser Aetna.
62. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
63. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
64. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
65. 101 S.Ct. 2376 (1981); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (1981);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
66. The Court, however, has repeatedly asserted that its analysis is imprecise. "[Tihis
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends
largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."' Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Similar sentiments have been expressed in virtually all Burger Court taking issue cases. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979):
"There is no abstract of fixed point at which judicial intervention under the 'Takings Clause'
becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings .... Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of
judgment as for the application of logic."
67. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980).
68. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In his dissenting opinion in Penn Central,
Justice Rehnquist gave taking clause property its most inclusive definition: "The term
[property] is not used in the 'vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect
to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law... [Instead, it] denote[s] the group of
rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.... The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess."' Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43
(1978) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
377-78 (1945)).
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tioned by the law as rights in property. 6 9
That sanction does not, however, extend to an owner's use of his or
her property in ways that damage a neighbor's property. 70 The state
69. "But not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages that are supported by the law are 'rights' and only when they are so recognized may
courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)). Cf.Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 455 U.S. 15. In Webb's, the Court invalidated, as a violation of the takings clause,
a Florida statute authorizing its county courts to take as their own interest accruing on monies deposited with the registry of the court pending the outcome of litigation. The Florida
Supreme Court had upheld the statute, reasoning that the deposited funds temporarily assumed the status of "public money" while on deposit and that, therefore, "the interest 'is not
private property.'" Id. at 163. Justice Blackmun, for an unanimous Court, disagreed. Recognizing that " '[p]roperty interests. . . are not created by the Constitution,. . . [but rather]
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from at, independent source such as state law,'" id. at 161 (quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)), he nevertheless declared: "This is the very kind of thing
that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent." Id. at 164. "The
earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the
fund itself is property. The state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the
county the value of the use of the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry." Id.
(emphasis added). This physical invasion of private property was a "forced contribution to
general governmental revenues," id. at 163, did not amount to the taking of "a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need that is not a property interest entitled to protection," id.
at 161, and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
There is some disagreement in the Court over the competing roles of the states and the
federal government in the definition of property. Justice Rehnquist would confer the fundamental responsibility for defining rights in property upon the states. See Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 173-80; Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 80-81.
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, is unwilling to abrogate all federal responsibility for
defining rights in property: "I do not think Hawaii or any other State is at liberty through
local law to defeat the navigational servitude by transforming navigatable water into 'fast
land. . . . [S]tate law cannot control the scope of federal prerogatives.'" Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 280 infra.
70. The distinction between permissible uses and nuisances has affected taking issue
decisionmaking in America since the inception of the common law maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1968). It underlay the 19th century definition of the police power as the government power to protect society against harms. See
Corwin, The Doctrine ofDue Process ofLaw Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366,
479 (1911); Hastings, The Development of the Law as Illustratedby the DecisionsRelating to
the Police Power ofthe State, 39 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 359

(1900); Smead, Sic Utere Tuo UtAlienum Non Laedas: A Basis ofthe State PolicePower, 21
CORNELL L. REV. 276, 285-92 (1936).
The permitted uses-nuisance dichotomy was also a principal determinant during the
19th century of the difference between noncompensable regulations and eminent domain
condemnations requiring compensation. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887), in which the first Justice Harlan stated: "A prohibition simply upon use of property
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation
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properly may abate a nuisance or a noxious use without offering com71
pensation; this is not a "taking" within the ambit of the taking clause.
In Penn Central, for example, the application of historic preservation
legislation to Grand Central Station was upheld, at least in part, in
72
reliance upon the dichotomy between sanctioned uses and nuisances.
The inclusion of all legally sanctioned economic expectations
within the definition of taking clause property has limited the Court's
willingness to find a regulatory taking. 73 The regulatory deprivation of
rights of use, consumption, and exchange must be virtually complete
before an unconstitutional taking will be found to have occurred.
The Burger Court's substantive standards of taking clause review
have, by its own admission, produced "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. '74 The Court has, however, identified the costs and benefits of
regulation that are of particular analytical significance:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property
In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the
of property for the public benefit ....
other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner." The distinction has
also been recognized in political economic theory. See, e.g., ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note
6, at 159: "Think of private-property rights as a person's rights to decide on the use of his
and only his goods and services (that is, without violating the same rights ofotherpeople) and
to sell or exchange those rights. We do not exchange goodsperse; we exchange rights over
goods. Physical possession is not the essence of property rights; at best, physical possession
is a means of asserting or giving evidence of rights." (Emphasis added).
71. See Corwin, The Doctrine of Due ProcessofLaw Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L.
REv. 366, 378 (1911).
72. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125-27 (1978). In his
dissenting opinion in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist, however, pointed out that the railroad company had not been required to cease from injuring others through the use of its
land. Rather, because it had to maintain Grand Central Station in its historical condition, it
was being required to perform an affirmative duty. Justice Rehnquist's point here is that,
while actions taken by government to prohibit the noxious use of property do not run afoul
of the Taking Clause, nevertheless regulations that place affirmative obligations on a landowner can infringe upon his or her right to use and consume and can, therefore, be an
unconstitutional taking. 438 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

73. "mhe denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking....
mhe destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle [of property rights] is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. at 65-66. "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather on both the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
inteerence with rights in the parcelas a whole." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added).

74. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). See note 66 supra.
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can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common
75
good.

When determining private regulatory costs, the Court also will offset
the deprivation with private regulatory benefits received, a form of
nonmonetary compensation.
Moreover, "[tihese 'ad hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted
with respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique circumstances. '' 76 In HodelI and Hodel II, certain "steep slope" and "prime
farmland" provisions of the federal Surface Mining and Reclamation
Control Act of 1977 were challenged as unconstitutional takings. As
the regulations in question had not yet been applied to individual parcels of land, the Court held that taking issue weighing and balancing
"simply is not ripe for judicial resolution. ' 77
Physical invasion is perhaps the most objective of the Court's taking issue analytical factors. An actual physical appropriation of the
right to exclude without compensation is ordinarily unconstitutional,
however insignificant the value of the property taken. 7 8 In Kaiser
Aetna,79 for example, the Army Corps of Engineers sought not only to
regulate a newly constructed marina as a navigable waterway, but also
to provide a right of access and consumption to the public. The Court
upheld regulation of the use of the waterway. However, because public
access would "result in an actual physical invasion,"8 0 an unconstitutional taking had occurred. Granting a right of public access and consumption imposed disproportionately burdensome costs upon the
owner.
The regulatory creation of a public right of access, nevertheless,
may be justified if it fulfills an important public interest. In
75.

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979): "[Taking issue analysis has] identified several factorssuch as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action--that have particular
significance."
76. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2371
(1981) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165 (1979)).
77.

Id. See also Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376, 2388 (1981).

78. Cf Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (requiring just compensation
for air easements "taken" by flights over plaintiffs' homes); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
79.

444 U.S. 164 (1979).

80. Id. at 180.
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Pruneyard,Ithe Court held that the "exercise [of] state-protected rights
of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does

not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants' property
rights under the Taking Clause. ' 8 2 The evidence that the right of ac-

cess "'physically invaded' appellants' property cannot be viewed as de-

terminative"8 3 of constitutionality. The owners could not demonstrate

that access to political speakers "will unreasonably impair the value or
use of their property as a shopping center."8' 4 Thus, when the Court

included first amendment political speech values in its cost-benefit balance,85 it found that the physical invasion of the owner's right to exclude was not an unconstitutional taking.
Assessing the diminution in economic value is the second taking
issue standard of review. The Supreme Court has never specified a

percentage of value that, when lost to the owner, automatically establishes an unconstitutional taking. 86 In diminution of value situations,
the Court has neither erected a per se rule of invalidity nor relied upon
a virtually irrebuttable presumption against unconstitutionality. Nor
has it specified how to measure regulatory impact on private market
value. Because of the vagueness of the constitutional standards for
identifying and weighing regulatory costs and their impact on property
value, the Burger Court has used diminution in value only as evidence
81. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), is the latest in a line of
cases balancing the right of access and expression against the right to exclude. See Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). After an initial ruling in favor of first amendment rights, the Court reversed its
course and, in Logan Valley and Hudgens, upheld the right to exclude. These cases, however, did not involve the scope of regulatory authority. Pruneyardis distinguishable because
there the California Supreme Court ruled that the relevant rights of access and expression
are based on state constitutional values and override the owner's right to exclude.
82. 447 U.S. at 83.
83. Id. at 84.
84. Id. at 83.
85. In Pruneyard, the shopping center owners attempted to counterbalance the first
amendment interests of the individuals seeking access with first amendment interests of their
own. 447 U.S. at 85-86. The Court concluded "that neither appellants' federally recognized
property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed." Id. at 88.
86. Diminution in value analysis was promulgated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes saw government's power to regulate under the police power as existing along a continuum with its power to appropriate
property under eminent domain. The question was how to distinguish between a valid exercise of the police power and one that so deprived an owner of his or her reasonable economic expectations that compensation was required. "When [diminution in economic
value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." Id. at 413. Justice Holmes, however,
did not give monetary value to the term "certain magnitude."
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of taking. In Penn Central,87 for example, Justice Brennan characterized the case law as "uniformly reject[ing] the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking.' ",88 As
the regulation permitted Penn Central not only to continue the present
use of the terminal, but also to obtain a reasonable return on its invest89
ment, no unconstitutional taking had occurred.
In Andrus v. Allard,90 the Court declined to find an unconstitutional taking despite a virtually complete diminution in value. The
Secretary of the Interior had promulgated regulations prohibiting the
sale of Indian artifacts made with the feathers of federally protected
birds. The loss of virtually all exchange value, however, "is not necessarily equated with a taking. . . . [L]oss of future profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender reed
upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially
competent to perform."' 9
A challenge to the taking issue constitutionality of regulations that
have not yet been applied to specific property also requires a virtually
complete diminution in value. In Hodel I and Hodel II, the regulations in question easily survived such a facial challenge. "[T]here is no
reason to suppose that 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act has
deprived appellees of economically viable use of their property. 9 2 The
Act neither "categorically prohibit[ed] surface coal mining" 93 nor "pur87.

438 U.S. 104.

88. 438 U.S. at 131. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist took exception to the
majority's statements on diminution in value. His view of taking includes more than mere
"physical seizures of property rights. . .. 'The courts have held that the deprivation of the
former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the
taking.'" 438 U.S. at 143. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
89. 438 U.S. at 136. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, disagreed with this characterization
of diminution in value. Contrary to the majority's view that a taking occurs only when "a
property owner is denied all reasonable value of his property," Justice Rehnquist asserted:

"A taking does not become a noncompensable exercise of police power simply because the
government in its grace allows the owner to make some 'reasonable' use of his property. '[I]t
is the character of the invasion, not the amount of the damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking.'" 438 U.S. at
149-50
90.
91.
92.
(1981);

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)).
444 U.S. 51 (1979).
Id. at 66.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2370
see also Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376, 2388 (1981).

93.

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370

(1981).
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port[ed] to regulate alternative uses" 94 of coal bearing lands. Absent a
complete deprivation and evidence of the application and effect of the
regulations on individual property, no unconstitutional taking could be
shown.
When the regulation in question benefits owners of private property, the Court will use these benefits to offset the regulatory costs imposed. Reciprocal benefits or advantages arise when the regulated
party is compensated for his or her individual loss by his or her share of
the public's regulatory benefits. 95 Regulatory benefits provide a kind of
nonmonetary compensation to the aggrieved property owner for bearing the costs of implementation. In essence, reciprocity of advantage
diminishes the disproportionate impact of regulatory costs on the property's value. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,96 for example, an owner
claimed that a one-acre minimum lot size restriction on his property
forever prevented its development and thereby completely destroyed its
value. The Court brought reciprocal benefits into its cost-benefit balance: "Appellants . . . will share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. . . . [T]hese benefits
must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the
'97
appellants might suffer."
In these taking issue decisions, the Burger Court has implicitly relied on Level III scrutiny, granting the statute a rebuttable presumption
of constitutionality. In Agins,98 Justice Powell indicated that a regulation "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests." 99 The Court has not only been consistently
94. Id.
95. Reciprocity of advantage, like diminution in value, was the product of Justice
Holmes's opinion in Pennyslvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also id. at
422. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
96. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
97. Id. at 262. In his dissenting opinion in KaiserAetna, Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, would have relied on the reciprocal advantage received by
the marina operators to uphold the constitutionality of public access: "Whatever expectancy
petitioners may have had in control over the pond for use as a fishery was surrendered in
exchange for the advantages of access when they cut a channel into the Bay." 444 U.S. at
190-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which Justice Rehnquist noted that government
may legitimately prohibit non-noxious uses of property "[if] the prohibition applies over a
broad cross-section of land and thereby '[s]ecures an average reciprocity advantage."
When regulation burdens individual property values "relatively evenly," and the individual
harmed by the regulation in certain respects is benefitted in others, reciprocity of advantage
exists and no unconstitutional taking has occurred. Id.
98. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
99. Id. at 260.
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willing to weigh and balance the evidence of regulatory costs and benefits, it has also consistently placed the burden of persuasion on the individual challenging constitutionality. In Pnneyard, Justice Rehnquist
stated, "[A]ppellants have failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state authorized limitation of it amounted to a
'taking.' "100 Given the ambiguity of its substantive analysis, the Court
has restrained its political discretion by deferring to legislative
judgments.
The Burger Court has offered some minimal protection to the
rights of exclusion. Although the promotion of free speech has justified
public access to private property, an unconstitutional taking will usually be found when exclusionary rights have been physically appropriated. When there is a diminution in the property's value, the Court has
offset regulatory costs to the owner against reciprocal benefits and then
weighed and balanced private costs against benefits to the general welfare, relying on Level III rebuttable presumptions favoring constitutionality and placing the burden of proof on the property owner. Only
a grossly disproportionate distribution of costs will justify a finding of
unconstitutionality; regulatory costs must destroy virtually all value in
the property instead of merely destroying future expectations that arise
from the possibility of exchange. This is particularly true with regard
to facial challenges to a regulation's taking issue constitutionality. Despite the importance of the right to exclude, the Court's reliance on
Level III scrutiny seems justified if the Court is to restrain its political
discretion over regulatory policy.
The Reliance Interest
The contract clause states: "No State shall enter into any. . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."10 1 It protects the reliance interest,10 2 an individual's legally sanctioned expectation that the terms
100. 444 U.S. at 66.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
102. The reliance interest has also been accorded constitutional dimension in a series of
procedural due process cases involving the right to possess, upon default, property pledged
as security in debtor-creditor contracts. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The
issue in these cases was whether the creditor's reliance interest in obtaining possession of the
encumbered property could be enforced without prior notice and hearing. The Court's resolution of these issues has changed with changes in its membership. In general, however, it
has relied on Level II presumptions and an increasingly specific enunciation of its standards
of procedural due process review to weigh the costs and benefits and to establish the need for
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of existing agreements will be fulfilled or damages paid. The contract

clause, however, protects only vested contract rights against regulatory
encroachment. It must, therefore, be contrasted with "liberty to contract," which, when protected during the heyday of substantive due
process, encompassed the much broader right to enter into private mar03
ket agreements.

Agreements to exchange property rights are created by legal stipulation.' °4 Two individuals, an arrowmaker and a hunter, negotiate and
agree to exchange some of their legally defined and sanctioned rights of
use, consumption or exchange. They agree also upon the value of the

benefits exchanged; they decide how much meat is worth how many
arrows. They also distribute the risks and costs of their exchange.
These economic decisions are encompassed by their agreement. Rights
of exclusion, defined by law, have been allocated and distributed by a
private agreement sanctioned by law. The arrowmaker and the hunter
are reasonably certain that their respective promises will be honored.
a limited prior hearing. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), Justice Stewart established
both the nature and importance of the procedural due process reliance interest: "There are
'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing.
These situations, however, must be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations has this
Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case,
the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State
has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure
has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance." Id. at 9091. These three elements have restrained the Court's discretion in specifying the nature and
importance of the reliance interest. See also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972);
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
103. During the heyday of substantive due process, liberty to contract was given preferred status under the Constitution. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896)
(quoted in note 231 infra); see also Pound, Liberqy of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
Lochner v. New York elevated this liberty to contract to the status of a preferred constitutional right. In Lochner-derived substantive due process cases, the Court used a virtually
irrebuttable presumption against constitutionality to defeat most regulations. The abuse of
political discretion imposed by this laissez faire judicial activism contributed significantly to
its demise following the New Deal.
104. "The contractual arrangements and exchanges needed for the market operation
cannot exist without the protection and enforcement of a governmentally provided legal
structure." MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE,supra note 12, at 6. "[Trade permits the exchange of
'bundles' of rights authorizing the recipients to do things with the goods that are traded. A
contractual agreement is vitally important here because it represents the means by which the
bundles of rights are exchanged." Furubotn & Pejovich Introduction, supra note 9, at 6.
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This certainty is based on the belief that the law will continue to define
their rights of exclusion in the same way; the terms of their agreement
will continue to merit legal sanction for the life of their contract. However, social and economic conditions change and, thus, the regulatory
definition of both exclusion rights and protected agreements also
evolve. When the laws upon which a contract was based are altered,
the economic expectations created and distributed by that contract similarly may be altered. Reliance interests may be destroyed. The issue
in the Burger Court's sole business regulation-contract clause case was
to identify the constitutional nature of these reliance interests. 10 5
Prior to the advent of substantive due process, the contract clause
provided a principal constitutional restraint on regulatory power. 0 6 In
1880, however, the Court drastically reduced the protection available to
reliance interests when it held that state authority to regulate was ina07
lienable by contract and, therefore, superior to vested contract rights. 1
Thereafter, changes in regulation were generally permissible without
regard to the destruction of reliance interests. In 1933, however, the
Court gave renewed vitality to contract clause analysis. It combined
the vested rights definition of contract clause property with the permissible purpose-rationality of relationship analytical model of substantive
due process. 0 8 This case, Home Building andLoan A4ssociation v. Blais105. The contract clause is not "the Draconian provision that its words seem to imply
....
[T]he police power ... is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals." Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240-42 (1978). Nevertheless,
"the Contract Clause remains part of the Constitution. It is not a dead letter ....
[I]t must
be understood to impose some limit upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power." Id. at 250.
106. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911);
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. 512 (1944); Schreiber,
The Roadto Munn: Eminent Domain andthe ConceptofPublic Purposein the State Courts, 5
PERSPECTIVES IN AM. HIST. 329 (1971); Vernon, Contracts Clause and the Court: A View of
Precedent andPracticein ConstitutionalAdjudication, 54 TUL. L. REV. 117 (1979).
107. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880): "No legislature can bargain away
the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its
nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require."
See also Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1913); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
108. See Reznick, Empiricism and the Principleof Conditions in the Evolution of Police
Power. A Modelfor DefinitionalScrutiny, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 60-64 [hereinafter cited as
Reznick]. In Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933), the Court relied
on Level IV scrutiny to uphold mortgage moratorium legislation enacted in response to the
extreme exigencies of the Depression. Using Level IV scrutiny, id. at 438; see Reznick,
supra, at 60-64, the Court emphasized the narrow and temporary scope of relief justified by
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is the fountainhead of the few 0 modem contract clause cases.
The Burger Court has decided only one case involving analysis of
business regulation under the contract clause." In Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus," 2 the Court invalidated the Minnesota Private
dell, 0 9

Pension Benefits Protection Act, which required the company to pay
$185,000 into a pension fund covering its Minnesota employees to close

its Minnesota operations. The money was needed to fund pension
rights vested by the Act that had not been stipulated in the employees'
contract. The Act was new and had retroactive effect in an area of
precarious economic conditions. "While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power." Id. at 426. Subsequent to Blaisdell, the
post-New Deal courts consistently deferred to legislative judgments in contract clause cases.
See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-9 (1965); East N.Y. Savings Bank v.
Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945). But see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977). For a discussion of United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, see note I ll infra.
109. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
110. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); East N.Y. Savings Bank
v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941);
Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189
(1936); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). See Reznick, supra note 108, at 75-80.
111. The Burger Court has also examined the scope of the state's taxing and spending
powers under the contract clause when the state is a party to an agreement with private
market interests. Its opinion in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977),
was the model for its subsequent decision in Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
234 (1978). The challenged statute in United States Trust Co. repealed a covenant that limited the Port Authority's ability to subsidize commuter rail transportation out of revenues
and reserves pledged as security for its consolidated bonds. In a suit by bondholders claiming impairment of security, the Court invalidated the statute by a four to three vote.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, relied on broad standards of review and the
heightened scrutiny of Level II. "As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose. In applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's
self-interest is at stake." 431 U.S. at 25-26. In addition, the majority was willing to search
for "less drastic" means. Id. at 29-30. The burden of demonstrating constitutionality was
placed on the state.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, dissented. "IT]his Court
should have learned long ago that the Constitution-be it through the Contract or Due
Process Clause--can actively intrude into such economic and policy matters only if my
Brethren are prepared to bear enormous institutional and social costs." Id. at 62 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He advocated the deferential scrutiny of Level IV review. "[I]f a State, as
here, manifestly acts in furtherance of its citizens' general welfare, and its choice of policy,
even though infringing contract rights, is not 'plainly unreasonable and arbitrary,'. . . our
inquiry should end: 'The question is... whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate
end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.'" Id. at 53 (quoting
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934)).
112. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Cf. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (upholding the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act against supremacy clause
preemption challenge).
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private market activity previously left to private negotiation. Generally, the majority would interpret the clause to be a broad restraint on
the government's authority to alter regulations. The dissent would narrow the substantive reach of the clause and curtail the depth of the
Court's contract clause discretion with a Level IV virtually irrebuttable
presumption.
The majority found that the impairment of virtually any reliance
interest could trigger contract clause scrutiny. "Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and business affairs according to their
particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on
them."' 1 3 The dissent would severely limit the protections available to
only the reliance interests generated by certain types of agreements.114
"Historically, . . .the Contract Clause was not intended to embody a
broad constitutional policy of protecting all reliance interests grounded
in private contracts." 115 Moreover, the dissent would not extend contract clause protection to new contract obligations created by regulation. Rather, they would limit its protection to the preservation of
existing obligations that have been destroyed."16 In sum, the dissent
and majority disagreed completely about the nature of the economic
interests given dimension by the contract clause.
The majority identified the specific standards of review to be applied in contract clause cases:
The law was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social problem. It did not operate in an area
already subject to regulation at the time the company's contractual
113. Id. at 245.
114. "[The contract clause] was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular
social evil-the state legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain contracts-and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting 'as
[their] policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means
to enforce them,' Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934). But
the Framers never contemplated that the Clause would limit the legislative power of States
to enact laws creating duties that might burden some individuals in order to benefit
others. . . . The Clause was thus intended by the Framers to be applicable only to laws
which altered the obligations of contracts by effectively relieving one part of the obligation
to perform a contract duty." Id. at 256-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 256.
116. "Since creating an obligation when none had existed previously is not an impairment of contract, it of course should follow necessarily that legislation increasing the obligation of an existing contract is not an impairment." Id. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). The imposition of new obligations on contracting parties, in Justice
Brennan's view, should be scrutinized under the due process clause to the extent that it
operates to protect existing economic values. In this regard, Justice Brennan would apply
Level IV scrutiny and uphold Minnesota's regulation.

September 1981)

BUSINESS REGULATION

obligations were originally undertaken, but invaded an area never
before subject to regulations by the State. It did not effect simply a
temporary alteration of the contractual relationships of those within
its coverage, but worked a severe, permanent, and immediate
change
7

in those relationships-irrevocably and retroactively."1
The majority felt free to assess the legitimacy of the Minnesota legisla-

ture's purposes in enacting the legislation. New regulations encompassing only aspects of more comprehensive problems may be suspect
under the contract clause. The retroactive extension of government

control over private market activity produced regulatory costs that
were permanent and irrevocable, immediate and severe.

The judicial balance had initially been in favor of private rights.
The majority found the reliance interest constitutionally important.
"The presumption favoring 'legislative judgments as to the necessity
and reasonableness of a particular measure,' simply cannot stand in
this case."' 18 The severity of the impairment

19

dictated the use of

Level II scrutiny, in contrast with the general deference accorded legislative judgments in post-New Deal contract clause cases. 20 Because of
the broad range of protectable reliance interests, the majority's use of

Level II presumptions substantially increased the risk of abuse present
in contract clause scrutiny.
In dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that "[t]oday's decision
greatly expands the reach of the [contract] clause." 12 ' His concern with
the risk of judicial abuse was clear.

22

To limit that discretion, he

would have relied on Level IV virtually irrebuttable presumptions. 23
Added to his extremely narrow conception of the nature of the reliance
117. Id. at 250.
118. Id. at 247 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 123 (1977)).
"[lit is not necessary to hold that the Minnesota law impaired the obligation of the company's employment contracts 'without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression."'
Id. at 250 (quoting W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935)).
119. "Minimal alteration of the contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first
stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination
of the nature and purpose of the state legislation." Id. at 245 (footnote omitted).
120. See note 110 supra.
121. 438 U.S. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. "The necessary consequence of the extreme malleability of these rather vague criteria is to vest judges with broad subjective discretion to protect property interests that happened to appeal to them." Id. at 261.
123. "Decisions over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified interpretation
of all the constitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations and these decisions have recognized a broad latitude in States to effect even severe interference with existing economic values when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare." Id. at
260 (Brennan J.,dissenting).
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interest, his use of Level IV would effectively abdicate the Court's contract clause jurisdiction.
Allied StructuralSteel may allow for a significant expansion of the
Court's political discretion over changes in regulatory policy with retroactive effect. Regulations, both new and altered, may easily violate the
broad substantive standards and heightened scrutiny of the majority.
The extreme judicial deference advocated in dissent would, however,
abdicate the Court's checks and balances authority and emasculate its
constitutional review of contract clause issues.
Competitive Preconditions: Information and Entry
It became known that the old arrowmaker sold arrows of superior
quality. Many hunters came to her cave to trade corn and game for
arrows. She was soon rich, but she could not make arrows fast enough.
She hired a young apprentice, and soon another. Seeing the arrowmaker's stockpile of corn and game, other cavedwellers began to
make arrows. Apprentices learned the trade and sold their own arrows.
In the face of this competition, the old arrowmaker was forced to accept less corn and game for her arrows. Eventually, all the arrowmakers were taking only enough game and corn to pay for the flint,
wood, and feathers needed to make their arrows and to compensate for
their labor. To their amazement, however, many more arrows were
being traded and they had even more game to eat. The hunters, too,
had more to eat. With their many new arrows they were more successful hunters.
The cavedwellers were able to enjoy the benefits of the old arrowmaker's superior arrows only after they had learned of their availability and price. In the cavedwellers' valley, the information of
commerce flowed freely by word of mouth. Today, commercial information flows by more circuitous means. It continues, however, to
perform the same economic function. Accurate information about the
availability, quality, and price of goods and services permits consumers
knowledgably to express their preferences. With awareness of those
preferences, producers can supply the goods and services demanded.
When commercial information is readily available, competitive efficiency is improved. 124 When, however, the costs of obtaining accurate
information are high, economic welfare is reduced. If information
costs become too high, the pricing mechanism of the marketplace may
124.

See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 155. See note 125 infra.
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break down. 125
The apprentice arrowmakers entered the market when they sensed
that demand in excess of supply was driving up the price of arrows.

Surplus profits promised opportunity. Apprentices eventually grew in
number and proficiency, and other cavedwellers entered the arrowmaking business. Supply then met demand and prices fell. The supply of
food grew with the supply of arrows and everyone prospered, except
perhaps the original arrowmaker. Free entry into the arrowmaking in-

dustry brought supply into equilibrium with demand and eliminated
126
her monopoly profits.

The constitutional nature and importance of rights in commercial
information have been determined under the first amendment. The
right to enter the marketplace has found constitutional dimension in

substantive due process and constitutional protection in the equal protection clause. The rights of individuals to remain in the market may

not be suspended or terminated by regulation unless the mandates of
procedural due process have been fulfilled. Interstate entry, an entry
problem unique to our federal system of government, is protected by
the commerce clause 127 and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.128
125. "The extent of mutually preferred revision of goods among consumers is affected
by the costs of obtaining information about bids and offers for goods or their uses, by the
costs of negotiating a binding exchange, by the costs of policing the contract, and by the
kinds of property rights people have to the goods. The higher these costs or the more weakened are private-property rights, the less will mutually preferred re-allocation of goods occur. One person may be prepared to offer a second party more for goods or services than the
second party is now getting from those goods and services, but with sufficiently high exchange-negotiation costs the mutually preferred revision or exchange will not occur." ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 173; see also Demsetz, InformationandEfficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
126. "Every seller in the market has an incentive to try to keep out other sellers. In the
absence of arbitrary obstacles or legal restrictions, the prospect of profits will entice new
sellers into the market. . . . The government will be appealed to as a means of keeping out
new competitors-that is, restricting the open market in order to maintain a larger buyingselling price spread, under the guise of protecting the consumer from unscrupulous sellers,
who would undermine the quality of the product." ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 53;
see also G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 116-18 (1975).
The existence of monopolies and oligopolies has engendered regulatory response since
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Attempts to monopolize or oligopolize private market
production are subject to antitrust legislation. The Court's role in antitrust cases is to interpret the relevant statutes rather than the Constitution. An analysis of the Court's statutory
interpretation is not within the scope of this Article.
127. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
128. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
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The Right to Commercial Information

The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech .
,129
"... The first amendment protects "[flreedom of speech as an essential corollary of representative
democracy."' 30 The corollaries of democracy have encompassed both
"political speech"' 13 and other forms of personal expression. 132 The
protection of these two forms of speech customarily has invoked Level
I scrutiny. 133 They have, however, until very recently, included only
129. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech. Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979).
131.

See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-

ERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, FirstAmendment and Evils That Congress Has a Right to Prevent, 26 IND. L.J. 477 (1951); Meiklejohn,
The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245; Meiklejohn, What Does the
First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953). See also Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy. The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L.
REV. 41 (1974); Cox, Foreword- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1980). But see BeVier, The First Amendment and PoliticalSpeech. An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, NeutralPrinciples
and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court
andthe Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Redish, The FirstAmendment in the Marketplace. Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
132. See generaly Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL

THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); Emerson, Towarda General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980).
133. The Burger Court's "political speech" cases have included: CBS Inc. v. FCC, 101
S. Ct. 2318 (1981); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 101 S. Ct. 67
(1981); Democratic Party of the United States v. La Follette, 101 S.Ct. 264 (1981); Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Beliotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Hynes
v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977).
In addition, the Burger Court has considered the use of "loyalty oaths" as a condition of
government employment. See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Connell v.
Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of
Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). These cases did not explicitly include a judicial appreciation of
the economic as well as political manifestations of the legislation in question.
The cases in which the Burger Court has considered the first amendment right to individual self-fulfillment through free expression include: Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
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the flow of information in the marketplace of ideas.
Information in the marketplace of goods and services first
achieved the status of a constitutional property right in 1976 in Virginia
State Boardof Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc. 134
The definition of first amendment commercial speech promulgated by

Justice Blackmun in Virginia State Board has allowed the Court to review the costs and benefits of regulations controlling or prohibiting the
flow of information in the private marketplace.135 In subsequent opin-

ions, many of them by Justice Powell, the substantive standards of review initially propounded in Virginia State Board have been refined

with particular attention to the problems of deceptive advertising, the
time, place, and manner of communication, and the development of a
more precise analytic means of balancing regulatory costs and benefits.
The constitutional importance of the right to commercial information
also has evolved so that, ordinarily, the Court relies on Level II scrutiny. As commercial speech is more robust than political speech, it
warrants review less burdensome of the states' interests. In cases of
deceptive advertising, the Court has more readily deferred to the legislative judgment.
The constitutional history of commercial speech is brief. In 1942,
in Valentine v. Chrestensen,1 36 the Court placed commercial expression
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
134. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
135. The extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech has generated
considerable commentary and disagreement. See, e.g., Baker, CommercialSpeech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1 (1976); Barrett, The UnchartedAreaCommercialSpeech and the First Amendment, 13 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 175 (1980); Farber,
CommercialSpeech andFirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372 (1979); Jackson &
Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L.
REv. I (1979); Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment, 13 CAL. W. L.
REv. 430 (1977); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: ConsumerProtectionand the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977); Reich, PreventingDeception in Commercial Speech, 54
N.Y.U.L. REV. 775 (1979); Roberts, Toward a GeneralTheory of Commercial Speech and the
FirstAmendment,40 OHIO ST. L. J. 115 (1979); Schiro, CommercialSpeech: The Demise ofa
Chimera, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 45; Symposium-Commercial Speech, 46 BKLYN. L. REV. 389
(1980).
136. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942): "This court has unequivocally hell that the streets are
proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the
privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in
these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respectspurely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such
activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative
judgment." (Emphasis added).
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outside the ambit of first amendment protection. Chrestensen, and its
mandate of deference to legislative judgments, controlled the availability of first amendment protection for commercial expression until Vir137
ginia State Board.
The Burger Court first examined the precedential vitality of
Chrestensen in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations. 138 The challenged ordinance prohibited newspapers from
publishing columns of want ads segregated by gender. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, declined to give commercial speech "a higher

level of [first amendment] protection than Chrestensen and its progeny
would suggest."' 139 He did, however, suggest that a commercial right to

information "might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation." 140 When "the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation
on economic activity,"' 4' benefits would be far in excess of costs and
the regulation constitutional.
PittsburghPress was followed by Bigelow v. Virginia, 42 in which a

newspaper editor, found guilty of publishing an advertisement for
abortion services not legally available in Virginia, sought first amendment protection. The right involved was strictly his own, and did not
137. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring), in which Justice Douglas dismissed Chrestensen: "The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection."
The most significant of the Court's "commercial speech" opinions between Chrestensen
and the Burger Court was New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The newspaper invoked the first amendment against a libel action brought by a government official.
The Court thus faced the issue whether the advertisement in question was commercial
speech, and therefore outside the ambit of first amendment protection, or whether it was
speech of a protected nature expressed in a commercial forum. The Court held the speech to
be protected. "The publication here was not a 'commercial advertisement' in the sense in
which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern." 376 U.S. at 266. The Court thereby provided a link between political speech and
commercial speech that facilitated the Burger Court's extension of first amendment protection to purely commercial speech. See text accompanying notes 138-46 infra. See also
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
138. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
139. Id. at 388.
140. Id. at 389.
141. Id. at 388. "Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is
illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance." Id.
142. 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(invalidating a statute completely suppressing information about the availability and price
of contraceptives; decided on noneconomic grounds).
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include that of the abortion group to advertise. 143 The advertisement
was clearly of a commercial nature. Nevertheless, "[t]he fact that the
particular advertisement. . . [was in] appellant's commercial interest
did not negate all First Amendment guarantees." 144 The content of the
advertisement, however, was of "public interest."14 5 While the means

of communication were purely commercial, the ends sought were also
political. Thus, the Court did not place purely commercial expression

completely under first amendment protection. Justice Blackmun indicated, however, that "[t]he relationship of speech to the marketplace of

products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas." 146

First amendment protection for commercial speech was established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,147 in which the Court examined a regulation
prohibiting price advertising of prescription drugs. 148 The Court considered the constitutional dimension of purely commercial speech and

concluded that it did not lack all first amendment protection, 149 although the private right to advertise is "purely economic."' 150 The con143. 421 U.S. at 817.
144. Id. at 818. The Court concluded: "The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement involved sales or 'solicitations,' or because appellant was paid for printing it, or because appellant's motive or the motive of the advertiser
may have involved financial gain." 1d.
145. Id. at 822.
146. Id. at 826. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, would have denied the advertisement in
Bigelow all protection under the first amendment. In his view, the advertisement was "a
classic commercial proposition directed toward the exchange of services rather than the exchange of ideas." Id. at 831. He would, therefore, have applied a limited rationality-ofrelationship test, with the burden of persuasion on the individual. On this basis, he would
have upheld the statute given that "the States have a strong interest in the prevention of
commercial advertising in the health field." Id. at 832.
147. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
148. The Court had upheld similar prohibitions when challenged on substantive due
process and equal protection grounds. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v.
Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
149. 425 U.S. at 762. The Court noted that economically motivated speech retained
overtones of public political interest found in traditionally protected speech. Commercial
expression is "indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not
say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal." Id. at 765 (footnotes
omitted).
150. Id. at 762. Justice Rehnquist argued that the application of first amendment protection to commercial speech inappropriately applies laissez-faire economic principles to
limit the states' regulatory authority. "[Tihere is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in
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also

of

constitutional notice, for "that interest may be as keen, if not keener by

far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."' 5 1 The
Court emphasized, however, society's interest in an efficiently functioning competitive marketplace. "So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable."' 152 The Court thereby elevated a
precondition of competitive efficiency to the status of a constitutional
property right. The free flow of commercial information as well as its
effects on the private marketplace required the availability of first
153
amendment protection.
In VirginiaState Board,the Court expressly incorporated commercial speech into the ambit of first amendment protection. 154 The Court
there considered a standardized commodity-prescription drugs. In
subsequent decisions, the Court has added different kinds of commodities to the commercial activities protected by the first amendment.
These have included real estate,' 55 "routine legal services,"' 156 promotional advertising by public utilities, 57 and billboards.' 58 It has also
its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession." Id. at 784. He criticized the
majority's intervention as an abuse of discretion typified by the substantive due process doctrine. Courts should "not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies who are elected to pass laws." Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730 (1963)). He would afford the rights in issue the most limited level of constitutional
protection and apply Level IV scrutiny. Id. at 790.
151. Id. at 763.
152. Id. at 765.
153. "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as
is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both." Id. at 756 (footnotes omitted).
154. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980), Justice Powell defined commercial speech in two distinct ways. First, it was
defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Id. at 561. Somewhat more narrowly, commercial speech was defined as "speech
proposing a commercial transaction." Id. at 562. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
took exception to these definitions. He concluded the first was too broad; it encompassed all
speech entitled to maximum protection under the first amendment. He thought the second
was too narrow; it did not include the entire range of communication protected under the
commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 579-80. (Stevens, J., concurring). For a discussion of
CentralHudson, see notes 181-83 & accompanying text infra.
The extension of first amendment protection to commercial speech has generated considerable commentary and disagreement. See note 135 supra.
155. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977).
156. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See notes 162-66 infra.
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solicitation by lawyers 59
reviewed regulations prohibiting in-person 16
0
and the use of trade names by optometrists.
These cases necessarily have involved the Court in the creation of
an appropriate standard of first amendment review. Three separate
standards have evolved. The Court has recognized that commercial information can only enhance aggregate information when it is truthful.
To the extent that a "right to deceptively advertise" may be said to
exist, it has, therefore, been disfavored by the Court. The time, place or
manner of communication may be regulated only on a content-neutral
basis and when alternative avenues of communication are available.
Regulations predicated upon the content of suppressed commercial expression were initially prohibited per se. This blanket first amendment
ban, however, has evolved into a four-step balancing process that assesses the importance of the legislature's purpose and the substantiality
of the relationship between that purpose and the narrowly drawn
means designed to effectuate it.
Commercial information has the potential to enhance aggregate
economic welfare when it is accurate and reliable. In Virginia State
Board, Justice Blackmun recognized that the regulation of deceptive
advertising was a permissible public purpose supporting the imposition
of regulatory constraints on commercial speech. 16' In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,162 explicitly recognizing that "the public and private
benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy
157. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). See notes 181-83 & accompanying text infra.
158. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (1981). See notes 184-203 &
accompanying text infra.
159. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 437 U.S. 447 (1978). See notes 167-69 & accompanying text infra.
160. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). See notes 170-72 & accompanying text
infra.
161. "The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from
insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely." 425 U.S.
at 771-72. Justice Stewart, concurring in Virginia State Board, agreed that commercial
speech has constitutional dimension, but was concerned with the states' continued capacity
to regulate false and misleading advertising. This concern, at least implicitly, caused him to
reason that allegedly deceptive commercial speech deserves less rigorous levels of scrutiny.
"The scope of constitutional protection of communicative expression is not universally inelastic." Id. at 778. "Indeed, the elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to promote
the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment
protection-its contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private decisionmaking." Id. at 781.
162. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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and reliability,"1 63 Justice Blackmun denied deceptive advertising even
that benefit of constitutional doubt customarily accorded misleading
political speech, a more fragile form of expression. 164 Because issues of
deception were not before the Court, however, these statements were
dicta. The advertisement in question only informed consumers of the
availability and price of "routine legal services"; it contained no

"claims, extravagant or otherwise, as to the quality of services."'' 65 The
regulation was a prohibition of truthful commercial speech and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The first amendment costs to lawyers, their
prospective clients, and the system of justice outweighed the putative
66
benefits of that prohibition.

163. Id. at 383. "Advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to
restraint." Id.
Justice Powell dissented, arguing that legal services are not standardized as were the
prescription drugs in Virginia State Board. The majority's failure to recognize the significance of this distinction, in his view, also "fails to give appropriate weight to the two fundamental ways in which the advertising of professional services presents a different issue from
that before the Court with respect to tangible products: the vastly increased potential for
deception and the enhanced difficulty of effective regulation in the public interest." 433 U.S.
at 391 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). His view did not prevail in Bates, but he
convinced a majority of the Court to approve a wholly analogous rationale in Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). For a discussion of Friedman v. Rogers, see text accompanying notes 170-72 infra.
164. "[T]he leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed in
other contexts has little force in the commercial arena." 433 U.S. at 383.
In Bates, Justice Blackmun rejected the use of the overbreadth doctrine in commercial
speech cases. Id. at 379-80. This doctrine has provided a broad scope for determining
standing in first amendment cases. "This Court often has recognized that a defendant's
standing to challenge a statute on First Amendment grounds as facially overbroad does not
depend upon whether his own activity is shown to be constitutionally privileged." Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815 (1975) (Blackmun, J.); see also Note, The FirstAmendment
OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). In Bigelow, the Court left undecided
the availability of overbreadth analysis in commercial speech cases. 421 U.S. at 818. In
Bates, Justice Blackmun declined to incorporate this form of scrutiny into first amendment
protection of commercial speech. "The reason for the special rule in First Amendment cases
is apparent: An overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech. . . . But the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary
commercial context. . . . Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."
433 U.S. at 380-81. The inapplicability of overbreadth analysis in commercial speech cases
was confirmed in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 565 n.8 (1980).
165. 433 U.S. at 366.
166. Justice Blackmun's balancing of regulatory costs and benefits was quite detailed
and extensive. Throughout this analysis, he demonstrated a keen awareness of the political
economic function of freely flowing commercial information and the costs and benefits of its
regulation. For example, when assessing the alleged public purpose of preserving the administration ofjustice from the adverse effects of advertising legal services, he stated: "Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier to inform a
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When a lawyer attempted to solicit clients in person, however, the
pressure of solicitation greatly increased the risk of deception. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAssociation,167 the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Powell, upheld the indefinite suspension of an attorney who had
personally sought to represent two teenage automobile accident victis. "[I]n-person solicitation of professional employment does not
stand on a par with truthful advertising . . let alone with forms of
speech more traditionally within the concern of the First Amendment."' 168 The burden of persuasion, therefore, was placed on the at69
torney to demonstrate unconstitutionality.1
The potential for deception determined constitutionality in Friedman v.Rogers,170 in which the Court upheld a Texas law prohibiting
the use of trade names in optometry. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, observed that "there is a significant possibility that trade
names will be used to mislead the public."'' 1 The state's interest in
protecting consumers from deception was neither "speculative" nor
"hypothetical" and justified the regulatory costs imposed on trade72
name optometrists.1
potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue
likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and
the unknowledgeable. A rule allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with the
bar's obligation to 'facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in
making legal services fully available.' ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-1
(1976)." Id. at 376-77.
167. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Cf.In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (finding NAACP's solicitation of prospective litigants to be expressive and associational conduct protected by the
first amendment).
168. Id. at 455.
169. Id. at 457.
170. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
171. Id. at 12-13. Justice Powell also explained the status of deceptive advertising in
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
"The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.
The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity." Id. at 563-64. Somewhat cryptically, and in seeming contradiction to both his own and the general doctrine on deceptive
advertising, he also stated: "Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is
better than no information at all." Id. at 562. Incomplete information, apparently, need not
be misleading.
172. 440 U.S. at 13. The majority also took a dim view of the type of speech.involved.
"[A trade name] has no intrinsic meaning. A trade name conveys no information about the
price and nature of the services offered by the optometrists until it acquires meaning over a
period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the name and some
standard of price or quality." Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). The value of a trade name as a
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The substantive standards for reviewing time, place, and manner
of regulations of commercial speech were specified by Justice Blackmun in Virginia State Board. "We have often approved restrictions
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest,
and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."' 17 3 In Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro,'174 Justice Marshall relied on these standards
to invalidate an ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs on the lawns of the township's homes. The ordinance did not fulfill a significant, or even a legitimate, public purpose. "Willingboro has proscribed particular types of signs based on
their content because it fears their 'primary' effect-that they will cause
those receiving the information to act upon it."' 75 Moreover, it failed
76
to leave open "ample" alternative channels of communication. 1
The substantive standards for review of prohibitions of commerproperty right protected from appropriation was recognized by the Court. However, "a
property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge or diminish the First
Amendment protection of that communication." Id. at 12 n. 11.
Justice Blackmun took exception to the majority's view: "Trade names are a vital form
of commercial speech." Id. at 22 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, therefore, would have granted trade names commercial speech protection.
173. 425 U.S. at 771.
174. 431 U.S. 85 (1977); cf Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting solicitations by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75% of receipts for "charitable purposes" as unconstitutionally overbroad): "[B]ecause charitable solicitation does more than inform possible economic
decisions and is not primarily concerned of providing information about the characeristics
and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely
commercial speech." See also United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a prohibition of all
residential picketing except that related to labor disputes); Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
175. 431 U.S. at 94. "If the ordinance is to be sustained, it must be on the basis of the
township's interest in regulating the content of the communication, and not on any interest
on regulating the form." 1d.
When the Court rejected the validity of the ordinance as a time, place, and manner
regulation, the town argued that its goal was important and its means sufficiently related to
that goal to justify content-based suppression. Id. at 94-96. Justice Marshall agreed that the
legislative goal-"promoting stable, racially integrated housing"-was of importance. 431
U.S. at 94. Nevertheless, Willingboro had "failed to establish that this ordinance is needed
to assure that Willingboro remains an integrated community." Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
He therefore relied on Level I scrutiny to protect the private interests involved.
176. "The options to which sellers realistically are relegated ... involve more cost and
less autonomy ... are less likely to reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information
The alterna. . . and may be less effective media for communicating the message ....
fives, then, are far from satisfactory." Id. at 93.
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cial speech, based on its content, have evolved from an absolute constitutional ban into a four-step process that identifies, weighs, and
balances regulatory costs and benefits. This doctrinal evolution is illustrated by the juxtaposition of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in
Virginia State Board with Justice Powell's majority opinion in Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York. 177 The difficulties in applying the new fourstep balancing process consistently became apparent in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego.

178

In VirginiaState Board,Justice Blackmun established blanket protection for commercial speech against content-based prohibition:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them .... The choice among these alternative approaches is not
ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this
kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its abuse
if it is freely available that the First Amend17 9
ment makes for us.
80
To be valid, a regulation may not keep consumers in ignorance.'
Such a suppression of commercial speech would be invalidated, therefore, if the Virginia State Board criteria had prevailed.
In CentralHudson, Justice Pgqwell enunciated a four-step balancing test, modeled on Level II permissible purpose-rationality of relationship scrutiny, for examining the suppression of advertising that
promotes the availability, quality, or price of goods and services in
trade.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.' 8 '
177. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
178. 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
179. 425 U.S. at 770.
180. "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists; ... [b]ut it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful
terms that competing pharmacists are offering." Id. at 770.
181. 447 U.S. at 566. Dissenting in CentralHudson,Justice Rehnquist inveighed against
the Court's return to the "bygone era ofLochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which it
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Justice Powell's commercial speech test did not provide blanket
protection against the content-based suppression of advertising. The
ambit of first amendment protection was narrowed and no longer included a right to advertise illegal activities or to advertise in a deceptive
manner. Justice Powell's test then followed permissible purpose-rationality of relationship scrutiny at Level II. Government interests
should be "substantial"; means should "directly advance" the legislature's ends and should not be more intrusive of the right to commercial
information than is necessary.
Under Justice Powell's test, the regulation prohibiting Central
Hudson from promoting the consumption of its electricity in its advertising was unconstitutional. Justice Powell found that commercial
speech was implicated, that the government's interests were "clear and
substantial,"' 8 2 and that the regulation directly advanced the state's interest in energy conservation. Nevertheless, the prohibition was invalid
because alternative and less intrusive means were available to accomplish the regulatory goals.' 83 The state had not carried its burden of
persuasion at all four analytical steps. The regulatory costs imposed on
the right by the means of regulation outweighed the benefits to the
public.
Justice Powell's four-step CentralHudson test was relied upon by
both the plurality and the concurring Justices in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego. 184 The city had enacted an ordinance prohibiting
outdoor advertising display signs in commercial and industrial areas,
but permitting two exceptions to its general ban: on-site commercial
signs and billboards conveying twelve specific categories of noncommercial political and social messages. 8 5 Justice White rendered the
plurality opinion for Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Justices
was common practice for the Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State
based on the Court's own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement
its considered policies." 447 U.S. at 589. Justice Rehnquist viewed the prohibition on promotional advertising in issue as "more akin to an economic regulation to which virtually
complete deference should be accorded by this Court," id. at 591, and thus would use Level
IV scrutiny to defer to the legislature. He apparently had far greater faith in the wisdom of
regulators than in the "invisible hand" of the marketplace. "There is no reason for believing
that the marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more than there is to
believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions in the commercial market." Id. at 592.
182. Id. at 569.
183. "The Commission also has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant's commercial expression." Id. at 570.
184. 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
185. d. at 4926-27.
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Brennan and Blackmun concurred. The Chief Justice 186 and Justices
Rehnquist 187 and Stevens 188 dissented.
Limiting the plurality's analysis of first amendment values to the
"law of billboards,"'' 89 Justice White first "observe[d] the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, indicating that the
former could be forbidden and regulated in situations where the latter

could not be."' 190 As a ban on off-site commercial billboards, the regulation withstood CentralHudson scrutiny. 19 1 The advertisements were

neither unlawful nor deceptive. The city's twin purposes, traffic safety
and the advancement of its esthetic interests, were substantial. In addi-

tion, the ordinance was no broader than necessary to fulfill those goals
and directly advanced them. The plurality, however, eschewed analyti-

cal predictability and chose to rely upon Level IV presumptions rather
than the Level II presumptions established in CentralHudson. Recog-

nizing that the meager record did not adequately show the connection
between the billboards and traffic safety, and that "esthetic judgments
186. Chief Justice Burger would follow Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), and defer
to the local legislative judgment of San Diego. "This is the long arm and voracious appetite
of federal power-this time judicial power-with a vengeance, reaching and absorbing
traditional concepts [of] local authority." 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2917 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger set forth a test: "Although we must ensure that any regulation of
speech 'further[s] a sufficiently substantial governmental interest,' given a reasonable approach to a perceived problem, this Court's duty is not to make the primary policy decisions
but instead is to determine whether the legislative approach is essentially neutral to the
messages conveyed and leaves open other adequate means of conveying those messages."
Id. at 2920. He would thus replace Level II rationality of relationship analysis with a Level
IV standard of review that is merely neutral in content. Cf.id at 2897-99 (Justice White's
critique of the Chief Justice's view).
187. Justice Rehnquist, like the Chief Justice, recoiled from what he believed to be the
excessive judicial activism of the plurality and concurring opinions. "Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to believe that a judge is in any better position than a city or
county commission to make decisions in an area such as aesthetics. Therefore, little can be
gained in the area of constitutional law, and much lost in the process of democratic decisionmaking, by allowing individual judges in city after city to second-guess such legislative or
administrative determinations." Id. at 2925 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188. Justice Stevens stated, as a preliminary matter, that "a city may entirely ban one
medium of communication." Id. at 2910 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[I1n my judgment the
constitutionality of a prohibition of outdoor advertising involves two separate questions.
First, is there any reason to believe that the regulation is biased in favor of one point of view
or another, or that it is a subtle method of regulating the controversial subjects that may be
placed on the agenda for public debate? Second, is it fair to conclude that the market which
remains open for the communication of both popular and unpopular ideas is ample and not
threatened with gradually increasing restraints?" Id. at 2915 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2889.
190. Id. at 2892.
191. Id. at 2892-95.
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are necessarily subjective,"' 192 Justice White nevertheless stated: "[A]
legislative judgment that billboards are traffic hazards is not manifestly
unreasonable and should not be set aside. . . . It is not speculative to
recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and
however constructed, can be perceived an 'esthetic harm.' "193 Although the ordinance was underinclusive, because it permitted on-site
commercial billboards while prohibiting all others, it nevertheless reflected a reasonable, and therefore constitutional, judgment by the
city. 194 As a regulation of commercial speech, San Diego's ordinance
was constitutionally valid.
The plurality, however, found that the ordinance was not a constitutionally valid regulation of noncommercial speech. Three rationales
were advanced by Justice White. First, "our recent commercial speech
cases have consistently accorded noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than commercial speech."' 9 5 By permitting on-site
commercial advertising but not on-site noncommercial advertising, San
Diego in effect had inverted the Court's hierarchy of first amendment
protection. 96 Second, by exempting twelve kinds of noncommercial
speech from its general ban, the city had attempted unconstitutionally
to control the content of permissible speech. "Although the city may
distinguish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech . . . [w]ith respect to noncommercial speech, the city
may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse."'' 7 Finally, the ordinance was not a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of noncommercial speech. "Signs that are banned are banned
everywhere and at all times."' 98 The ordinance failed to provide sufficient alternative means of communication. 9 In addition, "the ordinance distinguishes in several ways between permissible and
impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to their
2
content."z o
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred. Treating
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 2894.
Id. at 2893.
Id. at 2895.
Id.

196. "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their content
to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the communication of commercial
information concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of greater
value than the communication of noncommercial messages." Id.
197. Id. at 2896.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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the ordinance as a total ban of billboards, 20 ' the concurrence would

require the city to "show that a sufficiently substantial governmental
interest is directly furthered... and that any more narrowly drawn
restrictions, i.e., anything less than a total ban, would promote less well
the achievement of that goal. ' 20 2 Thus, the concurrence, as had the
plurality, would rely on the CentralHudson standards of review but,

unlike the plurality, would place the burden of persuasion on the city
through use of Level II scrutiny. The concurrence thus treated the or-

prohibition of both commercial and
dinance as an unconstitutional
20 3
noncommercial speech.
The importance of the right to commercial information has

evolved with the substantive standards available for its review. In Pittsburgh Press2°4 andBigelow, 205 the Court, still influenced by Valentine v.

Chrestensen20 6 and unwilling to confer constitutional dimension on
commercial advertising having no political content, relied on Level IV

scrutiny. Subsequently, when the purpose underlying the regulation
was to insure the truthfulness of advertising, in Ohralik20 7 and Friedman,20 8 Level III scrutiny was utilized. Time, place, and manner regulations must be constitutionally justified by the state under Level II

analysis. In Linmark, Justice Marshall went so far as to require that

20 9
the legislative means be "necessary" to the fulfillment of its ends.

The prohibition of commercial speech ordinarily has been scrutinized
at Level II. In Virginia State Board and Bates, Justice Blackmun was
not explicit in his ranking of the right. Nevertheless, he indicated in

Virginia State Board that "common sense differences between speech
that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' and other
varieties" 210 justified "a different degree of protection."21 1 That protecconcurring). The plurality apparently believed that the
201. Id. at 2901 (Brennan, J.,
ordinance did not present the total prohibition issue. See id.at 2896 n.20.
202. Id. at 2903.
203. Justices Brennan and Blackmun were also concerned that the plurality's grant of
substantial discretion to city officials to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
speech "presents a real danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating
commercial speech." Id. at 2907.
204. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
205. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
206. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See notes 136-37 & accompanying text supra.
207. See notes 167-69 & accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 170-72 & accompanying text supra.
209. See note 175 & accompanying text supra.
210. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
211. Id. at 771-72 n.24. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger agreed that
more limited first amendment protection was necessary in the area of commercial speech:
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tion was also clearly of lesser degree. The "greater objectivity and hardiness" 21 2 of commercial speech made it less necessary to use the
virtually irrebuttable presumptions relied on to protect political speech.
In Justice Powell's CentralHudson balancing test, the right to commercial information also had constitutional importance; thus, Level II scru-

tiny was relied upon.

"The Court review[s] with special care

regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue
a nonspeech related policy. ' 21 3 Moreover, the four-step analysis required a "substantial" governmental interest and a "direct" relationship between means and ends. The "lesser protection [accorded] to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-

sion"214 was justified by its "greater objectivity and hardiness.

' 215

Jus-

tice Powell thus affirmed Justice Blackmun's evaluation of the
constitutional importance of commercial speech.
In Justice Powell's view in CentralHudson, however, the level of

scrutiny available to protect commercial speech from suppression
turned not only on the "nature. . .of the expression," but also on the
"governmental interests served by its regulation. ' 2 16 This adhoc juxta"'[T]he differences between commercial price and product advertising ... and ideological
communication' allow the States a scope in regulating the former that would be unacceptable under the First Amendment with respect to the latter." Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 771-72 n.24. Justice Blackmun justified his reliance on Level II scrutiny by
suggesting that the truth of commercial information "may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator" than may other forms of speech. Id. "Also, commercial speech may be more
durable than other kinds," because it is motivated by the advertiser's desire for profit. Id.
"[T]here is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely."
Id.
213. 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
214. 447 U.S. at 563.
215. 425 U.S. 772 n.24.
216. 447 U.S. at 563. Concurring in CentralHudson, Justice Blackmun, joined by Jusices Brennan and Stevens, took exception to the majority's use of Level II scrutiny. They
would have relied upon Level I: "I agree with the Court that this level of intermediate
scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers
from misleading or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of
commercial speech. I do not agree, however, that the Court's four-part test is the proper one
to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or outlawed
directly." Id. at 573. In Blackmun's opinion, a state regulation that attempts to suppress
information about the availability or price of legally offered goods or services is never permissible. "I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability
and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to 'dampen'
demand for or use of the product." Id. at 574. Moreover, he would not distinguish between
commercial and political speech. "No differences between commercial speech and other
protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information." -d. at 578.
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position of the private right and the public welfare made the depth of
the Court's substantive analysis more difficult to manage consistently.
Indeed, in Metromedia,217 the plurality's reliance on Level IV scrutiny
to assess the directness of the relationship between San Diego's goals
and the means chosen to implement them illustrate the analytical pitfalls inherent in relying on ad hoc balancing to determine the applicable level of scrutiny. The public welfare purposes that may be
advanced to justify the suppression of commercial information are
likely to be far more complex and laden with legislative value judgments than are the purposes of preventing deception or controlling
time, place, and manner. To the extent that the Court will continue to
depart from its consistent reliance on Level II scrutiny, the risk of
abuse and uncertainty in the exercise of judicial discretion will
increase.
The advent of first amendment protection for "speech proposing a
commercial transaction" 218 reveals the Burger Court's creation of doctrine in a new area of constitutional review. Such speech, when truthful, may be controlled in the time, place, and manner of its
communication by only the least intrusive of regulations. The Court
has more readily deferred to legislative judgment in matters of deceptive advertising. Commercial speech may be suppressed only when the
state has demonstrated that its regulation furthers an important public
purpose by direct means that are only as intrusive as necessary.
Regulations of commercial speech have been held unconstitutional
when the constitutional costs of regulation to the public, the consumer,
or the advertiser exceed the purported benefits to the public welfare. In
so holding, the Court has given constitutional dimension and protection to a private economic right that is a precondition to optimizing
competitive efficiency. The Court's evolution of commercial speech
doctrine shows active management of its political discretion. Specified
substantive standards of review and established levels of scrutiny have
permitted it to weigh and balance regulatory costs and benefits with a
relatively high degree of consistency and predictability.
The Right to Enter the Marketplace

The Burger Court has distinguished three interests associated with
the right of entry to the marketplace: the right to compete, the right to
remain a competitor, and the right to enter interstate competition. The
217. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
218. 447 U.S. at 562. See note 154 supra. See also 425 U.S. at 762.
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private interest denied in the right to compete cases has been a license
to enter the marketplace. The Court has relied upon substantive due
process and equal protection to weigh and balance the costs of denial to
the prospective licensee against the benefits accruing to the public from
limiting market access to qualified individuals, but has not yet recognized a constitutional value in the public costs inherent in arbitrarily
limited market access. The Court has applied Level IV scrutiny unless
the right to compete was linked with a suspect or semi-suspect classification. The Court has protected the right to remain in the marketplace
with procedural due process scrutiny of the suspension or termination
of licenses previously issued. Initially this right generated Level II
scrutiny. In more recent opinions, the Court has increasingly deferred
to legislative judgments: the benefit of promptly removing the licensee
from the marketplace has outweighed the costs of license removal without a hearing. The right of interstate entry has been protected under
the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV. While using Level I to scrutinize regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce, the Court has assessed merely burdensome regulations at Level II. The Court has clearly recognized the economic benefits created when an open, national marketplace is
maintained. Private and national regulatory costs ordinarily have outweighed local public benefits in these cases.
The Right to Compete

The fourteenth amendment states: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
2 19
law."
The right to compete has found constitutional recognition in both
substantive due process and equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment. 220 Unlike the rights of exclusion 22 1 and commercial
speech, 222 no provision in the Constitution explicitly protects the right
to enter the competitive marketplace. The cases considering the right
to compete have involved the denial of a license, the regulatory prerequisite to entry. The Court has weighed and balanced the private costs
of denying the license to the prospective licensee against the benefits
accruing to the public from restricting entry to qualified individuals.
219.
220.
221.
222.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See notes 241-49 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 52-100 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 134-218 & accompanying text supra.
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The Court has not included in its costs-benefits balance the economic
costs to society from inappropriately restricted market access. Thus,
the right to compete has been afforded heightened scrutiny only when
linked with a suspect or semi-suspect classification.
Historically, the due process and equal protection clauses have

been the Supreme Court's principal vehicles for limiting the scope of
regulatory authority. They have a common doctrinal heritage, 22 3 and

both continue to rely on the permissible purpose-rationality of relationship model to weigh and balance the costs of enforcing economic regu-

lations against their benefits to the community. Substantive due
process has been used by the Court to scrutinize virtually any characteristic of the means used to implement regulatory goals. Equal protection analysis ordinarily is focused on the legislature's means of
classification.
Due process was originally conceptualized and applied as a procedural limitation on the powers of government. 224 In the late nineteenth
century, due process was entrusted, after some reluctance, 225 with substantive authority over economic regulation. 226 From 1905 to 1933,
substantive due process was the Court's primary vehicle for enforcing
its laissez faire doctrines and preventing the incursion of regulation

into the private marketplace. Many of the cases of this period remain
valid. 227

2 28
Others, particularly those based on Lochner v. New York,

223. See R. MoTr, DuE PROCESS OF LAW 275-99 (1926).
224. See notes 271-72 & accompanying text infra.
225. See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884); The Slaughter House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See generally Reznick, supra note 108, at 34-36.
226. The Court independently reviewed challenged legislation's purposes and effects.
"If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661
(1887); see also Brown, Due Processof Law, PolicePower and the Supreme Court, 40 HIARv.
L. REv. 943, 947 (1927).
The general expansion in the definition of the property rights open to due process
clause protection was noted in Brown, supra at 98-102; Corwin, The Doctrine ofDue Process
ofLaw Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. REV. 366, 468 (1911); Corwin, The Supreme Court
and the FourteenthAmendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643, 664 (1909); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE Li. 454, 461 (1909); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally Reznick, supra note 108, at 36-37.
227. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912);
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549 (1911); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S. 561 (1906); Holden v.
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have been repudiated. 22 9 In Lochner, the Court relied on presumptions
against constitutionality when assessing legislative purposes and
means. 230 In its progeny, the Court inclusively defined the economic
rights deserving constitutional dimension 23 1 and identified the regulatory costs and benefits to be weighed and balanced on an ad hoc basis. 2 32 Substantive due process based on Lochner was thus an abuse of
the Court's political discretion, for it was both unrestrained and unfocused. Substantive due process was abandoned by New Deal Courts
in favor of a more carefully balanced analysis.2 33 After 1940, it succumbed entirely to the "well-nigh conclusive" presumption in favor of
constitutionality. 2 34 Post-New Deal Courts consistently deferred to legHardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). For a discussion of Village of Euclid, see text accompanying
notes 442-45 infra.
228. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928); Ribnik
v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Jay Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
229. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156, 167 (1973) (overruling Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928)); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941) (overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928));
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 386, 400 (1936) (overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). For a discussion of Snyder's Drug Stores, see text accompanying note 244 infra.
230. "The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself
must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes
with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in
relation to his own labor." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905).
231. "The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned." Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
589 (1897).
232. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
233. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933); see
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
234. "[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (emphasis added). See generally V. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1951); Beaird, In Their Own Image: The Refraining
of the Due Process Clause by the United States Supreme Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 479 (1979);
McCloskey, Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court: 4n Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34; Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL L. REV. 405
(1977); Preston & Mehhmen, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on the Reach of State
Legislation.: An HistoricalandAnalytical Examination of Substantive Due Process, 8 BALT.
L. REV. I (1978); Ratner, The "New" Substantive Due Process andthe DemocraticEthos: 4
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43; Stephenson, The Supreme Court & Constitutional
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islative judgments of economic regulatory policy.
With the demise of substantive due process, the Court began to

develop strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. 235 During the heyday
of substantive due process, equal protection was of limited use. When
relied upon, it required only the most minimal relationship between
legislatively chosen classifications and the purposes they were designed
to serve.236 This mere rationality Level IV scrutiny is still relied upon
by the Court when dealing with insignificant economic rights, such as

the right to compete, standing alone.237 In contrast, strict scrutiny
equal protection analysis uses the Level I virtually irrebuttable presumption against constitutionality. It has been relied upon in situations
involving suspect classifications or fundamental interests.23 8 The BurChange: Lochner v. New York Revisited, 21 VILL. L. REv. 217 (1976); Strong, The Economic
Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 419
(1973); Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Princile and Economic Due Process, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Tribe, Forword"Towarda Model of Roles in the Due Processof
Lfe & Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestionfor the
Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951); Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
235. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See generally
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
236. See, e.g., Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Metropolis Theater Co.
v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911);
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
In McGowen v. Maryland, the Court expressed its contemporary conceptualization of Level
IV mere rationality scrutiny: "State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S. at 425-26. But see Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957),
overruledin City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). For a discussion of
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, see text accompanying notes 248-49 infra.
237. See notes 241-49 & accompanying text supra.
238. See generally Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical
Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.L 3 (1981); Forum: EqualProtection andthe Burger
Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975); Fox, EqualProtectionAnalysis: Laurence Tribe,
The Middle Tier,and the Role ofthe Court, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 525 (1980); Gunther, ForewordIn Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 4 Modelfor a Newer Protection, 86
HARv. L.REv. 1 (1972); Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guaranteeof Equal Protection, 55
N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977): Karst, Foreword*Equal Citizenshp Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HAtv. L. REv. 1 (1977); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the
Return of the "Watural-Law-DueProcess"Formula,16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969); Nowak,
NeuRealigningthe StandardsofReview Under the EqualProtection Guarantee-Prohibited,
tral,and Permissive Classfcations, 62 GEo. LJ. 1071 (1974); Perry, Modern EqualProtec-
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ger Court, however, early moved to restrain the political authority implicit in strict scrutiny equal protection analysis239 and has instead
24
grown to rely more on Level II rationality of relationship scrutiny.
tion:.A ConceptualizationandAppraisal,79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Simson, A Method
for Analyzing DiscriminatoryEffects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV.
663 (1977); Stone, Equal Protection and the Searchfor Justice, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Wheeler, In Defense of Economic EqualProtection, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, the EqualProtectionClause, andthe Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Winter, The ChangingParametersof Substantive Equal Protection: From the Warren to the Burger Era, 23 EMORY L.J. 657 (1974); Wright, Judicial
Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1980); Yarbrough,
The Burger Court and UnspecifiedRights. On ProtectingFundamentalandNot-so-Fundamental 'Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Concept of Equal Protection, 1977 DUKE L.J.
143; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
239. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973): "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
Rather, the answer lies in assessing
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws ....
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
Early restraint in equal protection analysis was also apparent in government entitlement cases. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970), the Court made clear its
reliance on Level IV virtually irrebuttable presumptions. Justice Stewart stated, for example, "[i]t is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination." Id. at 487. Level IV scrutiny has prevailed in a large number of subsequent
cases. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170
(1978); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Mathews
v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 (1978);
Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977); Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977); Alexander
v. Fioto, 430 U.S. 634 (1977); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361 (1974). But see United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
The Burger Court has, however, relied on heightened equal protection scrutiny when
assessing suspect classifications in the distribution of government entitlements. Its heightened scrutiny alienage cases have included Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See note 250 infra. See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976). Its illegitimacy cases have included Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972). For a discussion of its sex discrimination government entitlement
cases, see note 259 infra. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
240. Sliding scale scrutiny was enunciated in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in
Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970): "In my view, equal protection analysis
of this case is not appreciably advanced by the aprioridefinition of a 'right,' fundamental or
otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the
classification." (footnote omitted); see also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Burger Court has decided three cases involving the alleged
regulatory infringement of the right to compete standing alone: North
Dakota State Boardof Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. ,241 New
Motor Vehicle Boardof California v. Orrin W. Fox Co. ,242 and Ciy of
New Orleansv. Dukes.243 Snyder's DrugStores and Orrin W. Fox were
both decided under substantive due process. Dukes was decided under
the equal protection clause. In each, the Court presumed constitutionality, using Level IV scrutiny, to uphold the regulations in question.
In Snyder's Drug Stores, a statute required certain professional
qualifications for a permit to operate a pharmacy. Justice Douglas's
opinion for the majority was characteristic of the demise of substantive
due process: it examined neither costs nor benefits. Justice Douglas
merely quoted extensively from post-New Deal opinions, which he and
Justice Black had authored, to establish complete judicial deference to
legislative judgments. 2A4
In Orrin W. Fox, a California statute required prior administrative
approval for the opening or relocation of an automobile dealership if
requested by a competing dealer. The Court was faced with both procedural and substantive due process challenges. 24 5 Concerning procedural due process, the Court held that "California was not required to
provide for a prior individualized hearing each and every time the provisions of the Act had the effect of delaying consummation of the business plans of particular individuals." 246 Concerning substantive due
241. 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
242. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
243. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
244. For example, Justice Douglas quoted from Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 73132 (1963): "We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,' and
we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to
strike down state laws, regulation of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' Nor are we
able or willing to draw lines by calling a law 'prohibitory' or 'regulatory.' Whether the
legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other
is no concern of ours. ... [R]eief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body
constituted to pass laws. . . ." 414 U.S. at 165-66.
245. Fox, a franchisee, and General Motors, a franchisor, were required to seek administrative approval for a proposed relocation. Challenging the regulation's facial constitutionality on the basis of its adverse impact on competition, they contended that "absent a
prior individualized trial-type hearing they. . .[have] a due process protected interest right
to franchise at will. . . ." 439 U.S. at 106.
246. Id. at 108. Justice Stevens dissented. He agreed that the right to enter and compete
is of constitutional insignificance, but treated the Act as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to existing, established franchisees. The "special benefit," id. at 120, conferred on these individuals gave them the "unfettered ability to invoke the power of the
State to restrain the liberty and impair the contractual arrangements of their new competi-
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process, the Court also used a virtually irrebuttable presumption:
"'For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough
to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.' ",247
In Dukes, a New Orleans ordinance prohibited vendors from selling food in the French Quarter, but exempted two vendors who had

more than twenty years of seniority. In a per curiam opinion, the
Court explicitly indicated that economic rights standing alone are constitutionally insignificant under the equal protection clause. 248 Great
2 49
deference was granted to legislative judgments.
Standing alone, the right to compete has not been accorded signifitors," and thus served only private advantage. Id. at 127. In his view, this power could not
withstand a procedural due process challenge. "Such a statute blatantly offends the principles of fair notice, attention to the merits, and neutral dispute resolution that inform the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This statute simply cannot bear the Court's
creative recharacterization as a general-and substantively constitutional-rule governing
when and how dealerships may be established and relocated." Id. at 127.
247. Id. at 111 (quoting Exxon v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978)). The
Court noted: "Even if the right to franchise had constituted a protected interest when California enacted the Automobile Franchise Act, California's Legislature was still constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of business regulation that imposed reasonable
restrictions upon the exercise of the right. '[T]he fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited
without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited.'"
439 U.S. at 106 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965)). At least since the demise of
the concept of 'substantive due process' in the area of economic regulation, this Court has
recognized that, '[legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic
problems.... '" 439 U.S. at 106-07 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963)); see also id. at 114 (Blackmun, J., concurring): "In asserting a right to franchise at
will and a right to franchise without delay, appellees are essentially asserting a right to be
free from state economic regulation. But any claim the appellees may have to be free from
state economic regulation is foreclosed by the substantive due process cases, such as Ferguson P.Skrupa." Justice Blackmun, moreover, denied the existence of a constitutional property interest cognizable under the fourteenth amendment. "[T]he abstract expectation of a
new franchise does not qualify as a property interest." Id. at 113. Justice Marshall, concurring, wrote: "In view of the substantial public interest at stake and the short lapse of time
between notice and hearing, the Due Process Clause does not dictate a contrary legislative
decision." Id. at 112-13.
248. "When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. . . . [O]ur decisions presume the
constitutionality of statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude
in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions
may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only
partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future
regulation." 427 U.S. at 303.
249. "We cannot say that these judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection." Id. at 305.
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cant constitutional protection by the Burger Court. The Court has per-

mitted the right to compete to bear any and all costs of regulation. It
has declined to recognize either the public costs of artificially limiting
entry or the role regulation can play in enhancing competitive efficiency. Thus, it has declined to weigh and balance the substantive merits of the competing claims under either the due process clause or the

equal protection clause. Instead, the Court has deferred to legislative
judgments.
Judicial deference, however, has given way to heightened scrutiny
in two cases linking the right to compete with the suspect classification
of alienage. 250 In In re Grofths25 1 and ExaminingBoard of Engineers,
Architects and Surveyors v. F/ores de Otero,252 the Court relied on

Level I equal protection strict scrutiny review to invalidate regulations
prohibiting resident aliens from admission to the bar in Connecticut
and denying them licenses as civil engineers in Puerto Rico. Justice
Powell established the applicability of Level I scrutiny in Griffths. "In

order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show
that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary

accomplishment' of its purpose ....

253

. .

. to the

The state's interest in pre-

serving high standards in the professions was clearly "permissible and
substantial. '254 The means chosen, classification by alienage, however,
250. At least since Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Burger Court
has recognized alienage as a suspect classification. Graham involved the availability of welfare benefits, a government entitlement rather than an economic right arising out of private
market activities. See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976). But see Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S.
1 (1978). The Burger Court has also examined the right of aliens to government employment. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634 (1973). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978).
251. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
252. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
253. 413 U.S. at 721-22. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice
Rehnquist rejected the application of strict scrutiny analysis to classifications based on alienage. "In my view, the proper judicial inquiry is whether any rational justification exists for
prohibiting aliens. . . from admission to the state bar." Id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In the Chief Justice's view, the questions involved were policy decisions within the
legislative sphere and outside the ambit of fourteenth amendment review. Id. at 730 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, he questioned the analytical soundness of the use of suspect classifications as a means of triggering strict scrutiny analysis. "In recent years the
Court, in a rather casual way, has articulated the code phrase 'suspect classification' as
though it embraced a reasoned constitutional concept. Admittedly, it simplifies judicial
work as do 'per se' rules, but it tends to stop analysis while appearing to suggest an analytical process." Id.
254. Id. at 722. Justice Powell noted the various formulations of the state interest or
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was not sufficiently related to achieving that interest. 25 5 Alternative
available means, less intrusive of Griffith's right to compete, could ef25 6
fectively protect the state's welfare.

In Flores de Otero, the Court explicitly relied on Grio7ths to justify
its Level I scrutiny and invalidated the statute. 2 57 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion noted the importance of the right to com-

pete: "[A]liens have been restricted from engaging in private enterprises and occupations that are otherwise lawful. . . . It is with respect
to this kind of discrimination that the States have had the greatest difficulty in persuading this Court that their interests are substantial and
constitutionally permissible, and that the discrimination is necessary
for the safeguarding of those interests. '2 58 Heightened scrutiny was
justified, at least in part, by the importance of the right to compete.

The importance of the right was the principal subject of debate in
2 59
the Burger Court's only business regulation, sex discrimination case,
public purpose requirement, such as "overriding," "compelling," "important," or "substantial." Id. at 722 n.9. He declined to distinguish analytically among the consequences of
these descriptions. "We attribute no particular significance to these variations in diction."
Id.
255. "[T]he arguments advanced by the [state] fall short of showing that the classification . . . is necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest." Id. at 725.
256. Id. at 725-27. "In sum, the [state] simply has not established that it must exclude all
aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional standards." Id. at 727 (footnote omitted).
257. 426 U.S. at 601-02.
258. Id. at 603.
259. Gender-based discrimination was first placed within the ambit of the equal protection clause in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the
Court invalidated an Idaho statute that established a mandatory preference for men over
women for appointment as an administrator of a deceased minor's estate. The Chief Justice
was somewhat vague in his choice of the appropriate level of scrutiny in sex discrimination
cases: "The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 75-76.
A year after Reed, the Court decided Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). At
issue was the availability of military benefits for the husband of a woman in the Air Force.
A plurality of the Justices, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, agreed that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore by subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682. They
therefore applied Level I analysis. Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun, concurred in the judgment. While they, too, believed that the statutes in issue
violated the equal protection clause, they took exception to the plurality's reliance on the
virtually irrebuttable presumption against constitutionality. "It is unnecessary for the Court
in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all the far-reaching implications of such a holding. Reed v. Reed, which abundantly supports our decision today, did
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In seven separate opinions, the Court invalidated an

Oklahoma statute that prohibited eighteen to twenty year old men from
purchasing 3.2 percent beer, while permitting women of the same age

to do so. Justice Brennan, for a four member plurality, relied on Reed
v. Reed2 6 1 to justify the use of Level II scrutiny. The statute was invalid because its means were not "substantially related" to the promotion

of traffic safety, its admittedly "important" end.262 Concurring, Justice
Powell expressed reservations, 263 but also relied on Level II rebuttable

not add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect."
411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); see Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); see also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), in which the Court invalidated a
Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as "head and master" of property jointly owned with
his wife, a right to dispose of such property without her consent. Justice Marshall explicitly
relied upon Level II scrutiny: "mhe burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a
statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the challenged classification." Id. at 4272 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). To meet that burden, it is necessary to demonstrate that the gender-based classification in issue "was substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective." Id. at 4271. Butsee Rostker v. Goldberg, 49
U.S.L.W. 4798 (June 25, 1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
See generaly B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975); K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG, H. KAY,
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974); Calhoun, The Thirteenth and FourteenthAmendments: ConstitutionalAuthoriyfor FederalLegislationAgainst
PrivateSex Discrimination,61 MINN. L. REv. 313 (1977); Erickson, Women andthe Supreme
Court: Anatomy is Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 209 (1974); Getman, The Emerging ConstitutionalPrincoileof Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 157; Gilbertson, Women andthe
Equal ProtectionClause, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 351 (1971); Ginsburg, Gender andthe Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 &
1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Hull, Sex Discriminationand the EqualProtection Clause:
An Anaysis ofKahn v. Shevin and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 639 (1979); Lombard,
Sex: A Classpfication in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1355 (1975); Rogge,
Equal Rightsfor Women, 21 How. L. J. 327 (1978); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977).
260. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
261. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See note 259 supra.
262. 429 U.S. at 204.
263. "As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had difficulty in agreeing upon a
standard of equal protection analysis that can be applied consistently to a wide variety of
legislative classifications. There are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two-tier approach that has been prominent in the Court's decisions in the past decade. Although
viewed by many as a result-oriented substitute for more critical analysis, that approachwith its narrowly limited 'upper-tier'--now has substantial precedential support. As has
been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be viewed by some as a 'middletier' approach. While I would not endorse that characterization and would not welcome a
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presumptions to find that the "gender-based classification does not bear
' '264 Jusa fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
tice Stevens, concurring, denied the existence of multiple levels of
equal protection scrutiny, 265 but agreed that the statute should be invalidated because its discrimination was based on an accident of birth,
reflected a tradition of discrimination, and was "perverse" in its effects. 266 In Justice Stewart's view, the disparate treatment produced by
gender-based classification "amounts to total irrationality." 267 The
26 8
level of scrutiny invoked by the Court was therefore inconsequential.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented separately. The
Chief Justice would use deferential Level IV scrutiny in gender-based
discrimination cases. 269 Justice Rehnquist would eliminate entirely the
use of strict scrutiny analysis because it is too open to the abuses of
270
subjectivity.

When the individual claiming an arbitrary or discriminatory limitation of his or her right to compete has not been a member of a suspect
further subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the
relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper
focus when we address a gender-based classification. So much is clear from our recent
cases." Id. at 210-11 (unnumbered footnote) (Powell, J., concurring).
264. 429 U.S. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
265. "There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a
different standard in other cases. . . . I am inclined to believe that what has become known
as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." Id. at 211-12
(Stevens, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 212-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
267. "The disparate statutory treatment of the sexes here, without even a colorably valid
justification or explanation, thus amounts to invidious discrimination." Id. at 215.
268. Id.
269. "Though today's decision does not go so far as to make gender-based classification
'suspect,' it makes gender a disfavored classification. Without an independent constitutional
basis supporting the right asserted or disfavoring the classification adopted, I can justify no
substantive constitutional protection other than the normal McGowan v. Maryland protection afforded by the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
270. "Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, masquerading as
judgments whether such legislation is directed at 'important' objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is 'substantial' enough. . . . [T]he Judicial Branch is probably
in no worse position than the Legislative or Executive Branches to determine if there is any
rational relationship between a classification and the purpose which it might be thought to
serve. But the introduction of the adverb 'substantially' requires courts to make subjective
judgments as to operational effects, for which neither their expertise nor their access to data
fits them." Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Further, Justice
Rehnquist would not elevate the level of scrutiny when the alleged gender-based classification discriminates against men rather than women. Id. at 217.

September 1981]

BUSINESS REGULATION

class, the right has been held constitutionally insignificant. When
linked with a suspect or semi-suspect classification, however, the right
to compete has triggered heightened scrutiny under the equal protec-

tion clause. The constitutional importance of protecting against discrimination in legislative classifications based on alienage or gender
has been used to justify the invalidation of regulations limiting access

to the marketplace. In both instances, the Court has declined to weigh
and balance the costs and benefits arising from the regulation and in-

stead has relied on the presence or absence of a suspect classification to
trigger its constitutional discretion.
The Right to Remain a Competitor
In addition to its substantive aspects, the due process clause has

procedural components, 271 which ensure that the processes by which
the government applies its laws to particular individuals comport with
society's notions of justice and fairness. Although the definition of justice and fairness may vary with the circumstances, 272 procedural due
process has required that an individual be afforded notice and an op-

portunity to be heard prior to suffering permanent deprivation of a ib271. See generally J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND GOVERNMENT (1978); Brudno, FairnessandBureaucracy: The Demise ofProceduralDue Processfor Welfare Claimants,25 HASTINGS L.J. 813 (1974); Catz & Robinson, Due
Processand Creditor'sRemedies: From Sniadach andFuentes to Mitchell,North Georgiaand
Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975); Countryman, The Bill ofRights andtheBill Collector, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 521 (1973); DeLong, InformalRulemaking and the Integrationof Law
andPolicy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257 (1979); Feldman,AdministrativeAgencies andtheRites ofDue
Process: Alternatives to Excessive Litigation, 7 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 229 (1978-79);
Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975); Hammer, Licensee Discipline andDue Process, 12 CONN. L. REv. 870 (1980); Lawrence,.A Restatement of the RothFuentes Analysis of ProceduralDue Process, 11 GA. L. REV. 477 (1977); Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Rabin,
Job Security andDue Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976); Rubenstein, ProceduralDue Processandthe Limits
of the Adversary System, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 48 (1976); Saphire, Specfying Due
Process Values: TowardaMore ResponsiveApproach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 111 (1978); Scott, ConstitutionalRegulation of ProvisionalCreditorRemedies: The Cost
ofqProceduralDue Process,61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975); Simet, The Right to a Pre-Deprivation
HearingUnder the Due ProcessClause-ConstitutionalPrioriesandaSuggestedMethodfor
Making Decision, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1201 (1978); Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the
Right to be Heard: The Signffcance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1974);
Symposium-InstitutionalDue Processin the Twenty-First Century: The Future of the HearingRequirement, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 287 (1979); Tribe, StructuralDueProcess, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Yudof, Reflections on PrivateRepossession,Public Policy and
the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 954 (1974).
272. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
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erty or property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. 273
The majority of the Burger Court's economic rights-procedural
due process cases have involved the deprivation of "government entitlements" 274 or government employment. 27 5 The Court, however, has
also examined the procedures used to suspend or terminate licenses to
compete in the private market granted under regulatory authority in
Barry v. Barchi,276 Bell v. Burson,277 Dixon v. Love, 27 8 and Mackey v.
Montrym .279 Two principal issues have arisen in these cases: whether
a state may deprive an individual of his or her license, and thus of the
right to remain in the marketplace, without the benefit of a presuspension hearing and, if such a hearing is required, what components of the
conflict between the individual and the state must be scrutinized.
The Burger Court has included the right to retain a license within
2 80
the ambit of economic interests protected by the due process clause.
(1965). Such a hearing must be "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Procedural due process has been relied upon to mandate the impartiality of the decision
maker. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972). But see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 1610 (1980); Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
273. See Armstong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
274. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 449 U.S. 221 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980); O'Brannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980); Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979); Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974). See notes 239, 250 supra.
275. See, e.g., Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979); Codd v.
Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). For a discussion of Board of Regents v. Roth, see note 280 infra.
The Burger Court has also reviewed property rights in government employment under
the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). See
note 250 supra.
276. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
277. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
278. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
279. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
280. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Justice Stewart enunciated the
standards against which the application of procedural due process would be measured:
"[T]o determined whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake. . . .We must look to see if the
interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at
570-71. With regard to the definition of property rights under the fourteenth amendment,

September 1981]

BUSINESS REGULATION

"[L]icenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due pro-

cess required by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 28' In its most recent

decision, however, the Court cut back the attributes of the right to re-

main in the marketplace that constitute constitutional property. In
Barry v. Barchi,2 82 the licensee, a race horse trainer, was suspended
when a post-race urinalysis revealed that one of his horses had been

drugged. Justice White, for the majority, held that mere possession of a
license was insufficient to invoke procedural due process review.
Rather, he conferred constitutional recognition only upon those specific

attributes of the right to remain in the marketplace explicitly granted
by the license. "[S]tate law has engendered a clear expectation of con-

tinued enjoyment of a license absent proof of culpable conduct by the
trainer. Barchi, therefore, asserted a legitimate 'claim of entitlement
. . . that he may invoke at a hearing.' "283 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens in concurrence, objected to the

majority's narrow view, preferring to predicate constitutional dimension on the mere issuance and possession of the license. 284 To the concurring Justices, Barchi's license, authorized by state statute, was per se
a property interest within the ambit of procedural due process
protection.
Justice Stewart continued: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.. . . Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state-law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." .d. at 577; see also Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court repudiated the right versus privilege distinction that had
frequently determined procedural due process issues during earlier eras of constitutional
jurisprudence. Economic interests denominated privileges generally had received less rigorous procedural due process protection than those denominated rights. See also Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 70-71 (1979) (Brennan, I., concurring); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971).
281. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). "Once licenses are issued... their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees." Id.
Bell was determinative of the constitutional protection of a licensee's right to remain in
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977), and Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 n.7 (1979).
282. 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
283. Id. at 64 n.ll.
284. "No extended inquiry into the formal and informal 'rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits,' is necessary
here. Appellee's claim to an entitlement in his duly issued trainer's license is confirmed by
the state statutes authorizing the issuance of licenses." Id. at 70 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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The Court's substantive standards of review have permitted examination of two principal issues: the timing and the evidentiary content
of the hearing. The individuals in these cases have alleged that an evidentiary hearing, or some component thereof, must be held before they
may be even temporarily deprived of their right to remain and compete. The Justices have weighed and balanced the costs to the individual of suspending his or her competitive participation in the
marketplace against the benefits accruing to the public welfare from the
individual's prompt removal.
In Bell,2 85 the Court examined the evidentiary content of an administrative hearing in which an uninsured motorist's driver's license
could be suspended if he or she failed to post security against potential
damages arising from an automobile accident. The available hearing
did not consider the uninsured motorist's fault or liability. Justice
Brennan, for the Court, held that due process required the hearing to
consider liability because "the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination to deprive an individual of
his licenses. ' 286 On balance, the Court found that the state interests
28 7
served by this hearing could not justify the denial of due process.
In Dixon,2 88 a truck driver's license was summarily suspended on
the basis of official records of his repeated convictions for traffic violations. As the statute provided an adequate hearing after the suspension, "[t]he only question is one of timing."'2 8 9 Relying on Mathews v.
Eldridge290 for the applicable substantive standards of review, Justice
285.

402 U.S. 535 (1971).

286. Id. at 541. "If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did
not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our
cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 539.
Justice Brennan, for the majority, also suggested, but declined to consider, the available
alternative procedures by which Georgia could fulfill its pre-termination hearing requirements. "The alternative methods of compliance are several ....
The area of choice is
wide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a
prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 542-43.
287. "The State argues that a licensee's interest in avoiding the suspension of his licensees is outweighed by countervailing governmental interests and therefore that this procedural due process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there is no
reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against a licensee, Georgia's interest in
protecting a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the
context of the State's fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying the process due its
citizens. Nor is additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement." 1d. at 540.
288. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
289. Id. at 112.
290. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge, involving the termination of disability payments,
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Blackmun concluded that "requiring additional procedures would be
unlikely to have significant value in reducing the number of erroneous
deprivations, ' 291 and that the public's interests in traffic safety and administrative efficiency 292 "are sufficiently visible and weighty for the

State to make its summary initial decision effective without a predeci-

sion administrative hearing." 293 Moreover, the driver had "had the op-

portunity for a full judicial hearing in connection with each of [his]
traffic convictions.

' 294

The costs of suspension to the individual arising

from the procedures relied upon did not outweigh the public benefits
arising from and the public costs of altering suspension.

In Mackey, 295 a Massachusetts statute mandated suspension of a
driver's license upon the driver's refusal to take a breath analysis test.

This "implied consent" law required only a police report for suspension, but provided for an immediate post-suspension hearing. In
weighing the competing interests, Chief Justice Burger, for the majority, found the property interest less substantial than in Dixon.296 The

police report offered "a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that
the Court used three factors in its due process analysis: "First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interests including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." Id. at 335.

291. 431 U.S. at 114.
292. The statute served "the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency" and
the "[flar more substantial... public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in
the prompt removal of a safety hazard." Id. The traffic safety purposes distinguished Dixon
from Bell, in which the "only purpose" of the statute had been to "obtain security from
which to pay any judgments" against the licensee resulting from the accident. Id. at 114
(quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)).
293. Id. at 115. In dicta, Justice Blackmun discussed the alternatives to a full trial-type
hearing in the administrative process. "The present case is a good illustration of the fact that
procedural due process in the administrative setting does not always require application of
the judicial model. When a governmental official is given the power to make discretionary
decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-by-case decisionmaking may not be the
The decision to use objective rules in this case provides
best way to assure fairness ....
drivers with more precise notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality
of treatment among similarly situated drivers." Id.
294. Id. at 113.
295. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
296. The statute in Mackey "authorizes suspension for a maximum of only 90 days,
while [in Dixon] the Illinois scheme permitted suspension for as long as a year and even
allowed for the possibility of indefinite revocation of a license." Id. at 12. The Chief Justice, however, did conclude that Dixon, and by derivation Eldridge, controlled Aackey analytically: "In each [case] the sole question presented is the appropriate timing of the legal
process due a licensee. And, in both cases that question must be determined by reference to
the factors set forth in Eldridge." Id. at 11.
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the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental
official warrants them to be."' 297 Chief Justice Burger concluded that
administrative efficiency and "the compelling interest in highway safety

justifly] the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension effective
pending the outcome of the prompt post-suspension hearing
298
available."
In Barry,299 the Court was principally concerned with the timing
of post-suspension review. The regulation under which the horse
trainer's license had been suspended did not specify when such review
would occur. Justice White, for the majority, held that "it was necessary that Barchi be assured a prompt post-suspension hearing, one that
would proceed and be concluded without appreciable delay. ' 30 0 Balancing the private costs and public benefits involved in pre-suspension
hearings was not relevant to this post-suspension timing issue. None of
the public benefits arising from prompt removal were involved for
30 1
there was little or no public benefit arising from the delay.
297. Id. at 13.
298. Id. at 19. "The summary and automatic character of the suspension sanction available under the statute is critical to attainment of [the state's] objective." Id. at 18. The Chief
Justice, moreover, declined to explore the availability of alternative procedures: "Nor is it
any answer to the Commonwealth's interest in public safety that its interest could be served
as well in any other way. . . . [In exercising its police powers, the Commonwealth is not
required by the Due Process Clause to adopt an 'all or nothing' approach to the acute safety
hazards posed by drunk drivers." Id at 18-19.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented. "[T]he
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process has always been understood to embody a
presumptive requirement of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the
State acts finally to deprive a person of his property." Id. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The
burden of persuasion was placed on the state. "The State-in my view-has totally failed to
demonstrate that this summary suspension falls within any recognized exception to the established protections of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 30. Justice Stewart concluded
that the state's purposes failed to justify its summary procedure. Id. at 26-27. He also questioned the value of the state's alleged immediately available postsuspension hearing. Id. at
27-30.
299. 443 U.S. 55 (1979). The Court also balanced costs and benefits to establish the
content required in the presuspension "probable cause" hearing afforded Barchi: "Unquestionably, the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoiding suspension is substantial; but the
State also has an important interest in assuring the integrity of the racing carried on under
its auspices." Id. at 64. Its "probable cause" standards closely parallels the majority's view
in Mackey of the reliability of the reports of government officials: "To establish probable
cause, the State need not postpone a suspension pending an adversary hearing to resolve
questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence. At the interim suspension stage, an
expert's affirmance, although, untested and not beyond error, would appear sufficiently reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements." Id. at 65. Four concurring justices would not
have reached the presuspension issues. Id. at 74.
300. Id. at 66.
301. "Once suspension has been imposed, the trainer's interest in a speedy resolution of
the controversy becomes paramount, it seems to us. We also discern little or no state inter-
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Thus the standards of review of procedural due process have
evolved. While the content of presuspension review has been explicated with some specificity, the Court has not required evidentiary
hearings prior to the infringement of the right to remain. The public
benefits of prompt removal and administrative efficiency have outweighed the private costs of suspension. A postsuspension hearing, on
the other hand, at which the evidence is reviewed, must be held
promptly.
The importance of the right to remain in the marketplace also
evolved in these four procedural due process cases. In Bell, the burden
of persuasion was borne by the state. "[Djue process requires that
when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it
must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective. ' 30 2 Six years
later, in Dixon, the Court reversed its position and placed the burden
on the licensee. "[Tihe nature of the private interest here is not so great
as to require us 'to depart from the ordinary principle, established by
our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.'"303 The right to remain
in the marketplace had clearly lost some of its constitutional importance. By adopting the Eldridge balancing test, the Court predicated
the distribution of the presumption upon an initial balance of the right
to remain and the public interest in issue. In Dixon, the weight of the
right depended upon its necessity and the possibility of retroactively
compensating victims of erroneous deprivations. 3°4 In Mackey, the
weight of the right depended upon the "personal inconvenience and
economic hardship" suffered by the individual and upon "[t]he duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest." 30 5
Balanced against the interests of public safety and administrative effiest, and the State has suggested none, in an appreciable delay in going forward with a full
hearing." Id. at 66.
302. 402 U.S. at 542.
303. 431 U.S. at 113 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)). For a
discussion of Eldridge, see note 290 supra.
304. Id. at 113. Eldridge had involved the termination of disability payments under the
Social Security Act. Suspension of a driver's license, while irreparable, nevertheless "may
not be so vital and essential as are social insurance payments on which the recipient may
depend for his very subsistence." Id. Moreover, the regulation in issue included special
provisions for hardship and for commercial licensees and thereby limited the possibility of
irreparable harm. Id.
305. 443 U.S. at 11-12. The absence of "hardship" exceptions was not "controlling,"
because a postsuspension hearing was immediately available. Id. The availability of
"prompt post-deprivation review" reduced the procedural due process requirements to be
met by presuspension procedures. Id. at 13. The suspension in Dixon could be for up to
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ciency advanced by the states, these deprivations were insufficient to
outweigh the Court's presumption for the regulation. The Court used
Level III presumptions; it has "traditionally accorded the States great
leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and
safety. ' 30 6 In Barry, the Justices agreed that "the consequences to a
trainer of even a temporary suspension can be severe." 30 7 When the
timing of postsuspension evidentiary review was in issue, Level II scrutiny was relied upon.
The four procedural due process-right to remain cases illustrate
the Burger Court's concern with the breadth and depth of its political
discretion. It has narrowed its specification of the constitutional attributes of the right to those granted in the license in question. It has declined to require presuspension evidentiary review on a per se basis and
has instead sought to balance the private costs of suspension against the
public benefits of prompt removal. The Court, however, has required
postsuspension review to be prompt. Under its recently adopted balancing approach, the Court has determined its level of scrutiny by
weighing the importance of the right against the importance of the public's interest. This balancing increases judicial flexibility in the distribution of rebuttable presumptions for and against constitutionality, but
correspondingly enhances the risk that the Court's analysis will lose
consistency and predictability. This method is less certain than the
more standardized hierarchy of rights developed under other constitutional vehicles.
The Right of InterstateEntry
The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have Power...
To regulate commerce . . . among the several states .... -308 By its
explicit language, the commerce clause authorizes Congress to regulate
the free flow of market activities among the states. Unlike other constitutional vehicles, this provision aligns the powers of governments in a
federal system rather than creating a limitation directly out of the personal or economic rights of American citizens. 309 It has, however,
one year, the interest "involved here actually is less substantial" because the maximum term
of suspension was 90 days. Id. at 12.
306. 443 U.S. at 17.
307. 443 U.S. at 66. The concurring Justices saw the deprivation as "substantial and
irreparable." Id. at 74 (Brennan, J., concurring).
308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
309. See also U.S. CONST. amend. X (residual sovereignty); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2
(supremacy). The Burger Court limited the scope of state regulatory authority through application of the residual sovereignty clause in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
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played a fundamental role in the constitutional protection of private
economic rights. "[A]t least since Cooley v. Board of Wardens, it has
been clear that 'the Commerce Clause by its own force created an area
of trade free from interference by the States. . .

[T]he Commerce

Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.' ,310
In commerce clause cases concerning the right of interstate entry,31' the Court has reconciled the power of state and local govern833 (1976). In Usery, the Court stated that "the tenth amendment residual sovereignty
clause 'expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system."' Id. at 842-43 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). Usery
was one of the few residual sovereignty clause decisions since the New Deal opinion of
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). For some of the extensive commentary on Usery, see L. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 308318; Michelman, States'Rightsand States' Roles: Permutationsof "So vereignty" in National
League of Ciies v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, UnravelingNationalLeague of
Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
The supremacy clause also limits the reach of state regulatory power. In cases of "actual conflict" between federal and state regulations, or when federal regulation has "occupied the field," the Burger Court has assessed the validity of the state regulation in light of
the constitutionally appropriate distribution of regulatory power in our federal system of
government. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 376-91; see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981); Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980); Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977);
Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Kleppe v.
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Gordon v. New
York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry.
& Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). These cases, brought by
individuals seeking vindication of their private economic rights, involved the Court in the
weighing and balancing of competing institutional arrangements of conceded governmental
power to regulate. They do not involve the assessment of the constitutional scope of regulatory authority in a private market economy. Because their method of analysis is statutory,
rather than constitutional, interpretation, they are not discussed in this Article.
310. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)). See notes 365-67 infra.
311. The Burger Court recently issued its only major opinion on the scope of Congress'
authority to regulate business activities under the commerce clause. In Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981) (Hodel I), discussed in text
accompanying notes 76-77, 92-93 supra, and Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981) (Hodel
II), discussed in text accompanying notes 76-77, 92-93 supra, and 410-35 infra, the Court
upheld various "steep slope" and "prime farmland" provisions of The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 against, inter alia,commerce clause challenge. In
both cases, the Court relied upon a permissible purpose-rationality of relationship test applied at Level IV: "The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular
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ments to regulate matters of local interest with the national interest in
maintaining and enhancing an open interstate marketplace. These
right of entry problems arise from our federal system of government.
To resolve them, the Court "is called upon to make 'delicate adjustments of the conflicting state and federal claims,' thereby attempting
'the necessary accommodation between local needs and overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce.' ,,312 Evidence of local benefits must be weighed and balanced against evidence of
interstate burdens. "[I]f [the Court] finds that a challenged exercise of
local power serves to further a legitimate local interest but simultaneously burdens interstate commerce, [it] is confronted with a problem of
3 13
balance."
exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow.
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. Thus established, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether 'the means chosen by [Congress] is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' The judicial task is at an end once
the court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory
scheme." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2360; see
Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S.Ct. at 2382.
In Hodel 1,appellees insisted that the principal goal of the regulations in issue was the
regulation of the use of private land in contravention of the States' inherent police powers,
and not the regulation of the interstate commerce effects of surface mining. 101 S.Ct. at
2359. The Court found, however, that Congress' commerce clause power extends "[e]ven
[to] activity that is purely intrastate in character. . . where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign
nations.'" Id. at 2360 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)). Ample
support existed in the legislative record to justify Congress' largely environmental protection
purposes. In addition, the means chosen to implement those purposes were not "redundant
or unnecessary," id. at 2363, in light of other federal environmental protection regulations.
Moreover, Congress believed, and the Court agreed, "that inadequacies in existing state laws
and the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal regulations imperative." Id. at 2362. Of particular importance was the congressionally perceived need to protect state regulatory efforts from being undermined by competition among sellers of coal
produced in different states with different surface mining standards. "The prevention of this
sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under
the Commerce Clause." Id. at 2363.
In HodellI, the Court similarly found that Congress had ample evidence to support its
regulations. 101 S.Ct. 2383-84. The protection "of agriculture, the environment, or the
public health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on
interstate commerce," id. at 2385, particularly when coupled with "the congressional goal of
protecting mine operators in states adhering to high performance and reclamation standards
from disadvantageous competition with operators in states with less rigorous regulatory programs," id., were constitutionally legitimate goals that were reasonably advanced by the
regulatory scheme adopted by Congress.
312. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); see also Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc., v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978).
313. 424 U.S. at 371. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), the
Court established the basic theme of commerce clause jurisprudence. "The validity of state
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Historically, the Court has relied upon a number of analytic for-

mulae to distinguish state legislation that validly regulates aspects of
commerce from that which infringes upon Congress' authority to maintain an open national marketplace. 314 During the twentieth century,
particularly prior to the New Deal, commerce clause analysis distinguished between "direct" and "indirect" burdens on interstate commerce. 3 15 This method of analysis, however, has been rejected as
"overly conclusory and misleadingly precise. '3 16 In its place, post-New

Deal Courts upheld state regulations affecting interstate commerce if
they were rationally related to legitimate local purposes and if the state
or local benefits derived from achieving those purposes outweighed the
317
burdens imposed upon interstate economic activity.

The Burger Court generally has followed the permissible purpose-

rationality of relationship methodology to balance the interstate costs
of regulation against local benefits. It has declined to extend constitu-

tional dimension to rights of interstate entry adversely affected by local
governments functioning in their proprietary capacity. It has also
found that state action may affect interstate commerce without generat-

ing the discrimination or burden required for invocation of the commerce clause. The Court's substantive standards of review and level of
scrutiny depend on the type of costs incurred by the interstate marketaction affecting interstate commerce must be judged in light of the desirability of permitting
diverse responses to local needs and the undesirability of permitting local interference with
such uniformity as the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce may require." L. TRIBE,
supra note 34, at 325 (emphasis deleted).
314. "Cooley v. Board of Wardens... distinguished between subjects 'imperatively demanding a single uniform rule' and subjects 'imperatively demanding that diversity, which
alone can meet the local necessities.' Other cases have distinguished between state regulations that affect interstate commerce 'directly,' and those that affect it 'indirectly.' And many
cases have distinguished between regulations that are an exercise of the State's 'police powers,' and those that are 'regulations of commerce."' Raymond Motor Tramp. Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 441 n.15 (1978). For a discussion ofRaymondAfotor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, see
notes 368-74 & accompanying text infra.
315. See, eg., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380 (1931);
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
316. L. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 326.
317. Id. See generally Cox, FederalismandIndividualRights Under the BurgerCourt, 73
Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1978); Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma" The Court, The Commerce
Clause, and State Controlof NaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51; Maltz, The Burger
Court, the Commerce Clause, and the Problem of Dfferential Treatment, 54 IND. L.J. 165
(1979); Maltz, The Burger Court, the Regulation ofInterstateTransportation,and the Concept
of Local Concern: The Jurisprudenceof Categories,46 TENN. L. Rnv. 406 (1979); Schwartz,
Commerce, the States, and The Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. R~v. 409 (1979); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125.
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place. 318 When the regulation has a discriminatory or protectionist effect, 319 the Court, using Level I scrutiny, has applied "a virtually per se
rule of invalidity. ' 320 When, however, the regulation is evenhanded
and merely burdens interstate commerce, the Court has adopted a
much more flexible approach, 321 assessing the relationship between the
legislature's means and ends, and exploring the possibility of alternative available means. Under this more flexible methodology, the distribution of the burden of persuasion has depended upon the importance
of the asserted state or local public interests as well as the importance
of the economic right. In general, the Court has used Level II scrutiny
to place the burden of persuasion on the state.
When regulations are challenged as discriminatory or burdensome
on interstate commerce, the individual's right to interstate entry will
usually be granted some constitutional dimension under the commerce
clause. 322 On two occasions, however, the Burger Court has held that
state action interfering with interstate commerce did not fall within the
318. "The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether [the regulation in question] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as
a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are
only incidental." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). For a discussion of City a/Philadelphia,see notes 346-49 & accompanying text infra. "Over the years,
the Court has used a variety of formulations for the Commerce Clause limitation upon the
States, but it consistently has distinguished between outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on the free flow of trade. The Court has observed that 'where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been
erected.' In contrast . . . legislation that visits its effects equally upon both interstate and
local business may survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly drawn." Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980). For a discussion of BT Investment Managers, see notes
382-84 & accompanying text infra.
319. "The principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute, since
the validity of state laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable effects." Id. at 37.
320. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). For a discussion of
City ofPhiladelphia, see text accompanying notes 346-49 infra.
321. Id. at 624.
322. "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded
by definition at the outset." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978),
"Philadelphia v. New Jersey made clear that there is no 'two-tiered definition of commerce.'
The definition of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state
legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation."
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979). For a discussion of Hughes v.
Oklahoma, see text accompanying notes 350-53 infra.
The Burger Court has had only one occasion to distinguish goods in intrastate commerce from those being traded interstate commerce. In Allenberg Cotton Co., Inc. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974), the Court held that a wholly intrastate transaction between a cotton
warehouser and a farmer nevertheless implicated the commerce clause. The cotton that was
the subject of the exchange was destined for the interstate marketplace. Id. at 30; cf Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) (use of material on interstate highway
does not mean producer of the material is "in commerce").
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ambit of the commerce clause. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporaion 323 and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 324 the Court distinguished between

government as regulator and government as private market participant.
As a private market participant, the state has been bound only by the
"invisible hand" of the competitive marketplace; commerce clause restraints have not been applied.

In AlexandriaScrap,325 Maryland had enacted a "bounty" scheme
in which it subsidized automobile wreckers who removed abandoned
cars from its streets. By a 1974 amendment, the state had eased title
documentation requirements for in-state wreckers, giving them "an advantage over . . . non-Maryland processors in the competition" for
subsidized abandoned automobiles. 32 6 Although, in the past, the creation of a local competitive advantage has been evidence of discrimination against interstate commerce, 327 the majority, in an opinion by

Justice Powell, declined to apply the mandates of the commerce
clause. 328 Maryland was merely functioning as a participant in the private marketplace. 329 The effects of its actions on interstate commerce
were, therefore, outside of constitutional protection. "Nothing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State. . . from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
'330
citizens over others.
323. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
324. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
325. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
326. 426 U.S. at 802.
327. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351
(1977). For a discussion of Hunt, see text accompanying notes 342-45 infra.
328. 426 U.S. at 805. The scrap company also argued that Maryland's documentation
requirements violated the equal protection clause. The Court used Level IV scrutiny, id. at
813, to conclude: "The 1974 amendment bears a rational relationship to Maryland's purpose of using its limited funds to clean up its own environment and that is all the Constitution requires." Id. at 814.
329. The Court distinguished prior cases in which "the State interfered with the natural
functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the
conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up
their price." Id. at 806.
330. Id. at 810. Justice Stevens, concurring, would have upheld the "bounty" scheme as
a permissible form of legislative experimentation with business incentives. Id. at 817.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, declined to distinguish among the regulatory, taxing, and purchasing functions of government when determining whether local actions have unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.
"Certainly the Court's naked assertion today that '[niothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State ... from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others'. . . stands in start contrast to our 'repeated emphasis upon the principle that the State may not promote its own economic advantages by
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Alexandria Scrap was decisive of the conflict in Reeves. 33 1 A plant
owned and operated by South Dakota had stopped selling cement to an
out-of-state company after years of interstate activity. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, relied on the distinction between the
state as market participant and the state as market regulator and denied
the applicability of the commerce clause.332 He would have the Court
defer to legislative judgment whenever the state acts as a participant in
333
market activities.
The substantive standards of review and level of scrutiny relied

upon by the Burger Court in applying the commerce clause have distinguished between regulations that are discriminatory in effect and those
that merely burden interstate commerce. Discriminatory regulations
must now undergo Level I scrutiny, while burdensome regulations have
been assessed at Level II.
As a preliminary matter, an individual challenging constitutionality must demonstrate that his or her right of interstate entry has been
infringed. In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,334 the majority,
per Justice Stevens, was unwilling to find either the requisite discrimination or burden. 335 A Maryland statute required interstate oil refiners
curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce.'" Id. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949)). The dissenters
would have applied a balancing test and invalidated the amendments. Id. at 823.
331. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). "South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the
'market participant' label more comfortably than a State acting to subsidize local scrap
processors. Thus, the general rule of Alexandria Scrap plainly applies here." Id. at 440.
332. "[S]tate proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants. . . . States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 439.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, White and Stevens, dissented. In their view,
South Dakota's refusal to sell cement in interstate commerce was "precisely the kind of
economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent." Id. at 447.
(Powell, J., dissenting). South Dakota's role as a market participant was inconsequential for
commerce clause purposes. "State action burdening interstate trade is no less state action
because it is accomplished by a public agency authorized to participate in the private market." Id. at 450-51.
333. "[T]he competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often
will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap wisely recognizes that, as a
rule, the adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress than this
Court." Id. at 439.
334. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
335. Exxon also alleged that the regulation violated substantive due process. Justice
Stevens relied on Level IV analysis to uphold its constitutionality. "Appellants' substantive
due process argument requires little discussion. The evidence presented by the refiners may
cast some doubt on the wisdom of the statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the Due
Process Clause does not empower the judiciary 'to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the
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to divest themselves of their company-owned retail service stations. At
the time, no refineries were located in Maryland and, therefore, the

Court found no basis for concluding that interstate commerce was the
victim of discriminatory regulation. 336 Moreover, even though the

"regulation cause[d] some business to shift from one interstate supplier

to another," 337 the refiner's right of interstate entry had not been bur-

dened. The commerce clause "protects the interstate market, not par'338
ticular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.
Absent a showing of either discriminatory effect or burden, that is, absent a demonstration that costs of regulation recognized by the commerce clause were implicated, the statute was upheld.
The Burger Court has decided three cases involving discrimination

in effect that reflect its willingness to extend its.political authority over
the exercise of regulatory power. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission,339 the Court balanced the interstate costs
against the local benefits, relying on Level II scrutiny. In City ofPhiladeiphia v. New Jersey,34° it elevated the right of interstate entry to very
important status and relied on a virtually irrebuttable presumption

against constitutionality. In Hughes v. Oklahoma,341 the Court confirmed the use of Level I scrutiny to protect interstate entry against the
effects of discriminatory regulations.
In Hunt, North Carolina apple grading requirements increased the
costs of doing business for Washington apple growers, but left local
growers unaffected. The state thus "shield[ed] the local apple industry
wisdom of legislation"'.... .Regardless of the ultimate economic efficacy of the statute,
we have no hestiancy in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the State's legitimate purpose incontrolling the gasoline retail market, and we therefore, reject appellant's
due process claim." Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted).
336. "Plainly, the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate goods, nor
does it favor local producers and refiners. Since Maryland's entire gasoline supply flows in
interstate commerce and since there are no local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatment between interstate and local commerce would be meritless." Id. at 125.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in part, would have invalidated the statute as impermissibly discriminating against interstate commerce in retail gasoline marketing. "The divestiture provisions . . . preclude out-of-state competitors from retailing gasoline within
Maryland. The effect is to protect in-state retail service station dealers from the competition
of the out-of-state businesses. This protectionist discrimination is not justified by any legitimate state interest that cannot be vindicated by more evenhanded regulation. [The divestiture provisions], therefore, violate the Commerce Clause." Id. at 135 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
337. Id. at 127.
338. Id. at 127-28.
339. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
340. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
341. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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from . . . competition. ' 342 With such a discriminatory effect in evidence, the Court used Level II scrutiny. 343 The state was required to
show not only that the public benefits derived from the statue outweighed interstate costs, but also that adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives were unavailable. 344 North Carolina failed to sustain either
345
burden.
In its next discrimination case, City of Philadelphia,34 6 the Court
heightened its scrutiny of discriminatory regulations. "[W]here simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se
rule of invalidity has been erected. . . . The clearest example of such
legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce
at a State's borders. ' 347 New Jersey had prohibited the shipment of
most solid and liquid wastes into the state. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart recognized the legitimacy of the state's environmental
purpose, but nonetheless concluded that the state could not rely on
means of implementation that saddled those outside it with the total
burden of fulfilling its goals. 34 8 "The evils of protectionism can reside
'349
in legislative means as well as legislative ends.
The Court again confronted state protectionism in Hughes.350 The
state had prohibited the interstate transportation of naturally spawned
minnows. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court relied heavily
on the analytical methods and Level I scrutiny formulated in City of
Philadelphia to invalidate the regulation. It declined to defer to the
35
legislative judgment with regard to the statute's purpose, ' its
342. 432 U.S. at 351.
343. "[T]he challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate
sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them." Id. at 350.
344. "When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests and state." Id. at 353.
345. Id. at 353.
346. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
347. Id. at 624.

348. "[T]he State has overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons. . . . What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."
Id. at 628.
349. Id. at 626.
350.

441 U.S. 322 (1979).

351. "[Wlhen considering the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by
'[t]he name, description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the
State,' but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law." Id. at 336.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the majority with
regard to the importance of the state's interest in preserving wildlife within its borders. "To
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means,35 2 or the availability of alternative means. 353
These three discrimination cases show significant growth in the

Court's willingness to exercise its political authority to protect the right
of interstate entry against the encroachments of state regulation. By
relying on proof of discriminatory effect for Level I scrutiny, however,
it has moved away from weighing and balancing the substantive evi-

dentiary merits and instead relied on presumptions to decide the issue.
This per se rule of invalidity extends the Court's authority to find con-

stitutional limitations on state regulatory power, but also reduces the
Court's capacity for making flexible decisions.
When a discriminatory effect is not found, a state statute may still
be challenged as unconstitutionally burdening interstate commerce. In

these cases, the Burger Court consistently has relied upon the balancing
test developed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. :354
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
be sure, a State's power to preserve and regulate wildlife within its-borders is not absolute.
But the State is accorded wide latitude in fashioning regulations appropriate for protection
of its wildlife." Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
352. The majority found the statute discriminatory because it "forbids" interstate transportation and "thus 'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders."
Id. at 336-37 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)). "[Flacial
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose, because 'the
evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.' At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported[ly] legitimate
local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 337.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice declined to find discrimination. The
statute in question was evenhanded; it prohibited residents of Oklahoma as well as nonresidents from the interstate transport of natural minnows. "The State has not used its power to
protect its own citizens from outside competition." Id. at 344 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist would, therefore, have relied on Level IV scrutiny with regard to both
legislative purposes and legislative means.
353. Oklahoma had not chosen the "least discriminatory alternative." Id. at 337. The
regulation "is certainly not a 'last ditch' attempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory
alternatives have proved unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means
the State's purported
even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill
legitimate local purpose more effectively." Id. at 338.
Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice, dissenting, would not have required the state to
demonstrate that it had chosen the least discriminatory alternative among the available
means. "[T]he range of regulations that a State may adopt... is extremely broad, particularly where, as here, the burden on interstate commerce is, at most, minimal." Id. at 344
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
354. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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course depend on the nature of the local interests involved, and on
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interwhether it could
355
state activities.
The Court thus balances the local benefits derived from the regulation
against the costs to interstate economic activities and determines
whether alternative means of adequately fulfilling the legislature's purpose are available. Whether the balance between local benefits and
interstate costs is tipped in favor of the individual or the state depends
not only upon the nature and importance of those costs but also upon
the nature and importance of the state's public welfare goals.
In Pike, the statute prohibited the transportation of uncrated Arizona cantaloupes to California to be packed. The state's asserted interest was its desire to enhance the reputation of its cantaloupe growers by
requiring in-state packaging. 356 The statute's effect was to require the
company to build a packing plant in Arizona. Even assuming the legitimacy of the state's purpose, 357 the Court noted in a unanimous opinion, "this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be
virtuallyperse illegal. ' 358 The judicial balance therefore was tipped in
favor of the interstate company. The local benefits derived from the
statute did not outweigh the interstate costs. Had "a more compelling
state interest" 359 been advanced, however, the regulation might not
have been invalidated.
The Pike permissible purpose-rationality of relationship-alternative available means balancing test characterizes the Burger Court's
commerce clause burden analysis. It has been relied upon in Great Atlantic & Pacfic Tea Company, Inc. v. Cottrell (A & p),360 Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice,36 1 Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways
Corporationof Delaware,362 Lewis v. BT Investment Managers,Inc.,363
355. Id. at 142. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), the Court, with the
benefit of intervening opinions, restated the Pike test with greater specificity: "Under that
general rule, we must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulated evenhandly with
only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce

either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purposes; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well
without discriminating against interstate commerce." For a discussion of Hughes v.
Oklahoma, see text accompanying notes 351-54 supra.
356. Id. at 145.
357.

Id.

358. Id. "The nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more significant than its extent." Id.
359. Id. at 146.
360.
361.

424 U.S. 366 (1976).
434 U.S. 429 (1978).

362.

450 U.S. 662 (1981).

363.

447 U.S. 27 (1980).
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and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company.364 In A & P, the
Court invalidated a regulation requiring reciprocity in the interstate
sale of milk. Statutes purportedly advancing highway safety were declared unconstitutional in Raymond Motors and ConsolidatedFreightways. In BT Investment Managers, a regulation prohibiting foreign
bank holding companies from owning or controlling investment advisory service companies was held unconstitutional. In these four cases,
the Court's balance of the nature and importance of the right against
those of the public purpose resulted in Level II scrutiny. In Clover
Leaf, a prohibition of plastic, disposable milk containers was upheld in
apparent reliance on Level III scrutiny.
In A & p,365 a Mississippi statute permitted the in-state sale of
milk produced out-of-state only when the producing state also accepted
Mississippi milk for sale. The Court, in a unanimous decision written
by Justice Brennan, held the statute unconstitutional, in part because
the burden imposed on interstate commerce clearly outweighed the asserted "vital interest ' 366 of maintaining the health of Mississippi's citi367
zens, but primarily because of the availability of alternative means.
3 68
Mississippi could itself inspect milk from nonreciprocating states.
In Raymond Motor,369 an administrative regulation limited the

length and configuration of trucks operating in Wisconsin. Numerous
in-state exceptions were granted. The plaintiff company, an interstate
operator, could not use its sixty-five-foot double-trailer rigs. Although
the public purpose of highway safety traditionally had been viewed as
presumptively compelling 370 and, thus, in the Pike balancing method
would ordinarily have triggered Level IV scrutiny, Justice Powell, for
the majority, declined to defer to legislative judgment and, instead,
placed the burden of persuasion on the state.371 With its exceptions,
364. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
365. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
366. 424 U.S. at 375. "Only state interests of substantial importance can save [the regulation] in the face of that devastating effect on the free flow of interstate milk. Mississippi's
contention that the reciprocity clause serves its vital interests in maintaining the State's
health standards borders upon the frivolous." Id.
367. "Inquiry whether adequate and less burdensome alternatives exist is, of course, important in discharge of the Court's task of 'accommodation' of conflicting local and national
interests, since any "'realistic" judgment' whether a given state action 'unreasonably' trespasses on national interests must, of course, consider the 'consequences to the state if its
action were disallowed."' Id. at 373.
368. Id. at 377.
369. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
370. Id. at 442-43 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) and South
Carolina v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)).
371. 434 U.S. at 447-48. Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
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the statute "discriminated on its face,"' 372 thus weakening the presumption favoring constitutionality. The exceptions undermined the as-

sumption that the "[s]tate's own political processes will act as a check
on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce. 3 73
Moreover, the company had presented uncontradicted evidence that
the regulation made no contribution to highway safety. 374 Justice Powell weighed the costs and benefits with some specificity and invalidated
the regulation as a "substantial burden on the interstate movement of
'37 5
goods.
ConsolidatedFreightways376 involved the constitutional validity of
an Iowa statute that, with significant exceptions, also prohibited the use
of sixty-five-foot double-trailer trucks within the state. 3 77 Iowa, like

Wisconsin in Raymond Motors, sought to justify its regulation as a
safety measure. While the Court recognized that "[tihose who would
challenge . . .bona fide safety regulations must overcome a 'strong
presumption of validity,' ",378 it nevertheless stated that "the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack. ' 37 9 When, as here, the
Brennan and Rehnquist, concurred. They would have placed the burden of persuasion on
the individual challenging constitutionality. "[Ihf safety justifications are not illusory, the
Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with
related burdens on interstate commerce." Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun, for example, would not apply the alternative available means test when dealing
with commerce clause assessments of safety regulations. Id. at 450.
372. Id. at 446-47.
373. Id. at 446.
374. "The State, for its part, virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a
safety measure." Id. at 444.
375. Id. at 445, 447.
376. 450 U.S. 662.
377. As Justice Powell stated for the majority: "This case is Raymond revisited." Id. at
671. Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, dissented. They did
not view Raymond Motors as controlling, id. at 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and would
generally rely on highly restrained judicial review: "A determination that a state law is a
rational safety measure does not end the Commerce Clause inquiry. A 'sensitive consideration' of the safety purpose in relation to the burden on commerce is required. When engaging in such a consideration the Court does not directly compare safety benefits to commerce
costs and strike down the legislation if the latter can be said in some vague sense to 'outweigh' the former. Such an approach would make an empty gesture of the strong presumption of validity accorded state safety measures, particularly those governing highways. It
would also arrogate to this Court functions of forming public policy, functions which, in the
absence of congressional action, were left by the Framers of the Constitution to state legislatures." Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissenters found the evidence
advanced by Iowa in support of its safety purpose persuasive. Id. at 696 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
378. Id. at 670.
379. Id.
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state's safety purpose is "illusory," 380 and the statute contains "several
exemptions that secure to Iowans many of the benefits of large trucks
while shunting to neighboring states many of the costs associated with
their use," 381 ordinary judicial deference is inappropriate. Applying
Level II scrutiny and weighing the evidence in some detail,382 the Court
invalidated the regulation.
In BT Investment Managers,383 a Florida banking statute was invalidated because the Court was "convinced that the disparate treatment of out-of-state bank holding companies cannot be justified as an
incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local concerns." 384 The
state's alleged purposes were "not well-served" by the statute, were
readily achievable by "some intermediate form of regulation" rather
than its chosen prohibition, were tinged with "local parochialism," and
did not "justify the heavily disproportionate burden... [placed] on
385
bank holding companies that operate principally outside the state."
In Clover Leaf,386 the Court scrutinized a Minnesota regulation
380. Id. "In addition the costs of the trucking companies (and, indirectly, of the service
to consumers), Iowa's law may aggravate, rather than ameliorate, the problem of highway
accidents.... Iowa's law tends to increase the number of accidents, and to shift the incidence of them from Iowa to other States." Id. at 674-75.
381. Id. at 676.
382. Id. at 669-79. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred. "For me,
analysis of Commerce Clause challenges to state regulations must take into account three
principles: (1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of
lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation. (2) The burdens imposed on commerce
must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State's
lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel. (3) Protectionist legislation is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are
related to safety rather than economics." Id. at 679-80 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan stated that "Iowa's actual rationale... [was] to discourage interstate truck traffic
on Iowa's highways. Thus, the safety advantages and disadvantages. . . are irrelevant to
the decision." Id. at 681-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). He viewed the regulation as protectionist and would, therefore, have applied Level I scrutiny and invalidated the regulation.
Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring).
383. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
384. Id. at 42. There was evidence that this prohibition, with the strong support of the
Florida financial community, had been enacted in direct response to BT Investment Manager's attempt to enter the state. Id. at 31-32. Despite this evidence of intent, "[t]he principle focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute, since the validity of state
laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable effects." Id. at 37. Viewing the effect
of the statute as erecting an explicit barrier to out-of-state competitors, the Court nevertheless declined to invalidate the regulation on the basis of the per se rule of invalidity promulgated in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 347-49 supra. "We need not decide whether this difference is sufficient to render the
" 447 U.S. at 42.
Florida legislationperse invalid .
385. Id. at 43-44.
386. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). See text accompanying notes 441-45 infra.
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prohibiting the retail sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers. The regulation had been promulgated to promote energy conservation and ease solid waste disposal problems. The
majority, 387 in an opinion by Justice Brennan, relied on Pike balancing
analysis to find that the "relatively minor" 388 burdens on interstate
commerce were outweighed 389 by the ample local benefits created in
support of a "substantial state interest. ' 390 Moreover, the alternative
means of implementation advanced by the creamery were "either more
burdensome on commerce . . . or less likely to be effective. ' 39 1 Relying, at least implicitly, on Level III scrutiny, the Court upheld the
prohibition.
The balancing analysis of Pike has provided the Burger Court
with an opportunity to weigh and balance state regulatory interests
against their impact upon free entry into interstate commerce. The
Court, however, has not specified a consistent level of scrutiny in these
burden on interstate commerce cases, but rather has relied upon a preliminary, case-by-case weighing of the economic right against the regulatory goal to determine the distribution and weight of the burden of
persuasion. The absence of a predetermined level of scrutiny makes
future consistency of analysis difficult to predict.
In addition to its reliance on the commerce clause, the Burger
Court has had two recent occasions to invoke the privileges and immunities clause of article IV to protect the right of interstate entry. The
privileges and immunities clause provides: "[T]he Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States. ' 392 Historically, the Supreme Court has infrequently invoked this provision to determine the constitutionality of state
regulation. 393
387.

Justice Powell concurred. He "would not.

. .

reach the Commerce Clause issue,"

449 U.S. at 475 (Powell, J., concurring), because it had not been decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. For comparable reasons, Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 486 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
388. Id. at 472.
389. "Only if the burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate
purposes does such a [nondiscriminatory] regulation violate the Commerce Clause." Id. at
474.
390. Id. at 473.
391. Id.
392. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.

393. "That Clause is not one the contours of which have been precisely shaped by the
process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation over the years since 1789."
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978). See generally Mullaney v.
Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Hague v. Committee

for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Corfield
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In Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission,394 the Court determined
that the mandates of the privileges and immunities clause were insufficient to invalidate Montana's discriminatory elk hunting license fee
structure, even though the nonresident fee was seven and one-half
times the resident fee. 395 "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and

'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity

'396
must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.
The Court concluded that "[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not
39 7
basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union."

In a dissent joined by Justices White and Marshall, Justice
Brenann objected to the majority's narrow view of privileges and immunities. "I cannot agree that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
so impotent a guarantee that such discrimination remains wholly beyond the purview of that provision." 398 Relying on Toomer v. Witsel 3 99 and Mullaney v. Anderson,4°° he would have applied a Level II
permissible purpose-rationality of relationship test and invalidated the

statute. 4 1
Justice Brennan's Baldwin dissent became the majority position in
v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) (adding "medical services" to the privileges and immunities within the ambit of
the clause).
394. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
395. Appellants also urged that Montana's distinction between residents and nonresidents violated the equal protection clause. Relying on the virtually irrebuttable presumption favoring constitutionality characteristic of Level IV scrutiny, the Court upheld the
classifications. "The legislative choice was an economic means not unreasonably related to
the preservation of a finite resource and a substantial regulatory interest of the State." Id. at
390; see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 814 (1976). For a discussion
of Alexandria Scrap, see text accompanying notes 324-31 supra.
396. 436 U.S. at 383. "When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been applied to
specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a State from imposing unreasonable burdens
on citizens of other States in their pursuit of common callings within the State. . .in the
ownership and disposition of privately held property within the State... and in access to
the courts of the State." Id.
397. Id. at 388.
398. Id. at 394 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
399. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
400. 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
401. "[IThe State could not meet the plaintiffs' privileges and immunities challenge simply by asserting that the discrimination was a rational means for fostering a legitimate state
interest." 436 U.S. at 400 (Brennan, ., dissenting) (quoting 334 U.S. 398 (1948)). "Drawing
from the principles announced in Toomer and Mullaney, a State's discrimination against a
nonresident is permissible where (1) the presence or activity of nonresidents is the source or
cause of the problem or effect with which the State seeks to deal, and (2) the discrimination
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relation to the problem they present." Id.
at 402.
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Hicklin v. Orbeck,4° 2 decided one month later. In a unanimous decision, the Court relied on Level II scrutiny to invalidate an Alaska statute that required residents to be preferred over nonresidents in
employment in the state's oil and gas industry. Again relying on
Toomer and Mullaney, Justice Brennan stated: "[C]ertainly no showing was made on this record that nonresidents were 'a peculiar source
of the evil' [the statute] was enacted to remedy, namely, Alaska's
'uniquely high unemployment.' ",403 The mere preference of residents
was a choice of means that did not "bear a substantial relationship to
the particular 'evil' [the nonresidents] are said to present." 404 Moreover, less intrusive alternative means were available. 4° 5
The commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause
have enabled the Burger Court to confer both constitutional dimension
and protection upon the right of interstate entry. The Court has
broadly defined the right, precluding commerce clause review only
when government has entered the marketplace in its proprietary capacity. Costs to interstate entry and benefits to the local public welfare
have been determined in terms of discriminatory effects as well as burdens on interstate trade. The Court has also established the means by
which it will distribute the burden of persuasion. Perhaps in deference
to the importance of a free, open marketplace to the protection and
enhancement of the nation's general economic welfare, the Court ordinarily has relied on elevated levels of scrutiny. Level I scrutiny is now
used in discrimination cases. Level II generally has been relied upon in
burden cases, although in the presence of more substantial state interests and relatively minor costs to interstate entry, the Court has relied
upon Level III presumptions favoring constitutionality.
The right of interstate entry cases illustrate the Burger Court's active management of its political authority and discretion over regulatory policy. The Justices have narrowed their specification of the
attributes of the right as constitutional property and elevated review of
discriminatory statutes. While subsequent opinions have approved this
increase in the Court's authority, the use of Level I scrutiny in discrimination cases has resulted in a shift away from evidentiary balancing
and towards a more rigid reliance on an evidentiary trigger. Political
discretion has, in part, given way to virtually conclusive presumptions.
402.

437 U.S. 518 (1978).

403. Id. at 526.
404.

Id. at 527.

405.

Id. at 528.
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Market Failures: Externalities
Some time after the cavedwellers began growing corn, an enterprising cavedweller who liked neither hunting nor farming began raising sheep. His sheep grazed in a pasture in the valley. Soon, other cave
dwellers were grazing their sheep in the pasture. The sheep ate well
and multiplied, and began to overgraze the pasture. As the pasture was
owned by the community in common, none of the shepherds had incentive to limit the number of his or her grazing sheep. The benefits of
husbanding the supply of grass could not be personally enjoyed because the other shepherds would continue to overgraze. Recognizing
that there soon would be no grass left, the shepherds agreed to divide
the pasture and provide a means of excluding sheep from one another's
property. Fences were erected; but fences needed mending. The sheep
of one of the shepherds who refused to mend fences, wandered into
neighbors' property and ate the grass. Sometimes the sheep would
wander into the cornfields.
The unfenced pastureland was a common pool resource held for
use by all.406 The right to exclude had not yet been established. Each
shepherd was able to enjoy the personal benefit of overgrazing his or
her sheep without cost. There was no incentive to conserve grass. Nevertheless, each shepherd's use or overuse directly reduced the use and
value of the pasture to the other shepherds. Overgrazing produced external costs. It reduced and eventually would have eliminated the grass
resources of the pastureland. The cave dwellers internalized the costs
of overgrazing when they established exclusion: the private right to
use, consume or exchange pastureland. Both the costs and benefits of
overgrazing were then borne by individual shepherds. If sheep were
permitted to overgraze, the individual shepherd would eventually have
no grass to feed them. If the grass were conserved, however, the sheep
could graze indefinitely. Private costs and benefits and social costs and
406. "A common pool resource is one that is available for everyone's use; Ze., it is characterized by nonexclusion because exclusion of users or limitations of use are not feasible or
legal, but nevertheless one person's use directly reduces the use or value of the common pool
to others. ... The efficient utilization of common pool resources requires collective action
among all users to curtail or ration use to nondestructive levels ... ." R. BISH & H.
NouRsE, URBAN ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS 119-20 (1975); see also Demsetz, Towarda Theory ofropert Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967), reprintedinTHE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 23 (H. Manne ed. 1975); Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprintedinECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY
LAw 2 (B.A. Ackerman ed. 1975). The fable of the cave dwellers as shepherds and the
accompanying political economic analysis closely follows the analysis and examples in Professor Demsetz's Article.
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benefits were no longer divergent. Then, however, a new form of externality arose. With fences unmended, sheep wandered. Shepherds were
no longer assured that they would enjoy the future benefits of their
conserved resources. Actions or inactions taken by their neighbors
could impinge upon those expectations and diminish the value of their
40 7
property.
The management of common pool resources by regulation has
been the subject of scrutiny in three substantive due process cases and
one equal protection case. Neighborhood externalities, as treated in
zoning ordinances, have been examined in three cases involving procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive due process.
These externalities cases reveal the Court's business regulation analysis
at its least substantively manageable. The Court, however, has generally relied on Level IV presumptions to restrain its discretion. The
willingness to use Level II presumptions in an unfocused substantive
due process case, however, illustrates the Burger Court's maximum exercise of judicial discretion and extension of its political authority.
Regulation of Common Pool Resources
The due process clause of the fifth amendment states: "No person
shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. ' 40 8 The Burger Court has relied on it to resolve conflicts between
private economic interests and the public welfare arising from the management of common pool resources. As the federal analogue of fourteenth amendment due process limitations on state action, the fifth
amendment due process clause restrains congressional legislation. Its
substantive standards of review similarly have suffered from ambiguity.
While the Court has followed the permissible purpose-rationality of relationship model, the regulatory costs and benefits open to scrutiny
have been chosen on an ad hoc basis.
The Burger Court has relied on fifth amendment substantive due
process in two cases involving insurance funds to which both the federal government and the affected private industries have contributed:
407. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also
ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 6, at 253-54; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 11, at 50;
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979); Kelman, Consumption
Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669
(1979); Wolf, A Theory ofNon-Market Failure: Framework/orImplementation Analysis, 22
J.L. & ECON. 107 (1979). The problem of unmended fences closely parallels Professor
Coase's analysis.
408. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Usery v. TurnerElkhorn Mining Company40 9 and Duke Power Company
v. CarolinaEnvironmentalStudy Group, Inc. 410 Fifth amendment sub-

stantive due process and equal protection were used in Hodel v. Indiana
(Hodel11)411 to examine sections of environmentally-motivated federal

regulations of strip mining. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Company,41 2 fourteenth amendment equal protection was relied upon

to assess an environmental regulation banning disposable plastic milk
containers. All four cases involved the use of Level IV virtually ir-

rebuttable presumptions and upheld regulations designed to ration resources held in common.
In TurnerElkhorn,4 13 a federal statute required that former as well

as present miners be compensated for death or disability due to black
lung disease. Coal mine operators alleged that the statute violated due
process4 in
two principal respects:414 the retroactive liability to former
15
miners

and the inability to pass the costs of compensation on to con-

sumers. 416 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the majority used a virtually irrebuttable presumption favoring constitutionality. 417 The
imposition of retroactive liability was per se supported by constitutional precedent 4l8 and was "justified as a rational measure to spread
the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
4 19
the fruits of their labor--the operators and the coal consumers."

Whether those costs could, as a practical matter, be passed on to the
consumer was "not a question of constitutional dimension." 420 The
majority was unwilling to assess the wisdom of the congressional
409. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
410. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
411. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). See text accompanying notes 430-35 infra.
412. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). See text accompanying notes 441-45.
413. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
414. The mine operators also challenged a series of rebuttable and irrebuttable evidentiary presumptions relied upon in the statutes. 428 U.S. at 10-12.
415. Id. at 15.
416. "[IThe Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent them from effectively
passing on to the consumer the costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities, and
will unfairly leave a burden on the early operators alone." Id. at 18.
417. Id. at 15.
418. "[O]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of
the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts." Id. at 16. But see
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). For.a discussion of Spannaus,
see text accompanying notes 112-23 supra.
419. 428 U.S. at 18. In addition, the Court noted that "a substantial portion of the burden for disabilities stemming from the period prior to enactment is borne by the Federal
government." Id.
420. Id. at 19.
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judgment. 4 2 1
In Duke Power,422 the Court considered the constitutionality of
regulations that limited aggregate tort liability for a single accident at a
nuclear power plant. 423 Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority
opinion. Relying on Turner Elkhorn for his standards of review and
Level IV scrutiny, 4 24 he nevertheless examined the merits of the substantive due process issues with some specificity. 42 5 Recognizing that
the congressional decision to limit liability to $560,000,000 was "based
on imponderables" and was therefore "arbitrary, ' 426 he determined
421. Justice Powell, concurring, seriously questioned both "[tihe rationality of retrospective liability as a cost-spreading device," and "the Court's view that the costs now imposed
by the Act may be passed on to consumers." Id. at 42 (Powell, J., concurring). Despite his
reluctance to agree with the majority's conclusion on these matters, he nevertheless felt constrained to concur in thejudgment. "Congress had broad discretion in formulating a state to
deal with the serious problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. Nor does the
Constitution require that legislation on economic matters be compatible with sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a result, economic and remedial social enactments
carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the operators had the heavy burden of
showing the Act to be unconstitutional." Id. at 44.
422. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
423. The Price-Anderson Act provided for maximum liability of $560,000,000 for damages in the event of a nuclear incident. In the event that a nuclear accident resulted in
damages in excess of the $560,000,000 limitation, "'the Congress will thoroughly review the
particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to
protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude.'" 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(e) (Supp. V 1970), quoted in 438 U.S. at 66-67.
424. "The liability-limitation provision thus emerges as a classic example of an economic regulation-a legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life. . .It is by now well-established that [such] legislative Acts. . .come
to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way.'" 438 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). For a discussion of Turner Elkhorn, see text accompanying notes 414-21
supra.
425. The Court was presented with three substantive due process assertions. First,
"'[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential losses.'" Second, "'[the
Act tends to encourage irresponsibility in matters of safety and environmental protection
'" Third,
.
"'[t]here is no quidpro quo' for the liability limitations." Id. at 82.
Appellees had also urged that the legislation violated the equal protection clause "because the Act 'places the cost of [nuclear power] on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society,
those injured by nuclear catastrophe.'" Id. at 82. The Court dismissed the equal protection
issues in a perfunctory manner. "The general rationality of the Price-Anderson Act liability
limitations-particularly with reference to the important congressional purpose of encouraging private participation in the exploitation of nuclear energy-is ample justification for the
difference in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries
are derived from other causes. Speculation regarding other arrangements that might be used
to spread the risk of liability in ways different from the Price-Anderson Act is, of course, not
pertinent to the equal protection analysis." 1d. at 93-94.
426. Id. at 86.
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that it was not, however, "the kind of arbitrariness which flaws other-

wise constitutional action. '427 The contention that the liability ceiling
would encourage irresponsible conduct by nuclear licensees similarly
could not "withstand careful scrutiny." 4 28 Congress had imposed stringent licensing requirements, and the "risk of financial loss and possible

bankruptcy to the utility" 429 was a substantial inducement to the exercise of due care. Moreover, it was not clear that the due process clause

required "that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute
431
remedy." 430 This common law expectation was not a property right.
Destroying the expectation did not leave "the potential victims of a
nuclear disaster in a more disadvantageous position than they would be
in if left to their common-law remedies-not known in modem times
'432
for either their speed or economy.
In Hodel J1,433 the Court upheld those provisions of the federal

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act that allowed variances
from its steep-slope reclamation requirements, but failed to allow a
comparable variance from its prime farmland reclamation standards.
The district court had held that this disparity in treatment amounted to

impermissible geographic discrimination against the Midwestern states
and coal mine operators under the fifth amendment's equal protection

mandates, and to arbitrary, irrational, and capricious regulation under
427. Id. "When appraised in terms of both the extremely remote possibility of an accident where liability would exceed the limitation and Congress' now statutory commitment
to 'take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the
consequences of' any such disaster, we hold the congressional decision to fix a $560 million
ceiling, at this stage in the private development and production of electric energy by nuclear
power, to be within permissible limits and not violative of due process." Id. at 86-87 (footnote omitted).
428. Id. at 87.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 88.
431. "Our cases have clearly established that '[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.' The 'Constitution does not forbid the creation of
new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object,' despite the fact that 'otherwise settled expectations' may be upset
thereby." Id. at 88 n.32.
Justice Stewart concurred in the result. He stated that property rights of constitutional
dimension were implicated in the litigation: "One of those property rights, and perhaps the
sole cognizable one, is a state-created right to recover full compensation for tort injuries.
The Act impinges on that right by limiting recovery in major accidents." Id. at 94 (Stewart,
J., concurring in result). He also stated, however, that the issues were not ripe for adjudication and that the appellees lacked standing to sue: "[Tihere has never been such an accident,
and it is sheer speculation that one will ever occur." Id. at 95.
432. 101 S.Ct. 2376 (1981).
433. Id. at 92.
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its substantive due process manifestations. 434 The Court disagreed.
4 36
Relying on Level IV scrutiny, 435 Justice Marshall, for the majority,
stated: "A claim of arbitrariness cannot rest solely on a statute's lack of
uniform geographic impact. ' 437 Moreover, the Court remonstrated the
district court for "act[ing] as a superlegislature 438 and "substitut[ing]
' 439
its policy judgment for that of Congress.
In Clover Leaf,44° the creamery pressed only limited fourteenth
amendment equal protection claims against Minnesota's disposable
plastic milk container prohibition. It conceded the applicability of the
"rational basis" test and the legitimacy of the state's environmental
purposes. 44 1 It contested only the rationality of relationship between
that purpose and the classifications chosen to implement it. While the
Court examined the four justifications advanced by the state in support
of its classification, 442 its choice of Level IV scrutiny required that "[i]f
any one of the four substantiates the State's claim, we must. . . sustain
the Act." 443 Moreover, if any of the state's justification of rationality
"is at least debatable," 4 " the challenged regulation is constitutional:
434. 101 S. Ct. 2386.
435. "Social and economic legislation like the Surface Mining Act that does not employ
suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. Moreover, such legislation carries with it a presumption of rationality that can
only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. As the Court explained in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979), social and economic legislation is valid
unless 'the varying treatment of different groups and persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the
legislature's actions were irrational.' This is a heavy burden, and appellees have not carried
it." Id.
436. The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, relying upon their opinions in Hodel I,
concurred.
437. Justice Marshall stated: "Nor does the Commerce Clause impose requirements of
geographic uniformity .

. .

. Congress may devise

. . .

a national policy with due regard

for the varying and fluctuating interests of different regions." 101 S. Ct. 2387 (quoting Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950)). Congress,
aware of those varying geographical conditions, "presumably concluded that allowing variances from the prime farmland provisions would undermine the effort to preserve the productivity of such lands." 101 S. Ct. at 2387.
438. 101 S. Ct. at 2387.
439. Id.
440. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
441. Id at 461-62.
442. Id. at 465-70.
443. Id. at 465. Justice Stevens dissented, stating that the Court was overstepping the
bounds of its authority when it chose to review "the Minnesota courts' perception of their
role in the State's lawmaking process." Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
444. Id. at 464. "This Court has made clear that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils
at the same time or in the same way,' and that a legislature 'may implement [its] program
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"Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably support-

ing the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was

mistaken."445

These four common pool resources cases reveal the Burger Court
eliminating the risk of judicial overreaching by relying upon Level IV

virtually irrebuttable presumptions in favor of constitutionality. Substantive due process, however, continues to provide individuals with a

variety of potential complaints against constitutionality.
Regulation of Externalities

The government has regulated externalities among neighboring
property owners in many ways. The common law of nuisance, for example, was the traditional means by which the government prevented
the use of real property harmful to neighboring lands. 44 6 When nui-

sance law proved insufficiently responsive to industrialization and urbanization, it was superseded by prospective legislative determinations
of the permissible uses of property, principally zoning. Zoning prevents harmful and promotes beneficial land uses by distributing costs
and benefits among the landowner, neighbors, and the community at

large.
Zoning was first measured against constitutional standards during
the heyday of substantive due process. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Really Company,447 the Court relied upon Level III scrutiny" 8 to give

constitutional sanction to regulations that not only internalized nuisance costs but also required private property owners to contribute affirmatively to the public welfare. 449 Since Village of Euclid, zoning has
step by step,. . . adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and
deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.... .' Whether infact the
Act will promote more environmentally desirable milk packaging is not the question: the
Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could
rationallyhave decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater
use of environmentally desirable alternatives." Id. at 466. (Emphasis in original).
445. Id. at 464.
446. See note 70 supra.
447. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Subsequent zoning cases decided by the Court during the
heyday of substantive due process include Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
448. "[Blefore [a zoning] ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be shown
to be] clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." 272 U.S. at 395.
449. "Here, however, the exclusion is in general terms of all industrial establishments,
and it may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded,
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received little scrutiny by the Supreme Court. 450
The Burger Court has rendered three zoning decisions: 451 City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,4 52 Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,453 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland.454 In Eastlake, the

Court relied upon Level III scrutiny to uphold a city charter provision
that required referendum approval of rezonings against a procedural
due process challenge. In Belle Terre, equal protection analysis at
Level IV was used to uphold an ordinance restricting occupancy of single-family dwellings to related individuals, but to not more than two
unrelated individuals. In Moore, Level II substantive due process analysis was invoked to invalidate an ordinance that precluded some related individuals from occupying a single-family home. The diversity
of these opinions shows the Court's political authority over regulatory
policy at its least manageable. The "right to externalize" has been an
economic interest in search of both a constitutional vehicle and an appropriate level of scrutiny.
The issue in Eastlake45 5 was whether a property owner was denied
due process by a city charter requirement that proposed zoning changes
be approved by referendum. For the majority, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that property rights did not include reasonable expectations
that a zoning classification could be changed. "No existing rights are
being impaired; new use rights are being sought from the City Council."'456 The referendum was neither an unconstitutional delegation of
but those which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the same fate. . . . The
inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not put upon a law,
otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity. Such laws may also find their justification in the
fact that, in some fields, the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two
are not capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms of legislation. In the
light of these considerations, we are not prepared to say that the end in view was not sufficient to justify the general rule of the ordinance, although some industries of an innocent
character might fall within the proscribed class. It can not be said that the ordinance in this
respect 'passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.'"
Id. at 388-89.
450. See note 447 supra.
451. See also County Board of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Valtierra involved racial issues. See note 3 .rupra. Arlington County was apercuriam opinion involving equal protection analysis at Level IV scrutiny of a zoning ordinance prohibiting automobile commuters from parking in designated
residential neighborhoods.
452. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
453. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
454. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
455. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
456. Id. at 679 n.13. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan in dissent, stated that
property rights of constitutional significance had been impaired. "The expectancy that par-
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legislative power 457 nor an unconstitutional failure to specify standards
and criteria to guide the public's decision. 458 The majority determined
that the principal issue was "whether the zoning restriction produces
arbitrary and capricious results." 459 As the developer had not raised
these substantive issues, the Court had little difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of the referendum requirement.
In Belle Terre,46° the Court used equal protection analysis to scrutinize a zoning ordinance that precluded more than two unrelated individuals from living in a single-family home. Six unrelated college
students challenged the ordinance's constitutionality, contending that it
abridged many of their personal constitutional rights. 461 The majority,
in an opinion by Justice Douglas, rejected their claims. 462 "We deal
[here] with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of
the Equal Protection Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary,'
ticular changes consistent with the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on their
merits is a normal incident of property ownership .... [Tihe opportunity to apply for an
amendment [to the zoning ordinance] is an aspect of property ownership protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 682-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
457. "A referendum cannot. .. be characterized as a delegation of power. . . . [The
people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise
be assigned to the legislature." Id. at 672.
The dissenters, including Justice Powell in a separate opinion, stated that the issues
involved procedural rather than substantive due process: "The fact that an individual owner
(like any other petitioner or plaintiff) may not have a legal right to the relief he seeks does
not mean that he has no right to fair procedure in the consideration of the merits of his
dissenting).
application." Id. at 682 (Stevens, J.,
458. Such guidance is unnecessary when an exercise of regulatory authority is "reserved
by the people to themselves." Id. at 675. Earlier cases, invalidating the delegation of zoning
authority "to a narrow segment of the community, not to the people at large," were distinguished as such. Id. at 677 (emphasis in original). See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226
U.S. 137 (1912) (invalidating an ordinance conferring power to establish building setback
lines on owners of two-thirds of the property abutting a street); Washington v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928) (invalidating an ordinance conferring the power to prevent development of
philanthropic homes for the aged on the owners of two-thirds of the property within four
hundred feet of the proposed facility).
459. Id. at 675 n.10.
460. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
461. "The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: that it interferes with a
person's right to travel; that it interferes with the right to migrate... to the present residents; that it expresses the social preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them; that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of government; that the
restriction of those whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomers' rights of
privacy; that it is of no rightful concern to villagers whether the residents are married or
unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation's experience, ideology, and selfperception as an open, egalitarian and integrated society." Id. at 7.
462. Id. at 7-8.
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and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.' ",463
The Court thus invoked a Level IV virtually irrebuttable presumption
464
favoring constitutionality to endorse the regulation.
466
In foore,465 an ordinance, similar to that upheld in Belle Terre,
restricted the occupation of a single-family home to specified categories
of related individuals. Mrs. Moore was charged with violating the or-

dinance by living with her sons and two grandsons. The two grandsons
were cousins, not brothers. The Justices divided principally over the
importance of the right in issue. These divisions were most apparent in
Justice Powell's plurality opinion 467 and Justice White's dissenting
463. Id. at 8.
Justice Marshall dissented. He agreed with the majority that economic rights are of
limited constitutional significance and that the purposes served by the ordinance were permissible. When, however, fundamental interests such as the students' right of association
and privacy are implicated, he would rely on the Level I virtually irrebuttable presumption
against constitutionality and invalidate the statute. "Because I believe that this zoning ordinance creates a classification which impinges upon fundamental personal rights, it can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary
to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. And, once it be determined a
burden has been placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no less
intrusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and the challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seeking to justify the burden." 1d. at 18.
464. Justice Douglas, for the majority, gave zoning an extremely expansive regulatory
scope: "A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . .The police power
is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 1d. at 9; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 3233 (1954). Judicial deference extended to the legislative judgment in specifying its classifying traits: "[E]very line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been
included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function." 416
U.S. at 8.
465. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
466. The city argued that East Cleveland's ordinance regulated occupancy of a single
dwelling unit as in Belle Terre and so should be upheld. In a plurality opinion, Justice
Powell distinguished Belle Terre because "[t]he ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly allowed all who were related by 'blood, adoption, or marriage' to live
together, and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to note that it promoted 'family
needs' and 'family values.' East Cleveland, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy
of its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself. . . . On its face it selects certain
categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not." 431 U.S. at
498-99 (emphasis in original).
Dissenting, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist viewed Belle Terre as controlling. Since the
Court had there rejected the argument that the ordinance contravened protected rights of
privacy or association, it established binding precedent that the Court must follow in Moore.
Id. at 534-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
467. Justice Stevens, concurring, stated that "the right of a property owner to determine
the internal composition of his household" is a "basic property right." Id. at 518-19. "mhe
critical question presented by this case is whether East Cleveland's housing ordinance is a
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468

opinion.
To Justice Powell, Mrs. Moore and her family possessed a right of
constitutional importance: the right to live together. Level II scrutiny 469 was predicated upon a "careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society.' "470 Justice Powell recognized the risks of the abuse of judicial
discretion in coupling these vague standards of substantive due process
review with heightened scrutiny.471 While the city's goals were legitimate, "the ordinance before us serves them marginally, at best.

.

.[It]

has but a tenuous relation to alleviation of the conditions mentioned by
the city."'472 At Level II scrutiny, this "marginal" and "tenuous" relationship between means and ends was insufficient to support
constitutionality.
In dissent, Justice White agreed that Mrs. Moore and her family
permissible restriction on appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit. Long
before the original States adopted the Constitution, the common law protected an owner's
right to decide how best to use his own property. .. . [Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.] vastly
diminished the rights of individual property owners. It did not, however, totally extinguish
those rights. On the contrary, that case expressly recognized that the broad zoning power
must be exercised within constitutional limits." Id. at 513-14.
468. See notes 473-76 infra.
469. "When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family... the usual judi[Tihis Court must examine carefully
cial deference to the legislature is inappropriate ....
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation." 431 U.S. at 499.
In their concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that the regulatory
infringement of family rights justified heightened analysis: "[Tihe zoning power is not a
license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply
into private areas of protected family life. . . . The plurality's opinion conclusively demonstrates that classifying family patterns in this eccentric way is not a rational means of achieving the ends East Cleveland claims for its ordinance ... . The Constitution cannot be
interpreted... to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living." Id. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting, agreed that family rights had been intruded
upon, but rejected the application ofheightened scrutiny under the due process clause. Such
scrutiny should be utilized only "in those rare cases in which the personal interests at issue
have been deemed 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 537 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), quoting, in turn, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). To use it here would "extend the limited substantive contours of the Due Process
Clause beyond recognition." Id.
470. 431 U.S. at 503.
471. "Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There
are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties
without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of
the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this
Court." Id. at 502.
472. Id. at 500.
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had rights of constitutional dimension. 473 He would, however, have

limited the availability of heightened scrutiny only to those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, ' 4 7 4 that is, explicitly protected
constitutional rights. By granting the family rights in issue constitutional importance, the Court "unavoidably pre-empts for itself another
part of the governance of the country without express constitutional
authority." 47 5 As the "teachings of history" 47 6 were too ambiguous to
provide the Court with sufficient guidance in the exercise of Level II
substantive due process scrutiny, he would have relied on Level IV vir-

tually irrebuttable presumptions favoring constitutionality to uphold
the statute.

477

473. Id. at 550.
474. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). "I cannot believe that the interest in residing with
more than one set of grandchildren is one that calls for any kind of heightened protection
under the Due Process Clause. . . . The present claim is hardly one of which it could be
said that 'neither liberty, nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.'" Id. (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)). In this regard, he was in complete agreement with
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. See note 469 supra.
475. Id at 544. "The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the
present construction of the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms,
as well as on the anticipation of the Framers, and that much of the underpinning for the
broad, substantive application of the Clause disappeared in the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary in the 1930's and 1940's, the Court should be extremely reluctant to
breathe still further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down
legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare." Id.
476. "What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable; which of them
deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable. The [plurality's]
view would broaden enormously the horizons of the Clause; and, if the interest involved
here is any measure of what the States would be forbidden to regulate, the courts would be
substantively weighing and very likely invalidating a wide range of measures that Congress
and State legislatures think appropriate to respond to a changing economic and social order." Id. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting).
In the plurality opinion, Justice Powell responded: 'To the contrary, an approach
grounded in history imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any
based on the abstract formula taken from Palko v. Connecticut and apparently suggested an
an alternative." Id. at 504 n.12.
477. Justice White listed three potential standards of review, each differing in the severity of review and the degree of protection offered to the individual. First, a court may
merely assure itself that there is in fact a duly enacted law which proscribes the conduct
sought to be prevented or sanctioned. Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting).
The second standard of substantive review involves the legitimacy and rationality of
relationship test: 'This means-end test appears to require that any statute restrictive of liberty have an ascertainable purpose and represent a rational means to achieve that purpose,
whatever the nature of the liberty interest involved. This approach was part of the substantive due process doctrine prevalent earlier in the century, and it made serious inroads on the
presumption of constitutionality supposedly accorded to state and federal legislation. But
with Nebbia v. New York, and other cases of the 1930's and 1940's such as West Coast Hotel
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The Burger Court's market failure business regulation cases

demonstrate the risks of -unfocused standards of review, particularly
when coupled with heightened scrutiny. The standards of review are
too often substantively inconsistent, and lead to unpredictable results.

Nonetheless, only through the flexibility of varying standards of review
can the Court protect interests, such as that of Mrs. Moore, that would

otherwise not receive constitutional protection.
Conclusion
This Article has described and evaluated the methods used by the

Burger Court to assess the constitutionality of business regulations.
The Justices have relied on the nature and importance of the property

right in issue to ensure the manageability and consistency of their analysis of constitutionality. The nature of the right has determined the

availability and substantive standards of constitutional review, while
the importance of the right has determined the distribution and weight
of the burden of persuasion. Thus, nature and importance have been

the Burger Court's principal analytical variables for articulating the
constitutional values that inform its business regulation analysis.
Through the use of these variables, the Court has both revived its anal-

ysis of constitutionality and restrained its exercise of judicial discretion.
The attributes of constitutional property have been described and

categorized herein in terms of contemporary political economic theory.
Constitutional review has been available only to some private economic interests or expectations. In general, the Burger Court's definition of constitutional property has included: 1) the right to use,
Co. v. Parrish,the courts came to demand far less from and to accord far more deference to
legislative judgments. This was particularly true with respect to legislation seeking to control or regulate the economic life of the State or Nation. Even so, 'while the legislative
judgment on economic and business matters is "well-nigh conclusive... ," it is not beyond
judicial inquiry.' No case that I know of, including Ferguson v. Skrupa, has announced that
there is some legislation with respect to which there no longer exists a means-end test as a
matter of substantive due process law. This is not surprising, for otherwise a protected liberty could be infringed by a law having no purpose or utility whatsoever. Of course, the
current approach is to deal more gingerly with a state statute and to insist that the challenger
bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality; and there is a broad category of
cases in which substantive review is indeed mild and very similar to the original thought of
Munn v. llinoir that 'if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation,' it
passes its initial test." Id. at 547-48.
Justice White's third heightened scrutiny standard "require[s] that infringing legislation
be given closer judicial scrutiny, not only with respect to existence of a purpose and the
means employed, but also with respect to the importance of the purpose relative to the invaded interest." Id. at 548. Justice White did not include Mrs. Moore's interest among
them. He therefore applied Level IV deferential analysis.
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consume, and exchange resources when such use does not merely involve expectations of future gain and does not injure the property
rights of others; 2) vested reliance interests; 3) the right to send and
receive truthful information about the availability, quality, and price of
goods and services legally offered for sale; 4) the right to compete and
the right to remain a competitor when in compliance with license requirements imposed to protect the general welfare; 5) the right to enter
into interstate competition unless the regulatory burden has been imposed by a proprietary regulation; 6) the right to an equitable rationing
of resources held in common; and 7) some right to impose neighborhood externalities.
The Burger Court's specification of property's constitutional attributes indicates active judicial management as well as analytical restraint. The dimensions of constitutional review have been both
expanded and contracted. The broad definition of the contract clause
reliance interest and the inclusion of commercial speech within the ambit of first amendment protection have added significantly to the
breadth of judicial review. The exclusion of proprietary regulations
from commerce clause scrutiny has narrowed its breadth, as has the
apparent limitation of entry rights to those expressly stipulated in state
law and licenses. Substantive due process has continued to provide individuals with an opportunity to seek to establish constitutional dimension for economic interests not otherwise mentioned in the
Constitution.
The Court's management of the breadth of its review has shown
marked awareness of the virtues of doctrinal predictablity. Having
once established that truthful speech proposing a commercial transaction constitutes a right of first amendment dimension, for example, the
Court has consistently relied on that definition in its subsequent decisions. Proprietary regulations were left to the internal disciplines of
legislative discretion and the invisible hand of competition in 1976 and
again in 1980. This doctrinal predictability has served to restrain the
breadth of the Court's political authority over regulatory policy.
The nature of the constitutional property right sought to be protected has also determined the Court's choice of the substantive standard of review. The Court has used the nature of the right seeking
protection to identify the regulatory costs and benefits to be considered
in its permissible purpose-rationality of relationship review. Alleged
regulatory injury to particular attributes of constitutional property has
triggered particular substantive standards for weighing and balancing
the evidence of costs and benefits on its constitutional merits. In-
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dependent analysis of the legitimacy or importance of the public purpose underlying a regulation has been infrequent. Instead, the Court
has emphasized the ability of the legislative means of implementation
to achieve the desired public goals, without producing either an excess
of regulatory costs over benefits or their disproportionate distribution.
Means analysis has also frequently involved an assessment of the availability of alternative, less intrusive means of accomplishing the desired
public welfare goal.
Under the just compensation and contract clauses, the Court has
weighed and balanced the costs of uncertainty in legal stipulations of
property rights and the enforcement of legally stipulated exchanges
against society's need to maintain the responsiveness of its regulations.
The disproportionate distribution of taking issue costs and benefits has
been assessed in terms of physical invasion, diminution in value, and
reciprocity of advantage. Vested contract clause reliance interests in
private agreements have been protected from retroactive regulations
that produce immediate, irrevocable, and severe costs.
The costs and benefits arising from the regulation of the free flow
of commercial information, as measured under the first amendment,
have involved the risks of deception, the time, place, and manner of
communication, and the suppression of content. The substantive constitutional values for reviewing content-based prohibitions of advertising have yet to be articulated with specificity. Nevertheless, the Court's
most recent opinions suggest the use of permissible purpose-rationality
of relationship, alternative available means analysis.
The fourteenth amendment and commerce clause have provided
the Court with its principal vehicles for identifying the costs and benefits of regulating rights of entry. Costs to the right to compete as articulated under due process and equal protection standards have been
balanced against the public benefits of limiting entry to qualified competitors. In the right-to-remain-a-competitor cases, procedural due
process standards, examining the timing and evidentiary components
of both presuspension and postsuspension hearings, have balanced the
costs to an individual denied the continued possession of a license
against the public benefits of promptly removing from the marketplace
competitors who no longer fulfill regulatory requirements. The right of
interstate entry has generated two degrees of substantive, evidentiary
scrutiny. When a regulation discriminates, either overtly blocking the
flow of interstate traffic or placing interstate business at a competitive
disadvantage with regard to local counterparts, it has been strictly examined by the Court. When the regulation merely burdens interstate
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commerce, however, the Court has relied on permissible purpose-rationality of relationship-alternative available means balancing to determine whether the regulatory costs to an open national marketplace
outweigh local benefits or have been disproportionately distributed
among interstate and intrastate economic activities.
When protection has been sought for "market failure" rights, the
Court has used ad hoc fifth and fourteenth amendment substantive
standards of review. Due process and equal protection have not provided substantive, evidentiary focus. The Court has inadequately identified the regulatory costs and benefits subject to judicial balancing.
Nevertheless, flexibility in the substantive content of due process has
permitted the balancing of costs and benefits generated by regulation
that reflect traditional values of social importance.
Consistency and predictability in the Burger Court's management
of its substantive standards of review have been difficult to generalize.
Nevertheless, the Court has shown knowing restraint in its identification of constitutionally relevant regulatory costs and benefits. It has
continually relied on permissible purpose-rationality of relationship
methodology and on specific substantive standards of review. While
the breadth of the Court's stipulation of constitutional costs and benefits has expanded and contracted, the Justices have demonstrated discretionary restraint. The standards of review applicable in protection
of the right to use, consume or exchange and the right of interstate
entry have been true to doctrinal tradition. Contract clause scrutiny
and commercial speech analysis under the first amendment have been
expanded. In contrast, the standards of procedural due process review
of license suspensions have contracted. Substantive due process review
continues to present a significant risk of abuse of political discretion,
particularly as applied in market failure cases.
The importance of the right in issue has generally determined the
depth of the Court's analysis, distributing the burden of persuasion and
the weight of the presumption of constitutionality. Four levels of scrutiny have been relied upon. Level I virtually irrebuttable presumptions
against constitutionality have protected both an alien's equal right to
compete and the right of interstate commerce to be free of the effects of
local discrimination. The virtually irrebuttable presumptions favoring
constitutionality of Level IV scrutiny have been applied in cases involving the right to compete standing alone, proprietary regulations of
interstate commerce, and the rationing of common pool resources. The
Court has most frequently relied upon the Level II rebuttable presumptions against constitutionality. The state has borne the burden of per-

September 1981]

BUSINESS REGULATION

suasion when it desires to regulate the reliance interest or truthful
commercial speech, when it burdens interstate commerce, and when it
discriminates against entry rights on the basis of gender. The state was
also required to prove constitutionality in a market failures zoning case
involving family fights. Level III rebuttable presumptions favoring
constitutionality have dictated the depth of substantive review in taking
clause cases, under commercial speech deception analysis, when the
right to remain a competitor has alleged infringement, and in a rezoning referendum case. The principal changes in the distribution of presumptions have been the elevation of scrutiny in interstate commerce
discrimination cases to Level I and the demotion to Level III of procedural due process scrutiny of the right to remain.
The importance of the right generally has been measured by the
political economic function served by the right in establishing and
maintaining optimum competitive efficiency in the private marketplace
and, when applicable, by its link to a suspect classification or fundamental interest. The Court also has lowered its level of scrutiny when
it perceives that the substantive breadth of its analysis may, without
restraint, permit abuse of discretion. The level of scrutiny was thus
lowered in substantive due process scrutiny of entry cases and, with one
notable exception, in market failure cases. This may also explain the
Court's reliance on Level III scrutiny of taking clause issues.
The Burger Court's reliance on presumptions favoring constitutionality when the breadth of its analysis has been unrestrained by the
nature of the right in issue reflects the awareness of the Justices of the
institutional limits imposed by the separation of powers on their checks
and balances authority. In general, that awareness has resulted in an
evenhanded application of its political discretion over regulatory policy. The Court's determination of the availability, substantive standards, and weight of review have managed that discretion with
reliability and predictability. The Burger Court has avoided both the
abuse and the abdication of judicial discretion that has characterized
much of the constitutional history of economic rights and regulation.
There has, however, been one significant exception to restraint. In
Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland,47 the Court applied heightened Level
II substantive due process scrutiny to protect the right of a grandmother to live with her children and grandchildren. Substantive focus
and the presumption against constitutionality were ostensibly predicated upon the traditional significance of family values in American
478. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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society and also constitutional jurisprudence, a source of dubious reliability. Nevertheless, the Court recognized the risks attendant upon its
unrestrained and unfocused discretion: "Substantive due process has
at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are risks when
the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bil of
Rights. ' 479 Perhaps more eloquently than does methodological consistency, that awareness explains the Court's judicious exercise of its constitutional discretion over regulatory policy. Unlike its predecessors,
the Burger Court has had the lessons of history from which to learn the
costs and benefits of both judicial abuse and abdication. As those lessons are understood with increasing clarity and extended in the evolution of constitutional doctrine, the capacity of the Supreme Court to
articulate society's constitutional, political values in its search to optimize welfare should continue to improve.

479.

Id. at 502.

